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ABSTRACT 
This research clarifies some processes of inclusion and social (re )production within the 
UK higher education system. It constitutes a description of the realisation in practice of 
differential modes of participation in undergraduate classes. The analysis presented here 
foregrounds the interaction between gender, academic discipline and educational 
institution in the production of these differential modes of participation. To do this, the 
thesis conceptualises gender, discipline and institution as relatively stable, relatively 
autonomous discursive fields, in relation to which students are positioned/position 
themselves when they contribute to class discussions. 
The empirical basis of the thesis comprises my observations of four undergraduate 
degree modules. I videoed a series of sessions on Political Thought and American 
Literature modules in a 'new', access oriented university and a 'traditional', highly 
selective university. I interviewed both students and tutors, basing the interview on 
extracts from the observed sessions. 
The opemng chapters present an initial analytic description of the disciplines, the 
institutions and the conception of gender that constitute the relatively stable structures 
in relation to which students position themselves. The description of the disciplines 
constitutes a detailed account of the object, methodology, and thus of the form of 
legitimate knowledge claims in Political Thought in contrast to American Literature. It 
also foregrounds the differential social positioning of the two disciplines. The 
conceptualisation of gender is based on a Lacanian definition of the feminine. 
The later chapters constitute my interpretation of students' positioning in the observed 
sessions. The main argument is that the intersections between discursive fields 
overdetermine the extent to which students can construct a position within the class that 
is both legitimate, in relation to the discipline, and coherent, in relation to the students' 
gender, institutional context and their existing interests and experiences. This analysis 
constitutes an innovative framework for the sociological description of the relationship 
between gender and academic disciplines. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE OBJECT OF STUDY 
1.1. Introduction 
In the context of competing claims about the possible egalitarian effects of the 
expansion in the UK higher education system, this thesis clarifies some of the processes 
by which students may be included or marginalized, and identifies ways in which these 
processes are constituted within, and thus tend to reproduce, pre-existing social 
relations. The very general questions addressed here are: how and whether academic 
disciplines and institutions that might be said to have an explicitly politicised or 
inclusive agenda are indeed, in any sense, more inclusive; and, if there are differences 
between disciplines and institutions in relation to educational inclusion, how do these 
affect the positioning of students within the classroom? 
The object of analysis can be described at several distinct levels. At the highest level of 
abstraction the thesis is an attempt to describe the production of subject positions within 
the social order as a whole. At this level the object of study can be described as the 
relationships between the discursive regulations of different social fields: specifically 
the fields of academic disciplines, higher education institutions and gender. The thesis is 
also a description of the social positioning of academic disciplines, and from this 
perspective its object of study can also be described as the relationship between features 
of academic disciplines and external criteria, such as class and gender. At a more 
concrete level the thesis is a description of educational settings within the UK higher 
education system and the object is constituted in the interactions observed within 
specific classrooms and institutions. 
In the rest of this chapter I set out some concepts that can be used to identify the object 
of study at these different levels. I begin with the most abstract: a description of the 
interaction between social fields, drawing on the conceptual language of Chantal 
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Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau. I then outline previous descriptions of the academic field 
and the interaction between academic, social and economic interests, drawing largely on 
the work of Pierre Bourdieu. I relate some of the issues raised by Bourdieu to my own 
educational biography and use my own experience to identify gaps in Bourdieu's 
account. Bourdieu' s approach is then contrasted with that of Basil Bernstein, who pays 
more attention to the internal structuring of knowledge and how this relates to the 
structuring of the social field. The final section of the chapter begins to move towards a 
more empirical description of the object of study, in an analysis of the distinctions it is 
possible to make between 'old', highly selective and 'new' access oriented institutions 
in the UK higher education system. The chapter as a whole, therefore, moves from a 
highly abstract description of the social field to a more concrete analysis of specific 
types institutions. It is thus structured as a series of different introductions to the object 
of research. 
1.2. The concept of over determination and a relational conception of 
student positions 
The sites that form the empirical object of study are American Literature and Political 
Thought modules on undergraduate degree courses. I observed a series of sessions on 
two American Literature modules and two Political Thought modules, in two 
traditional, highly selective universities and in two 'new', access oriented universities. 
The research design thus enabled me to compare the same discipline in universities with 
different positions in relation to social inclusion, and also to make comparisons across 
disciplines that occupy very different positions in relation to existing power structures. 
American Literature explicitly addresses issues of class, ethnicity and gender within the 
curriculum, and it takes a generally critical approach to the analysis of social 
hierarchies. Political Thought, in contrast, can be described as a normative, rather than a 
descriptive discipline, and as such does not construct a critical analysis of existing 
power structures, but rather seeks to provide an account of justifiable forms of 
government. I participated in a series of at least six sessions on each of the four 
modules. I videoed the sessions and interviewed students and tutors about the 
discussions that I had observed. The central section of each interview was based on 
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extracts from the transcripts of the classes, and the questions were aimed at eliciting the 
views of the participants on the nature of the discipline they were studying, through 
their direct articulation of issues and concepts that had arisen during class discussions. 
The selection of these sites was thus intended to enable the analysis of academic 
disciplines as articulated within contrasting social and educational settings, in order to 
reveal how the discipline and setting each contribute to the positioning of students 
within class discussions. 
Through the analysis of this observational and interview data, the thesis develops a 
relational understanding of student positioning in undergraduate classrooms. The 
analysis foregrounds the interaction between gender, academic discipline and institution 
in the production of positions available to students. To do this, the thesis conceptualises 
gender, discipline and institution as relatively stable, relatively autonomous discursive 
fields in relation to which students are positioned and position themselves, when they 
contribute to class discussions. The resulting student positions can thus be seen as a 
product of the overlap between features of different discursive fields. This 
conceptualisation is framed within a theoretical understanding of society as constituted 
through the overdetermination of social fields and identities. 
There are several distinct sources of the concept of 'overdetermination'. One use of the 
term is more Freudian and one is more Althusserian. Freud's use of the term refers to 
sources of affects in individual human SUbjects. Althusser, in contrast, uses the term to 
explain the nature of change at a socio-historical level. In the original psychoanalytic 
usage, different sources of symptoms of affect are united within the ego's attempt to 
unify the contradictory forces within the individual. Thus, although the sources may be 
derived from distinct events or experiences, the object of their representation in the 
production of any instance of affect is unified (Freud, 1900). This contrasts with 
Althusser's use of the concept, which emphasises the autonomy of different social fields 
in the production of any historical change (Althusser, 1962, see also, J arneson, 1981, 
and Callinicos, 1989, pp. 128 - 132). Althusser explicitly rejects the Hegelian model of 
the dialectic as an 'expressive totality' driven by one 'internal spiritual principle' (p. 
103). These two uses of the concept of overdetermination would appear to operate at 
quite different levels of analysis, the psychic and the socio-historical. However, recent 
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developments within social theory offer a fuller articulation of the relationship between 
the two conceptual levels (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, Mocnik, 1993, Zizek, 1989). 
In each of these recent formulations the concept of overdetermination is based on the 
incompleteness of both SUbjective and social identities: the notion that neither a human 
subject nor a social field is ever fully constituted. Thus, it is not the case that gender, 
discipline and institution can be conceptualised as autonomous, discursive fields that are 
already fully constituted when they interact within a specific historical and social 
context. Rather, the very constitution of Political Thought or American Literature is 
only realisable within a particular institutional context, and in relation to particular 
gendered hierarchies, and therefore neither discipline is ever fully realisable as a 
separate identity. Similarly, the gender of an individual student is always negotiated 
within a particular classroom context, and in relation to a particular disciplinary 
methodology and culture: to attempt to delimit what counts as feminine or masculine 
without reference to the specificities of different contexts is therefore a misleading, 
totalising move. Even the attempt to define multiple femininities, within this 
conceptual framework, is doomed to failure, as Laclau and Mouffe suggest: 
'" the dispersion of subject positions cannot constitute a solution: given that none of them 
manages to consolidate itself as a separate position, there is a game of over determination among 
them that reintroduces the horizon of an impossible totality. (Lac1au and Mouffe, 1985, p. 121-
122) 
However, this move does not belie any form of description or analysis: 'The 
impossibility of an ultimate fixity of meaning implies that there have to be partial 
fixations - otherwise the very flow of differences would be impossible' (ibid, p. 112). 
Such fixity occurs, Laclau and Mouffe suggest, when a set of meanings, such as 
different forms of sexual difference, express a common relation within a specific 
symbolic system: 
'" while it is absolutely correct to question the idea of an original sexual division represented a 
posteriori in social practices, it is also necessary to recognise that overdetermination among the 
diverse sexual differences produces a systematic effect of sexual division. Every construction of 
sexual differences, whatever their multiplicity and heterogeneity, invariably constructs the 
feminine as a pole sub-ordinated to the masculine ... The ensemble of social practices, of 
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institutions and discourses which produce woman as a category, are not completely isolated but 
mutually reinforce and act upon one another. (ibid, p. 117 - 118) 
This suggests that it is possible to understand a multiplicity of social instances in terms 
of a similarity in their symbolic position, which thus overdetermines, and fixes, the 
social divisions instantiated in each separate instance. Alternatively, where a 
contradiction exists between social instances or discursive fields, the effect of 
overdetermination can be to reinforce the fragility or marginality, rather than the fixity, 
of certain terms. This antagonism occurs where 'the presence of the Other prevents me 
from being totally myself (ibid, p. 125). Thus while the dispersal of different 
performances of femininity coincide to overdetermine and fix the meaning of sexual 
difference, in some contexts, specific instances of femininity will be in an antagonistic 
relationship to other discursive practices. This thesis will suggest, for example, that this 
kind of antagonism exists between academic and feminine performances in the 
classroom, where each of these identities can prevent the other from 'being totally 
itself. In instances of both overdetermination and antagonism, meanings are produced 
within the context of a dominant signifying system. Thus it is possible to conceptualise 
subjectivities, or discursive fields as essentially incomplete identities, made meaningful 
but never fully realised within an essentially limited symbolic order. These identities, 
while incomplete and fragile, nevertheless provide a meaningful structure for analysis. 
Within this framework, then, the analysis of data within this thesis can be 
conceptualised as a process with two distinct stages. The first stage sets out the criteria 
by which it is possible to identify institutions, disciplines and gender as meaningful, 
relatively stable discursive fields. While there are generally available criteria for the 
identification of different types of institutions that are sufficient for the analysis 
undertaken here, a specification of criteria for identifying disciplinary and gendered 
positions is more fully articulated within the thesis. The criteria for identification of the 
disciplines are developed though the analysis of the class transcripts, and constitute a 
detailed account of the object, methodology, and thus of the form of legitimate 
knowledge claims in Political Thought in relation to American Literature. The criteria 
for the identification of gender are theoretically, rather than empirically derived, and are 
based on a Lacanian conception of feminine jouissance. The derivation of both sets of 
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criteria within the thesis attempts to maintain a sense of the contingent and incomplete 
nature of the identities that they describe. 
The second stage of the thesis constitutes my interpretation of how students' positioning 
within the observed sessions can be described in relation to the discursive fields of 
institution, disciplines and gender defined in the first stage of the analysis. The 
interpretation reveals how the interaction between these incomplete discursive identities 
overdetermines the in/exclusion of specific students or groups of students. It suggests 
that the contrasting forms of knowledge in the two disciplines have a significant effect 
on the extent to which students can construct a position that is both legitimate, in 
relation to the discipline, and coherent, in relation to their existing interests, experience, 
gender, and educational institution. 
The thesis thus offers a way of describing the positioning of students within higher 
education classrooms, at the same time as offering some insight into the process of 
construction of such descriptions. 
1.3. Bourdieu's description of the academic field 
Bourdieu's analysis of the academic world in Homo Academicus (Bourdieu, 1996) is 
carried out at a very different level to my own work. While my research is based in the 
classroom, his study maps out career paths and curricula changes in the French 
university system as a whole during the 1960s, in the period of initial expansion of 
higher education in France. His observations reveal some of the complex 
interdependencies between disciplines, social class and academic position. At the same 
time, as is typical of Bourdieu's work, he struggles to maintain a sense of the limits of 
his own interpretations. Thus both in explicit subject matter, as a description of 
academic knowledge as a socially situated object, and also in its concurrent exploration 
of the limits of written sociology, Homo Academicus provides a useful context within 
which to situate my own study. More specifically, the limits of the study, when read in 
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relation to my own educational biography, exemplify some of the gaps that my study 
aims to fill. 
Bourdieu suggests that the expansion in higher education has very specific effects on 
the personal struggles for position undertaken by individuals with different class 
origins. The increase in numbers of academic positions resulting from the expansion in 
student numbers simultaneously represents significant shifts in the values and 
hierarchies of the profession. These shifts involve both a lowering in academic 
qualifications of entrants to academic positions, and also an adjustment in the balance of 
power between disciplinary fields. The greatest increase in academic posts in France 
between 1963 and 1967, the period Bourdieu examined, was in the newer disciplines of 
linguistics, psychology and sociology. However, a significant proportion of these new 
posts were in the lower grades, and of the disciplines included in the study, sociology 
and psychology had the highest ratio of assistant lecturers and temporary senior 
lecturers to tenured professors (Bourdieu, 1996, table lib, appendix 2.2). This relative 
subordination of the social sciences, in terms of career progression, is exacerbated, 
Bourdieu suggests, by their disciplinary subordination to the natural sciences resulting 
from 'the rise in natural sciences and scientific values on the cultural stock exchange' 
(Bourdieu, 1996, p. 121). This 'doubly subordinate position' Bourdieu continues, 
explains why the social sciences 'still function as a refuge for bourgeois children with 
fair to middling results' (p. 121). He links the thwarted ambitions of upper middle class 
students to the diverse characteristics of academic sociologists, observing that the 
relatively high proportion of non-normaliens 1 with upper middle class origins in the 
lower grades of academic sociologists (p. 171) and of ex-philosophers in the higher 
grades suggests that sociology is a refuge for low achievers, i.e. those from the upper 
middle classes who wished to be academics but who were not of a calibre to get higher 
status jobs in the canonical disciplines. Thus the lack of job security and disciplinary 
prestige found in the social sciences are frequently combined with the expectations of 
success and social status that are a symptom of a bourgeois upbringing. What ensues is 
a struggle for position within both institutional and disciplinary hierarchies. 
1 'Normalien' refers to graduates of the Ecole Normale Superieur, and is thus a mark of high academic 
achievement. 
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Bourdieu's observations, it should be noted, do not only constitute an objective 
description of the structure of the field, but also offer an insight into the visceral 
emotional effects on participants, struggling to secure and stabilise their own positions: 
... the existence, form and direction of change depend not only on the 'state of the system', i.e. 
the 'repertoire' of possibilities that it offers, but also on the balance of forces between social 
agents who have entirely real interests in the different possibilities available to them as stakes 
and who deploy every sort of strategy to make one set or the other prevail. When we speak of a 
field of position takings, we are insisting that what can be constituted as a system for the sake of 
analysis is not the product of a coherence seeking intention or an objective consensus (even if it 
presupposes unconscious agreement on common principles) but the product and prize of a 
permanent conflict; ... the generative, unifying principle of this 'system' is the struggle ... 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 34) 
Bourdieu describes two effects of this struggle in the context of the French university 
system in the 1960s. Firstly, the relatively low status of sociologists in comparison with 
academics in the more traditional humanities subjects explains their visible and radical 
role in the political movement of May 1968. Those lecturers who found themselves in 
relatively powerless and unstable positions within the university had 'entirely real 
interests' in participating in a movement aimed at the transformation of existing 
hierarchies. While in contrast: 'The violence of the reactions which were provoked, 
among the most traditionalist teachers in the most traditional disciplines, by the 
questioning of the academic institution and of the market whose monopoly it guaranteed 
is strictly commensurate with the dependency of their production on this market' 
(Bourdieu, 1996, p. 126). Secondly, Bourdieu suggests, the disciplinary subordination 
of the social sciences can help to explain the introduction of 'avant-garde' scientific 
vocabularies into the disciplines of the social sciences (p. 121). 
It is in relation to this second effect that Bourdieu suggests that the career and 
disciplinary interests of bourgeois sociologists coincide. The security provided by a 
middle class background affords bourgeois entrants significant privileges within the 
field. These privileges arise indirectly, from the greater willingness of bourgeois 
students to deviate from traditional career and disciplinary paths. Bourdieu argues 'the 
propensity to take risks ... is a function of objective security and the confidence which 
that encourages' (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 109). While the offspring of petty bourgeois and 
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working class families tended to follow traditional routes into teaching, and aimed to 
achieve recognition within canonical fields of study, the offspring of the middle classes 
were more likely to be involved in research (ibid, note 20, p. 316), to align themselves 
with newer, more radical fields of study, and thus to benefit when these more 
fashionable fields began to displace the traditional canonical subjects (ibid, p. 126). 
Bourdieu concludes: 
And thus we can understand the bitterness of ENS and aggregation graduates of petty-bourgeois 
or working class origins who have trusted in once dominant careers and positions, when they 
discover too late, after a series of changes as imperceptible as the intercontinental drift, that their 
investments will be only very partially repaid. (ibid, p. 127) 
What Bourdieu's study demonstrates is that what appears as a coherent system is in fact 
a representation of the conflicting interests of the social agents in the field. His account 
foregrounds the instability of these social agents, engaged in 'permanent conflict' to 
maintain their position. The 'unconscious agreement', in the case of those upper middle 
class students pursuing a career in the expanded university, is that somehow they are 
entitled to the privileged opportunities enjoyed by their parents. This sense of 
entitlement, as well as the financial security provided by their families, determines both 
their political and their disciplinary activity, which in tum contribute to the re-
structuring of the field of the university as a whole. 
Reading Bourdieu's study invites a certain amount of objectification of one's own 
position within the academic field. My selective, and inevitably reductive, account of 
Bourdieu's work foregrounds features that I can relate to my own biography. The risk I 
have incurred in taking four years out of a career to study for this PhD is undoubtedly 
supported by the security of both economic and social position provided by my 
professional, upper middle class parents. Indeed, the fact my career prior to beginning 
my PhD - a haphazard series of jobs, teaching English as a Foreign Language, 
temporary contracts teaching in further education colleges, and leaving my one 
permanent job because I objected to the culture of the institution - was similarly self 
indulgent can be attributed to similar class related factors. This directionless career path 
is open to individuals from less privileged backgrounds than mine, but undoubtedly 
constitutes more of a risk for those lacking the economic, social and cultural capital 
1..+ 
provided for me by my parents. Further, in the light of Bourdieu's analysis, I can re-
interpret some of my frustration and directionless-ness as resulting from the 
unexpectedness of the difficulties I faced both in my undergraduate degree and in my 
later search for work. I would never have been more than inarticulately aware of a 
certain, unconscious, expectation of ease and status, but Bourdieu's explanation of the 
nature and effects of the upper middle class habitus does not sound unconvincing to me. 
I conform to Bourdieu's description not only in terms of career path, but also in my 
disciplinary background. My first degree, in which I didn't do particularly well, was in 
philosophy. I am now training to become a sociologist. An explanation for this 
disciplinary move is provided by Bourdieu in his description of sociology in relation to 
philosophy: 
Sociology: a pretentious discipline ... which situates itself at the top of the hierarchy of the 
sciences, thus challenging philosophy whose ambitions it claims to fulfil but with the rigour of 
science, is also a refuge, but a de luxe refuge allowing all those who wish to flaunt grand 
ambitions in theory, in politics and in political theory the maximum symbolic profit for the 
cheapest educational entry fee. (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 171) 
As a low achieving philosophy student, it is quite plausible to suggest that I was going 
to have to re-position myself in order to re-enter the academic world. It is also true, to 
an extent, that a philosophical training will have more cache in a sociology department 
than in a department of philosophy. My current position, then, can be described as an 
attempt to make the best of both my class and my disciplinary pretensions. 
Bourdieu's explanations are plausible, but they do not present the whole picture. 
Bourdieu's conception of habitus is explicitly not an objective structure, but, rather, an 
attempt to describe the lived, emotional attachments that are associated with the 
experience of such structures2. He describes habitus as 'a means of accounting for the 
2 Bourdieu has also described habitus as closely related to the concept of 'ethos', (Bourdieu, 1993a p. 86), 
however, to conflate the concept with the idea of a limited institutional or class ethos is to miss the point 
of the position of habitus between structure and practice, as the 'infinite yet strictly limited generative 
capacity' that is neither representative of freedom, nor of anyone system, institution or objectified 
structure: 'As an acquired system of generative schemes, the habitus makes possible the free production 
of all the thoughts, perceptions and actions inherent in the particular conditions of its production - and 
only those. Through the habitus, the structure of which it is the product governs practice, not along the 
paths of a mechanical determinism, but within the constraints and limits initially set on its interventions. 
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appearance of objective teleology presented by certain collectivities' (Bourdieu, 1996, 
n. 14, p. 311). Thus his description of the role of class factors and expectations in the 
production of the university field is not intended to be read as a description of the 
effects of deterministic class structures. However, the attempt to describe the habitus 
inevitably objectifies it, and thus the 'appearance' of objectivity is found in statistical or 
sociological attempts to describe the complex factors involved in the decisions and 
struggles of individuals: 
We can hardly formulate the statistical data which reveal a pattern, without running the risk of 
suggesting, through the connotations of ordinary language, a mechanist or fmalist philosophy of 
action, as if it were immanent in things themselves. (ibid, p. 147) 
My own response to Bourdieu's reductive description of 'my' position - as accurate, to 
some extent, but also as lacking in subtlety or insight into the precise processes that I 
have experienced - is thus consistent witb his own assessment of the risks of 
sociological description. 
To some extent, then, this thesis can be seen as my attempt to fill in important details 
that I feel Bourdieu' s account does not recognise. The specific details that my thesis 
explores in more detail than Bourdieu's study are the effects of gender regulations, 
institutional ethos and the internal structure of disciplinary knowledge. In order to do 
this I am engaged in the process of objectification, inherent in all sociological 
description, which, in this case, requires the conceptualisation of these three references 
- gender, discipline and institution - as relatively stable, relatively autonomous 
structures, in relation to which students position themselves when they contribute to 
class discussions. 
This infmite yet strictly limited generative capacity is difficult to understand only so long as one remains 
locked in the usual antinomies - which the concept of the habitus aims to transcend - of determinism and 
freedom, conditioning and creativity, consciousness and the unconscious, or the individual and society. 
Because the habitus is an infInite capacity for generating products - thoughts, perceptions, expressions 
and action - whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production, the 
conditioned and conditional freedom it provides is as remote from the creation of unpredictable novelty as 
it is from simple mechanical reproduction of the original conditioning.' (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 54). 
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1.4. Institutional culture, disciplinary choices and gender: an 
autobiography of the question. 
I think, initially, the idea for this research was a response to my experience as an 
undergraduate at Oxford. I have already said that I was not very successful in my first 
degree. I feel as if I went to university thinking that I would begin to learn something 
important and left university knowing nothing. After I left, I was often slightly nervous 
telling people that I have a degree in philosophy, because they might expect me to know 
something about what various philosophers might have said, and I had no idea at all. 
I'm slightly better now, having done an MA and, almost, a PhD since I left, I've begun 
to fill in some of the gaps, but it's still worrying. What confuses me is both the fact that 
I didn't learn anything at university, and the fact that I did learn some things. Recently I 
found the essays that I wrote for my tutorials on Marxism, and they were fine. They 
weren't brilliant, but they apparently demonstrated some coherent knowledge of the 
subject. It would have amazed and delighted me to know this at the time, since none of 
our essays were ever marked, and I assumed, probably correctly, that few of mine were 
more than passable, crammed as they were with every half digested thing that I knew on 
that week's topic. If you had asked me about Marx's ideas immediately after I left 
university, or even immediately after a tutorial, I don't think I would have been able to 
tell you anything. And I probably knew slightly more about Marx than about most of 
the other things that I studied. 
So, I didn't do well in my first degree. I probably wasn't bright enough and I was 
probably also quite lazy: I don't think I knew how to work. And in general, I am not a 
very good student. Even on my MA course, which I did some years later, my 
performance was very patchy. Nevertheless, the paradoxes, and the pain, of my 
undergraduate experience still confuse me. What had gone on to make me, and many 
other people I knew at college, both so ignorant and so unconfident? I am not going to 
be able to answer that specific question through my research, but my speCUlative 
explanations have informed the construction of the questions that I am investigating. 
There is, for example, something to do with the culture of the university and the 
underlying myths of the Oxford tutorial system. There is the myth that real learning 
must be autonomous, and that any interference in student autonomy is 'spoon-feeding'; 
there is the myth of equality, that the tutorial is a forum for equal debate between tutor 
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and student; and there is the over-riding myth of the superiority of the institution, which 
ensures your participation in the first two myths. These myths can be understood as 
legitimising disorganised and inflexible teaching methods. 
The myth of the autonomy of learning legitimises the lack of any structured exposition 
or explanation within tutorials. In our final term, we were each invited for a five-minute 
meeting with the Master of our college. He asked me for my opinion of the course. I 
said that more guidance on the different option papers would be useful. 'You mean you 
want the tutors to give you the answers', the Master interrupted. 'Oh no,' I said, 'not 
that ... ' I wasn't being disingenuous. The very idea that we might expect any help in our 
learning was taboo. If I had admitted, even to myself, that I wanted to be taught, that 
would have been the final confirmation of my failure. What I had meant, in my 
comment to the Master, was only that it would be helpful to be given more, or some, 
information about the subjects before choosing your option papers. And that in itself 
felt like an admission of failure. Other people, autonomous students, presumably found 
out for themselves, or instinctively knew what the titles of the option papers meant. 
What interests me, is the extent to which it was impossible to speak outside of this 
illogical myth: there was no way to talk about 'guidance', or 'teaching' that did not 
mean, simply, 'giving you the answers'. 
The second myth, the myth of equality, places disproportionate responsibility for what 
happens in a tutorial on the student. Peter Mirfield's account of his teaching at Oxford 
exemplifies this: 
I distinctly recall soon after becoming a Fellow, taking a young woman who left her tutorial 
partner to make all the going. He had the decency to fill the silences for her when I addressed the 
question directly at her. So I decided to take her on her own. Ready for the task, I swore to 
myself that I would not let her off the hook. The question was put, and the silence began. It 
seemed to go on forever. Initially, I kept my nerve, but she was the stronger party, and I ended 
up filling the void. Afterwards, I castigated myself for my own weakness, but, I have come to 
think, with the passage of time, that she was the real loser. Bluntly, there are some who are 
unsuited to the tutorial idea, and there is nothing that can be done about it. (Mirfie1d, 2001, p. 38 
-39) 
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Amazingly, Mirfield, a fellow of the university, employed to teach Economics to this 
female student, does not merely describe his student as an equal, but as 'the stronger 
party' in what he appears to perceive as a battle for control of the tutorial session. The 
myth of equality is the myth that the student can, in two and a half days, research a new 
topic adequately to write an essay and then defend it in discussion with the tutor. This 
myth fetishises 'innate intelligence' and ignores the role of contextual knowledge in 
developing an argument. The frequent result, in my experience, is that the student is 
either completely silent, as in Mirfield's example, and as such is responsible for the 
failure of the session, or else the student talks off the top of their head, desperate to 
justify their presence by demonstrating their 'innate ability', and so bullshits their way 
through the necessary hour. Both of these strategies are the last resorts of a novice 
required to pretend to be equal to their master. 
The final myth, the myth of superiority, not only traps you into accepting the other 
myths, it is also used as another excuse for avoiding supporting students. When I was 
struggling to understand Political Theory at the beginning of my second year I finally 
went to my tutor to ask for help. 'I could see you were unhappy', my tutor said kindly, 
'but don't worry. I do really think you are intelligent. I remember being impressed by 
you at your interview. If you don't do well here, I think you will do well at some point 
later in your life.' This did not offer me any re-assurance or support with my current 
difficulties. It appears that my tutor's concern was not that his students might not learn 
but that the selection processes had been effective: that students from Balliol were 
indeed inherently, 'effortlessly', superior, to students at other institutions. Even if this 
superiority did not show in their academic performance. Balliol, it could be argued, is 
here positioned not as an educational establishment, but as a quality assurance label for 
a political and social elite. I would justify my label not by my academic performance 
while I was at college, but by my successful performance in my career after I had left. 
In addition to the pedagogic myths of my university, I would also, speCUlatively, 
explain my bad undergraduate experience as something to do with my inarticulate 
expectation that I would begin to learn something important, which was frustrated by a 
curriculum dominated by analytical philosophy. I consistently felt that the texts I was 
required to read failed to describe the world in a way that I found illuminating or 
insightful. My gradual understanding of the limitations of this curriculum first initiated 
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my interest in disciplinary differences and the social positioning of knowledge. The 
particular instance I remember most clearly is when I began to wonder about the way 
Wittgenstein's writing contrasted with the writing of the other analytical philosophers I 
was studying. Wittgenstein presents his philosophy in a series of propositions that shed 
light on each other in ways that are left fairly open to the interpretation of the reader. 
His writing is thus more literary in style than that of mainstream analytical philosophers 
who tend to present linear arguments that, as far as possible, foreclose ambiguities of 
interpretation3• Wittgenstein exemplifies a break within analytical philosophy not only 
in his style of writing, a relatively minor point, perhaps, but also in his description of 
language. For me, mired in a narrow analytical philosophy course, which presented 
language as a transparent medium for the representation of ideas and experiences, 
Wittgenstein's inversion of this approach, suggesting that linguistic meanings are only 
produced for a specific purpose within a specific context, was liberating. What 
interested me, though, was not only that there were such different approaches to both 
writing and analysis within legitimate academic disciplines, but also why I personally 
should find one approach so much more persuasive than another. What other features of 
my existing interests, experience and social position made me so resistant to one mode 
of thinking and so reassured by another? 
After I left university I completely avoided any intellectual engagement for several 
years. I returned to university to do a part-time Masters in gender and cultural studies. 
My experience this time was dramatically different, partly because I was also working 
and enjoying my job, and so did not feel overwhelmed by an idea that I needed to 
succeed and be original in my academic work. More importantly, though, the texts I was 
reading offered illuminating descriptions of issues that I felt to be important. Crucially, 
in relation to this thesis, this was not an accident. I had moved from a narrow 
philosophy curriculum that rarely moved beyond the Anglo-American analytical 
tradition to more explicitly critical approaches, derived in part from the work of 
continental philosophers whose wor" was not taught on my undergraduate degree. The 
3 The distinction I am making between writing styles is similar to Roland Barthes' distinction between 
lisable and sctiptable texts, or between work and text. A scriptable text can be described as on written 'in 
response to an imperative to go beyond the discove,and communication of "truth'" (Moriarty, 1991, p. 
138). In defining the difference between work and text, Barthes says, ' ... a Theory of the Text cannot be 
satisfied by a metalinguistic exposition ... The theory of the text can coincide only with a practice of 
writing' (Barthes, 1997a, p. 164). From this perspective Wittgenstein's style of writing might be 
interpreted as inextricable from the argument of his philosophical investigation. 
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contrast in these two educational experiences clarified my scepticism about the 
objectivity of intellectual work and the assumption that students should be able to 
engage with different topics according to objective intellectual abilities, regardless of 
the substantive content of what they are studying. This is the origin of one of the central 
questions of my thesis: how do the different kinds of statements that count as legitimate 
knowledge within different disciplines affect educational inclusion? 
One last expenence that I think is relevant. During my MA in Gender Studies, I 
attended a class on Freud's Dora (Freud, 1905). A few years later, for various reasons, I 
sat in on a class on an MA in Psychoanalytic Studies, which, it turned out, was also on 
Freud's Dora. The reading set for both sessions was identical. What happened in the 
classes was not. In the session on my MA in Gender Studies, a significant part of the 
class was taken up with students' discussion of Freud's sexism. There was, as I 
remember it, comparatively little discussion of the concept of the unconscious or of the 
implications of the case for psychoanalysis. In the class I observed on the MA in 
Psychoanalytic Studies, the whole session was taken up with the teacher's relatively 
uncritical exposition of the set reading. The contrast between the two sessions clarified 
the exclusions made by the disciplines within the classroom. A student who wanted to 
take Freud seriously would have been marginalized in the MA Gender Studies. While a 
student who wanted to take a critical position on Freud would have been marginalized 
in the MA in Psychoanalytic Studies. Students are not necessarily aware of the 
exclusions or omissions they are inviting when they make choices between disciplines 
and institutions4• 
The findings of Kim Thomas' (1990) study of gender differences in undergraduate 
study in English and Physics resonate, in many ways, with my overall experience as an 
undergraduate. She argues that for all students, the ability to take on a disciplinary 
identity, to fit the image of 'a scientist' or of 'an English student' has an effect on their 
success in their studies (ibid, p. 65). In general, taking on a disciplinary identity is more 
difficult for the women in her study than for the men. She compares the experience of 
4 All disciplines enact these kinds of exclusions. For example, David Buckingham (1988) describes some 
possible interpretations of the ideologically ambiguous (i.e. sexist? and homophobic?) products made by 
students on a media studies course. Students choose media studies GCSE, it is implied, because they want 
to talk about television programmes and magazines. Then they find that they spend a lot of time talking 
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women as a minority within Physics departments with the experience of men as a 
minority on undergraduate English courses. In both cases, it was the men who found it 
easier to identify as a disciplinary subj ect: 
Outsiders might see English as slightly 'effeminate': the male English student knows better, 
however, because there is nothing easier than for a man to be 'masculine' in a subject where 
women predominate and where individualism, originality and assertiveness are highly valued. 
The women in physics had to try to be like the men; but the men in English ... had only to show 
that they were different from the women - a much easier task. In English, therefore, 
nonconformism (part of the disciplinary identity of English students) was closely allied to 
masculinity. (ibid, 1990, p. 177) 
Her findings make a connection between the academic discipline and interaction within 
teaching sessions, where the more 'masculine' attributes of 'individualism', 'originality' 
and 'assertiveness' are 'highly valued'. The reason I am mentioning Thomas' study here 
is that it identifies precisely the nebulous, uncomfortable feelings that I remember. She 
concludes that the experience of women, in partiCUlar, in higher education is 'confusing 
and contradictory' (p. 176). This conclusion does not use academic results as the criteria 
for educational success or failure, but is based on the way that the conflicting personal, 
social and academic demands on individuals affect their positioning of themselves as 
students of a particular discipline. 
Thomas' work raises the question of why the confusion produced by these conflicting 
demands seems to be more evident in the accounts given by female students than in 
those of male students. Other recent studies in the sociology of gender and education 
have suggested that there is an inherent contradiction between certain forms of 
intellectual activity and the gender regulations to which female students are expected to 
conform. Rosie Walden and Valerie Walkerdine suggest that the well documented 
anomaly of girls under-representation in mathematics in post-compUlsory schooling 
(Arnot, 2002, p. 184, Ernest, 1998) can be explained in terms of their need to conform 
to standards of femininity: 'Girls appear to be in a 'no-win', 'catch 22' situation. If they 
fail at mathematics they lack true intellect but are truly female. If they succeed .. , they 
somehow become less female' (Walden and Walkerdine, 1982, p. 63). Valerie 
about gender, etbnicity, etc ... and quite justifiably find ways to undermine/avoid the 'self righteous' and 
'politically correct' (p. 84) disciplinary language of the course. 
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Walkerdine makes the more general point that anxieties expressed by the academically 
successful, middle class female students in her study are 'often related to the conflicts 
between feminine sexuality and intellectuality' (Walkerdine, 1998, p. 170). What 
Walden and Walkerdine's account suggests is an image of the social as constituted 
through different discursive fields that impose different and frequently contradictory 
sets of criteria for success in the classroom. To succeed in the field of gender requires 
girls to act in ways which conflict with perceived performances of success within 
mathematics, and academia more generally. Walden and Walkerdine's work thus has 
theoretical as well as purely empirical implications. 
These studies all provide a context for my work looking at undergraduate students in 
contrasting disciplines. I want to describe how the conflicts and contradictions 
consistently observed in the educational experience of (female) students are actually 
enacted within undergraduate teaching sessions. How are the 'conflicts between 
feminine sexuality and intellectuality' expressed in the classroom? And are these 
conflicts constituted in different ways in different academic disciplines? In addition, I 
want to refine the theoretical framework for sociological explorations of gender and 
academic disciplines that is suggested in Walden and Walkerdine's work. The thesis 
will draw on a Lac ani an conceptual framework to define and interpret gendered 
positions. This framework, I believe, provides additional explanatory insights into the 
effects of the gender regulations on both female and male students. If, as Walden and 
Walkerdine suggest, failure in mathematics allows girls to be 'truly female', what is the 
effect on boys of experiencing a similar failure? The Lac ani an framework, which I will 
set out in more detail in chapter three, provides a structure within which to understand 
the gendered effects of positions within the classroom. 
1.5. The social positioning of academic disciplines 
Homo Academicus identifies a variety of factors that influence the social positioning of 
academic disciplines. As we have seen, socio-economic factors, such as the expansion 
in the higher education system, can act as a catalyst for changes in the relative positions 
of disciplines within the field of higher education. However, Bourdieu also identifies 
the way social factors inter-relate with the substantive content of disciplines. He 
describes how disciplines can be defined in terms of their relation to the existing social 
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order, and how this relationship is reflected in the class origins of entrants to different 
disciplines. Homo Academicus analyses correspondences between the relationship of 
disciplines to social and economic power and a wide variety of indicators of social and 
cultural capital of academics. These correspondences identify a higher correlation 
between disciplines such as law and medicine, which have a direct relationship to 
dominant social positions, and the conservative characteristics of the establishment. 
These conservative indicators of social and cultural capital were less evident in the 
disciplines with no direct relationship to external structures of power. Thus for a wide 
variety of indicators the same hierarchy was observed: the field of medicine had the 
highest proportion of academics from the dominant classes, who were privately 
educated, who were married, who had large families, etc .. , followed by law, arts, and 
finally by science, which had the lowest proportion of academics embodying these 
features of the conservative establishment in France (Bourdieu, 1996, pp. 40 - 48). 
These findings support a broad division of disciplines into two categories: those 
dependent on the temporal, social order, and those dependent on scientific, intellectual 
values. In the first category, academic positions are more closely correlated with social 
hierarchies; in the second category academic positions are more closely correlated with 
intellectual authority. What these findings suggest is that academic disciplines are 
always socially situated, firstly in tenns of their object, which mayor may not serve an 
explicit function in the maintenance of the existing social order, and following from 
this, in tenns of their recruitment of both students and academics to carry out these 
contrasting social functions. 
Ludwig Huber, in a survey of research into disciplinary cultures, forcefully supports 
Bourdieu's position. He argues that the consistency with which studies have found 
disciplinary differences in the social characteristics and political opinions of academics 
implies that disciplinary cultures cannot be explained purely in tenns of the abstract 
intellectual characteristics of their field of knowledge (Huber, 1990, p. 244). Huber also 
provides his own analysis of data on students at Gennan universities in the 1980s. His 
findings are very similar to Bourdieu's in relation to class based disciplinary choices: 
It appears that among students from disadvantaged backgrounds, relatively more choose 
engineering, mathematics or natural sciences and above all social sciences, psychology or 
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education, while relatively fewer choose law, economics and least of all medicine '" (ibid, p. 
251) 
Thus it would appear that the substantive function of disciplinary knowledge beyond the 
realm of higher education influences subject choices, which in turn serve to reproduce 
existing social relations. 
This understanding of the substantive basis for the social positioning of the disciplines 
is fundamental to my study. It supports the idea not only that disciplinary choices 
contribute to social reproduction, but also that individuals will enter disciplinary 
discussions already situated differently in relation to disciplinary ideas and modes of 
discussion. 
Observation of the social positioning of disciplinary knowledge has, however, also been 
carried at other levels of analysis. While Bourdieu and Huber have observed the 
external relations of social groups to academic disciplines, Ken Hyland's corpus 
analysis of language and genres in professional academic writing (Hyland, 2000) has 
charted the way linguistic choices within academic writing constitute strategic social 
interactions within specific disciplinary communities. He argues, for example, that the 
numerical increase in citations in modem academic writing (ibid, p. 21) and disciplinary 
differences in modes of citation suggest that references to other authors are not based 
solely on epistemological criteria, but constitute social moves within specific 
disciplinary communities: 'our routine and unreflexive writing practices are deeply 
embedded in the epistemological and social conventions of our disciplines' (ibid, p. 40). 
At another level, Foucault's argument that 'there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge' (Foucault, 1977, p. 27) is consistent 
with Bourdieu's description of temporally dominant disciplines and their relation to 
power. Studies in the field of education have produced similar analyses of the way that 
fields of knowledge relate to fields of power, revealing how academic theories about 
child development and educational practice construct teachers' expectations and 
responses to children's behavioUr in the classroom in ways that mirror the interests of 
dominant social groups (Walkerdine, 1990, 1998, Heath, 1983)5. My study of the social 
5 It is worth noting that Shirley Brice Heath's study (1983) exemplifies a systematic account of the 
relationship between ethnicity and school knowledge. My research design foregrounds gender as a 
reference point in the analysis of inlexclusion. The reasoning behind this is explained in more detail in 
chapter three. However, it is a note worthy limitation of my research design and methodology that it is not 
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positioning of the disciplines is carried out at yet another level, exploring the effects of 
the object and methodology of knowledge claims within the discipline being studied, in 
order to describe the relationship between student in/exclusion in classroom discussions 
and the disciplines that they are studying. 
Bourdieu's distinction between temporal and scientific disciplines provides a useful 
way of categorising disciplines that might be expected to be more socially exclusionary 
and those that might be expected to be more inclusive. The disciplines selected for my 
study can be categorised in accordance with Bourdieu' s distinction. The distinction, to 
re-iterate, is between disciplines that are dependent on temporally dominant hierarchies: 
knowledge in the service of order and power, aiming at the rationalization, in both senses, of the 
given order... (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 68). 
And more autonomous, descriptive, scientific disciplines: 
knowledge confronting order and power, aiming not at putting public affairs in order but at 
analysing them as they are (ibid, p. 69). 
This second type of knowledge, Bourdieu suggests, is always implicitly critical, 'since it 
supposes a withholding of ordinary support for the status quo' (ibid, p. 69). Political 
Theory, I will argue, can be identified with the first of these categories, while American 
Literature can be identified with the second. 
There are different ways of conceptualising the study of Political Theory, or Political 
Thought6. It can be described as a way of developing analytical skills and conceptual 
frameworks. It can also be thought of as the history of ideas, dealing with an empirical 
set of canonical texts. However, what distinguishes Political Theory from other 
able to distinguish systematically between the strategies and experiences of students with different ethnic 
backgrounds. 
6 I use these two terms interchangeably throughout the thesis. It is possible to distinguish between 
different approaches to the study of Political Thought: Political Theory, as opposed to the History of 
Political Thought, as opposed to Political Philosophy. However, within the introductory undergraduate 
courses that I have looked at, such distinctions are not consistent enough to have been relevant to my 
study. Where, in specific instances, differences in approach are relevant, I will explain within those 
specific interpretations. For a more detailed account of the different approaches to political theory, see 
Held, 1991. 
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analytical and historical disciplines IS its fundamental relationship to Issues of 
government: 
Political philosophy asks how the state should act, what moral principles should govern the way 
it treats its citizens and what kind of social order it should seek to create. (Swift, 2001, p. 5) 
Political theory, then, does not set out to describe the state, or the political system, but 
rather to justify it. This way of understanding Political Theory, or Political Philosophy, 
positions it clearly within the category of temporal disciplines, serving to rationalise 
governmental activity. While Political Theory has a less explicit and, perhaps, less 
essential role than law or medicine, in contributing to the maintenance of the state, it 
does see itself as clarifying the conceptual basis on which politicians may justify their 
actions. The subtitle to Adam Swift's introduction to political philosophy, 'A beginners' 
guide for students and politicians', re-affirms this understanding of the discipline as 
applied knowledge for the use of those in positions of power. Following Bourdieu's 
analysis, then, we might expect to find more interest in the field of political theory from 
students from the dominant classes. The study of political theory may not lead as 
directly into structurally dominant positions as the study of law or medicine, but it 
nevertheless carries with it associations of government and power that are more likely to 
be instinctively understood by those with some relation to similarly powerful positions. 
As David Held suggests: 
Those who have most interest in political life and who regard it most favourably are those 
closest to power and privilege. (Held, 1991, p. 3) 
My hypothesis, in setting up this study, was that differences in students' position in 
relation to power and authority might affect their mode of interaction with political 
theory as a discipline. 
There is more variety in, or dispute between, conceptions of literary criticism than 
conceptions of Political Thought. The main opposition within literary studies can be 
characterised as that between New Criticism and the multi-methodological, historicist or 
cultural studies approaches prevalent today. The approaches of New Criticism prioritise 
close readings of texts and scholarly knowledge of the cannon. These approaches can be 
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seen to fit into Bourdieu' s category of disciplines that serve the interests of power, in so 
far as they treat literary texts as aesthetic objects with inherent moral value, and 
knowledge of canonical texts is seen as enhancing understanding of the world and 
therefore the legitimacy of individuals within dominant positions7. This 
conceptualisation of literary analysis, emphasising the aesthetic and moral value 
inhering in individual works, can be opposed to historicist readings, which foreground 
political interpretations of literary texts. A broad definition of historicist approaches 
incorporates Marxist and feminist readings, and readings which prioritise issues of 
ethnicity and racism. These readings draw on sociological, psychoanalytic and political 
theory, and tend to attach greater significance to the unconscious role of language in 
ideological reproduction than to its aesthetic and moral value. These approaches, in 
attempting to describe the ideological production and effects of literary texts, come 
within Bourdieu's second category: disciplines that do not have a function in supporting 
the status quo, but which, in their production of descriptions of the existing social order, 
are implicitly politicised and critical. The American Literature courses in my study are 
situated within this school of literary studies, and thus present a contrast, within 
Bourdieu's categories, to the Political Theory courses. 
The aim of my study is to explore the effects of the differential social positioning of 
disciplines on students within the classroom. I want to use another brief biographical 
example to suggest the nature of these effects on individual students. The Oxford 
English degree in the 1980s, when I was an undergraduate, was extremely 'traditional', 
structured as an objective historical survey of the canon of English Literature. There 
were no options to study women's literature or colonial literature, and emphasis was 
placed on the analysis of text as text, rather than on text as a historical document, or as 
representative of a cultural or ideological position. This approach to literary studies can 
be associated with teaching methods which demand an unmediated response to a literary 
text, since historical or biographical research is not considered necessary. Without 
external sources of research, greater emphasis is placed on the ability of the student to 
produce their own 'original' response to a text. So there is a correlation between the 
discipline and the features of 'individualism', 'assertiveness', and 'originality' that were 
described by Kim Thomas as a masculine style of classroom interaction. My friend 
7 For characterisations of New Criticism, see Colebrook, 1997, p. 222, or Culler, 1997, p. 122. For a more 
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Charlotte, who studied English at Oxford during this period, has described both her 
continuing feelings of inadequacy in terms of literary knowledge, because she was 
never required to provide any context for her interpretations of texts, and also her lack 
of confidence in her performance in tutorials. She has also described how she used to 
plagiarise other critics, because she was continually attacked in tutorials for being 
unoriginal: 
... I was never accused of plagiarism - I just know that I committed it but I would say that it was 
partly because I felt deeply unconfident of my own opinions in that very masculine environment 
. .. I never felt I had enough time and space to fonnulate them and I was amazed at the 
confidence of my male peers and the seeming readiness of their opinion making. Our tutor was 
very fond of instant literary criticism - I remember a particularly dire seminar on a particularly 
opaque Auden poem in which we were all supposed to instantly voice our opinions and I went 
into a complete panic and could think nothing. Yet the fIrst time I had a female tutor I felt 
completely freed to express myself, and I remember my end of term report where she said it was 
ajoy to have a student so full of her own ideas. I felt with her that I could present an argument-
this is what several critics have said in the past, and the conclusions that I draw are these ... 
(Charlotte Jones, personal e-mail, 1993) 
Charlotte's account is consistent with a practice of literary criticism that is dependent, 
both in content and in style of articulation, on pre-existing patriarchal power structures. 
The tutor's prioritisation of 'instant literary criticism' over the analysis of 'what critics 
have said in the past', combined with the greater confidence demonstrated by her male 
peers acted to marginalise Charlotte in tutorials. Her experience provides a useful 
example because she is, in many ways, the exemplar of a successful Oxford 
undergraduate: she got a double first in English, was very active in student theatre, and 
has gone on to become a successful playwright. However, she is still unconfident of her 
academic abilities and, as is clear from her e-mail, has very ambiguous, largely negative 
feelings about her university experience. This example does not provide adequate 
evidence, but it does seem to me to suggest some relationship between the position of 
the discipline within the temporally dominant patriarchal establishment and the 
discomfort felt by students like Charlotte, and also, perhaps, some of the female 
students in Kim Thomas' study. 
detailed account of the inter-relationships between New Criticism and Historicism, see Currie, 1998. 
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Recent studies in other disciplinary areas have identified the effects of the critical or 
, 
scientific disciplines on student inclusion. Lindahl Elliot's research into a Science 
, 
Culture and Communications degree identifies a conflict between the two sections of 
the course (Lindahl Elliot, 1997). He demonstrates that the course as a whole was 
'ambiguous, if not contradictory, where its orientation to the market was concerned' 
(ibid, p. 135). While modules in the science faculty taught students to understand 
science, modules in the media faculty taught students to be critical of standard 
representations of science in the media. Students frequently failed to understand this 
difference in approach, and were confused when the media modules did not seem to be 
training them in the marketable skills they would need to gain employment in science 
communication (ibid, p. 178). In a different field, similar problems have been 
encountered by teachers of women's studies committed to feminist pedagogies, when 
students resist identification with discourses that put into question their position in the 
dominant order (Elliot, P, 1997, Middleton, 1982, p. 9, Roman and Eyre, 1997). It 
would not seem right, therefore, to suggest, that the disciplines of the establishment are 
necessarily more exclusionary than the newer, explicitly politicised and critical 
disciplines. What I hope to do is to provide a more precise account of the way students 
are positioned, or position themselves, in relation to both categories of disciplines. 
1.6. The conceptual gaps in Bourdieu's account: Bernstein's 
pedagogic codes. 
Bourdieu's description of the field of the university provides a framework within which 
to conceptualise the relationships between academic disciplines, class and institutional 
position. These relationships, within his framework, are defined not only in terms of a 
hierarchy of administrative posts or academic achievements, but, more importantly, 
through the ability to define what counts as legitimate knowledge. Thus those who, as a 
result of a combination of social and historical factors, are able to persuade their 
colleagues and prospective students of the legitimacy of their own specialism are 
simultaneously able to secure their position within the institution. In Homo Academicus, 
Bourdieu prioritises the influence of social or class factors, over the object and 
methodology of the discipline, as a factor in achieving control over definitions of 
knowledge. Similarly, his other studies of the distribution of cultural capital (1986, 
1993) are intended to demonstrate that middle class knowledge has a higher exchange 
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value than working class knowledge. As presented in his analysis, the value of 
disciplinary or cultural knowledge does not inhere in the form of knowledge itself, but 
is determined through the external interests of agents in the field of exchange. Middle 
class values control these fields not because of any inherent features, but because the 
middle classes dominate the processes of symbolic production through which value is 
attributed to different objects. His research, then, does not address the internal structure 
of knowledge, and how that internal structure might playa role in the exercise of power. 
It is at this point that Bernstein identifies the limitation, or gap, in Bourdieu's 
framework, arguing that the social factors described by Bourdieu are not sufficient to 
explain changes in the social position of different types of knowledge: 
. " the increase in numbers, the rituals of the generations, the new habituses are the resources, 
perhaps the necessary conditions but not the sufficient conditions to explain changes in 
languages. (Bernstein 1996, p. 166, see also ibid, p. 4) 
The gap that Bernstein identifies in Bourdieu's framework is the lack of a language to 
describe the way that the internal structure of units of cultural capital, particularly 
educational knowledge, itself exercises control over the social field. The point of 
Bernstein's work in this area is to suggest a relationship between features of the internal 
structure of knowledge and the social relations in which they are likely to be realised. 
For example, he describes how the strength of boundaries between areas of disciplinary 
knowledge relates to organisational structures, and how this relationship will always 
serve the interests of one social group over another. The divisions between specialisms 
within a school or a hospital, for example, will influencelbe influenced by the 
organisation of departments, and different organisational structures will serve the 
interests of either nurses or doctors, staff or patients, middle class or working class 
students. In this example, it is the strength of the boundary between fields of knowledge 
that constitutes the key feature of the internal structure of knowledge, the pedagogic 
code. This exposition of pedagogic codes, which constitute the relationship between the 
internal structure of knowledge and social organisation, is re-iterated throughout 
Bernstein's work. Most pertinent to my study is his description of the features of 
different forms of abstract knowledge as hierarchical and horizontal knowledge 
structures. 
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Hierarchical and horizontal knowledge structures are the terms used by Bernstein to 
describe the pedagogic codes that contribute to the production of fields of abstract, or 
academic, knowledge. They offer us a conceptual vocabulary to fill in the gaps left in 
Bourdieu's account of the social positioning of the disciplines. Hierarchical knowledge 
structures, according to Bernstein's definition, 'appear by their users to be motivated 
towards greater and greater integrating propositions, operating at more and more 
abstract levels'. In contrast, rather than developing towards one all encompassing 
theory, horizontal knowledge structures 'consist of a series of specialised languages' 
(Bernstein, 1996, p. 161). Bernstein offers Physics as an example of a hierarchical 
knowledge structure ,8 while Sociology, Literature and Philosophy are offered as 
examples of horizontal knowledge structures, each of which consists of variety of 
different languages or theoretical approaches. The different knowledge structures, 
Bernstein suggests, produce different relationships between students of academic 
disciplines and the social field. He argues that horizontal knowledge structures are 
more susceptible than hierarchical structures to influence by external social factors: 
Because a Horizontal Knowledge Structure consists of an array of languages anyone 
transmission necessarily entails some selection, and some privileging within the set 
recontextualised for the transmission of the Horizontal Knowledge Structure. The social basis of 
the principle of this recontextualising indicates whose 'social' is speaking. The social basis of 
the principle of the recontextualising constructs the perspective of the Horizontal Knowledge 
Structure '" I say that this principle is social to indicate that choice here is not rational in the 
sense that it is based on the 'truth' of one of the specialised languages. ... The dominant 
perspective within any transmission may be a function of the power relations among the 
teachers, or of pressure from groups of acquirers, or, particularly today, a function of indirect 
and direct external pressures of the market or the state itself. (ibid, p. 164) 
The suggestion that the recontextualisation of the discipline that takes place in any act 
of transmission necessarily entails a process of selection is plausible. Similarly, the 
suggestion that the basis of this selection in the transmission of horizontal knowledge 
structures must be conceived of as social, rather than as based purely on abstract 
8 It is not clear from Bernstein's own work whether Physics in fact conforms to his description of a 
hierarchical knowledge structure. It may indeed be the case that all disciplines are in fact horizontal 
knowledge structures, and that Bernstein's categories should be considered as end points on a continuum, 
rather than as mutually exclusive alternatives. There is clearly a need for further empirical investigation. 
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academic grounds is also convincing. Thus, it would seem reasonable to assume that 
this process of selection must be in the interests of a specific social group and that the 
ability to identify with this group is a part of what participants must acquire to enter the 
discipline, within the specific context of transmission. 
Both American Literature and Political Thought can be described as examples of 
Horizontal Knowledge Structures. However, while within Political Thought the 
different specialised languages - for example of Liberalism, Marxism, Libertariansim _ 
are generally segmentally transmitted, as Bernstein's model suggests, American 
Literature's explicit adoption of multiple methodologies does not confonn so precisely. 
The explicit application of multiple methodologies in American Literature means that 
the selection process inherent in transmission is far less significant than Bernstein's 
model suggests. One might expect, then, that in American Literature there may be less 
pressure on participants to confonn to one particular disciplinary perspective. Looked 
at in this way, my study might, in part, be described as an attempt to develop and refine 
Bernstein's conceptual language. While I do not use Bernstein's conceptual language in 
my analysis, it is clear that the object I am looking at is very close to that which his 
language describes: the social effects of the internal structure of fonns of educational 
knowledge. One reason I do not take up his conceptual language is that there are 
important aspects of, particularly, the analysis of gender and SUbjectivity, which cannot 
be incorporated productively within his framework. 
However, aspects of Bernstein's work have been used productively in the analysis of 
gender and education (Arnot, 2002, Middleton, 1982, Sadovnik, 1995). Sue Middleton 
applies Bernstein's distinction between integrated code, which involves the 
'subordination of previously insulated subjects or courses to some relational idea' 
(Bernstein, quoted in Middleton, p. 3.), and collection code, which maintains strong 
institutional boundaries between existing categories of knowledge, in her analysis of a 
women's studies programme. She argues that feminism acted as a 'relational idea' that 
brought together individuals from different, 'previously insulated', departments within 
the university to develop both new courses and, concurrently, new ways of thinking. 
This integration, she argues, was further facilitated by the position of women as a 
minority on the academic staff at the university, which gave them an additional reason 
to join together socially and politically as well as in a purely academic context (p. 11). 
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However, Middleton suggests, the conflict between new integrated forms of knowledge 
and the existing, collection code, departmental structure of the university had a negative 
impact of the developing status of women's studies. She concludes that it is possible to 
identify a relationship between 'the lower status of integrated code' and 'the devaluation 
of the qualities characterised as "feminine" in our patriarchal society', (p. 14) but that it 
is nevertheless important to explore 'the radical possibilities of integrated codes'. 
Middleton's precise analysis, then, identifies a relationship between the specific 
historical position of women and the possibility of institutionalising an integrated code 
in a way that neither essentialises the gendered connotations of integrated approaches 
nor prejudges the outcomes of such disciplinary innovations. Bernstein's concepts thus 
facilitate the clarification of the connection between the position of women and forms of 
knowledge, without providing specific insights into the definition of the 'feminine', 
which is taken as a given in Middleton's analysis. 
Other recent developments of Bernstein's work address similar issues to those 
addressed in Middleton's work - i.e. the development of new fonns of knowledge 
within the university - but attempt to transform Bernstein's descriptive categories to 
incorporate epistemological, as well as purely sociological distinctions. This seems to 
me to be a dangerous step for the sociology of knowledge, and these accounts 
frequently conftate valid criticisms of radical pedagogies and of some of the claims 
made by researchers regarding the inclusionary effects of their work, with seemingly 
imprecise and un-validated descriptions of whole fields of academic research and 
writing (Bernstein, 1996, Moore and Muller, 1999, Maton, 2000). Maton, for example, 
in his analysis of the position of cultural studies within the university, constructs an 
interesting distinction between categories of knowledge which prioritise 'procedures 
appropriate to a discrete object of study', and categories of knowledge which prioritise 
the 'personal characteristics of the author or subject' (Maton, 2000, p. 155). However, 
he appears to base his distinction on an analysis of the claims made by authors in 
general descriptions of their discipline and its aims, rather than on an analysis of the 
work itself, and thus fails to identify any actual examples which demonstrate that 
cultural studies does indeed prioritise 'personal characteristics of the author or subject' , 
and if so, that this prioritisation is not at the same time also a 'procedure appropriate to 
the discrete object of study'. Bernstein's own discussion of new disciplinary areas 
associated with cultural studies is even more blatantly based on what might appear to be 
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an ill-researched caricature. He argues that one result of equity driven moves to 
recognise diversity in education has been the 'colonisation' of 'vertical', abstracted or 
academic discourses by 'horizontal', or everyday, discourses. However, he bases this 
argument on a description of some of these newer disciplinary areas as 'the confessional 
narratives of a variety of Feminist and Black Studies in higher education' (Bernstein, 
1996, p. 170). Such descriptions seem to be based on prior epistemological 
commitments rather than on sociological description, and do not help us to understand 
how, if at all, the 'newer' disciplines affect educational inclusion. 
Madeline Arnot provides a more sympathetic interpretation of Bernstein's description 
of 'the confessional narratives of Feminist and Black Studies in higher education'. She 
interprets him as suggesting that 'feminist knowledge structures may not necessarily be 
liberatory if they are limited to such epistemologically weak horizontal knowledge 
forms' (Arnot, 2002, p. 241). It is possible that Bernstein's comment was intended as 
strategic advice rather than epistemological criticism: however, the validity of his 
advice would still need to be backed up with empirical evidence that the knowledge 
structures of 'Feminist and Black studies' do indeed conform to his description, and 
that they are not achieving their intended political effects. While Bernstein's categories 
of vertical and horizontal discourses may be universal to the extent that they can be used 
to categorise any form of knowledge, the universality of the social effects or influence 
of these different forms of knowledge, as Middleton rightly maintains, is not self 
evident9• 
9 It is, perhaps, worth briefly exploring this citation as an example of the social positioning of disciplinary 
writing (see the reference to Hyland in the previous section in this chapter). Firstly, the value of this type 
of reference to another's opinion, simply to make one's own opinion sound more plausible, is clearly 
questionable, though common in some disciplines. Hyland (2000) for example, notes how 'in the absence 
of an actual counter argument, philosophers may strengthen their position by inventing one and 
attributing it with a hypothetical citation' (p. 36), such as 'Wittgenstein would argue ... ' or 'Descartes 
might suggest ... '. The addition of the reference to another author, real or imaginary, signals, or 
constructs, academic and social allegiances over and above the strictly intellectual requirements of the 
argument. Secondly, a closer analysis of the specific choice of citational vocabulary in my reference to 
Middleton in the main text reveals precisely this type of strategic social function. In particular, the use of 
'maintains', which although just about defensible, is probably too strong in this instance. 'Implies' would 
probably be more accurate, since this is not an argument that Middleton articulates explicitly, it is more 
an implication I am reading into her suggestion that we should explore the radical possibilities of 
integrated code. Clearly, the rhetorical effect of 'maintains' is more pleasing, and implies more explicit 
support for my position. However, the point I am making is not one that should be reliant on the 
agreement of other people, and so the use of the reference would appear to be a move more in conformity 
with the social conventions of this type of writing than with the needs of the argument. 
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What Bernstein's knowledge codes cannot do is to predict the interaction between 
fonns of knowledge and other historically situated discursive fields. By separating out 
the discursive fields of gender, institutional cultures and disciplines within my analysis I 
hope to give some sense of the interaction between different fields that can 
overdetennine specific social effects. This separation is important to enable the 
identification of the relative autonomy of different discursive fields, and to avoid 
essentialising one form of knowledge as necessarily better, or more politically effective, 
than another. 
The final point I want to take from Bernstein's work relates to the difficulty of 
identifying the social effects of forms of knowledge. It is difficult to identify whose 
interest is being served by a particular knowledge structure because knowledge is 
always presented as objective and coherent. Bernstein says: 
. '. externally, the classificatory principle creates order, and the contradictions, cleavages and 
dilemmas which necessarily inhere in the principle of a classification are suppressed by the 
insulation. Within the individual the insulation becomes a system of psychic defences against the 
possibility of a weakening of the insulation, which would then reveal the suppressed 
contradictions, cleavages and dilemmas. So the internal reality of insulation is a system of 
psychic defences to maintain the integrity of a category. (Bernstein, 1996, p. 7) 
What Bernstein suggests here, but does not develop, is the psychic level to the 
structuring of knowledge. As Bernstein constantly re-iterates, different forms of 
knowledge serve the interests of different social groups, but it is this aspect of 
knowledge that is repressed. Bernstein's approach is to reveal these repressed interests 
by looking at the relationship between disciplinary, organisational and pedagogic 
structures. In doing this, he is able to construct his argument without incorporating the 
'suppressed contradictions, cleavages and dilemmas' into his theoretical system. As I 
have said, I am looking at a very similar object to Bernstein. However, my empirical 
study does not look directly at the level of organisational structures. I am hoping to 
reveal some aspects of organisational structures indirectly, by looking at the types of 
claims made in classroom interventions. In order to relate the internal structure of these 
claims to the construction of social positions in classroom interactions, I will draw on 
some psychoanalytic approaches to the analysis of talk, which I will introduce in the 
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chapter three. In doing this, I hope, to a very limited extent, to incorporate the psychic 
level described by Bernstein into my analytical framework. 
1.7. A description of access oriented vs selective universities. 
Within this study, the institutions function as settings, or contexts, which are realised in 
relation to the other discursive fields of discipline and gender, and in relation to which 
student positions must be negotiated. The analysis does not look directly at 
organisational structures, and 'institution' is the least conceptually developed of the 
three axes of my analysis. Different aspects of the institutional settings are foregrounded 
at different points in the analysis, but no overall conceptualisation is developed. Instead, 
the institutions are used as signifiers of cohort, class and academic orientation: factors 
which cannot be ignored, and in relation to which valid, if strictly limited, assumptions 
can be made on the basis of the contrast between institutions at the top and bottom end 
of the UK higher education market place. 
The contrasts between pre- and post- 1992, highly selective and access oriented 
universities, are easy to caricature. The 'pre' universities teach more of the traditional 
disciplines, have more full-time students and more traditional assessment methods 
(exams instead of or as well as coursework), they are less flexible in their teaching 
methods and course structure, they have fewer mature students, fewer students from 
working class and minority ethnic backgrounds, and fewer students with non-traditional 
or no academic qualifications on entry. The ethos of these universities is conservative: 
they value scholarship and high academic standards. In contrast, the 'post' universities 
teach more applied, vocational, inter- and multi-disciplinary courses, they have flexible 
modes of study, modular courses, assess more through course work than by 
examination, and they make provision for part time students and students without the 
'traditional' entry qualifications. These universities have a radical educational agenda 
and value social change over scholarship and standards. In the 'pre' universities, 
widening participation means identifying and offering a place to exceptional students 
from 'non-traditional' backgrounds. In the 'post' universities, widening participation 
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means offering a place to any student who fulfils the minimum criteria necessary to 
suggest that they will be able to complete the course. 10 
There is occasional truth to these caricatures. However, it has also been argued, quite 
convincingly, that the overall system of higher education in the UK is still dominated by 
the traditions and standards of its elitist origins (Tight, 1989, Fulton and Ellwood, 1989, 
Trow, 1981)11. My own study adds to existing evidence that a simplistic opposition 
between the ideologies of the 'pre-' and 'post-' 1992 institutions is inadequate. A head 
of department at one of the 'post-' universities in my study described the new tutorial 
system they were introducing as 'Oxbridge' style. In fact, the tutorial system he was 
describing was intended to give students support in academic skills and essay writing, 
and so they are not really 'Oxbridge' style at all, but the fact that he chose to describe 
them in that way reveals the continuing influence of the selective system on the less-
selective sector12. The caricatured divide between the two opposing sectors was also 
breached in the rationales given for their assessment methods by two tutors I talked in 
my study. Another tutor at a post-1992 university explained the assignments set for his 
module, summaries plus an essay, as ensuring that the students covered 'breadth and 
depth', i.e. in terms of product. A tutor at a pre 1992 university explained a similar 
variety of assessment methods on his course as a way of supporting students' 
development of academic writing skills. The timing of the assessment tasks on the two 
courses reflects the tutors different rationales: at the post 1992 university, the tasks were 
all due in at the end of the module, while at the pre 1992 university the tasks were 
staged throughout the module, with feedback provided on the first task before the next 
10 See, for example, Pratt, 1997, p. 9 - 12, for a similar characterisation of the 'two traditions'. 
11 Martin Trow (1981) contrasts the higher education system in the United States with that in the UK. He 
characterises the UK system as 'high standards and constrained access' and the US system as 'easy access 
and problematic achievement'. He bases this distinction on two main features of each system. The 
features common across the UK higher education sector are the essentialising of the need to provide 
products that conform to a common, 'gold' standard and the high staff student ratios. In the US, the key 
features are the long- term commitment to increasing access to higher education for all groups and the 
tradition of liberal, non-specialised, credit based system at university level. What this comparison reveals 
is the extent to which the contrasting institutions within the UK higher education sector share a common 
ideology, and one that is probably far closer to traditional elite conception of the university than the 
widely espoused 'access' model. 
12 I should add that this example could be used to make precisely the opposite point. The head of 
department who made this comment was new in post and had left, reputedly having failed to fit in to the 
ethos of the department, before I completed my fieldwork. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to read 
his comment not as a reflection of the ideology of the institution, but as a reflection of the fact that he did 
not conform to the ideology of the institution. But, nevertheless, he was head of department at the time ... 
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was due. These examples verify the very obvious dangers III assuming 
representativeness, especially in a study as small scale as mine. 
The detail of possible comparisons between the policy, curricula and teaching methods 
in 'old' and 'new' universities, however, is not relevant to my study. My use of 
contrasting institutions is not intended to produce results that are representative of those 
institutions. Rather, the institutions in my study were chosen with the aim of providing 
certain significant contrasts between the classes that I observed. 
The specific areas of contrast I was looking for were in ethos and student body, and 
recent studies suggest that there is strong case to be made for saying that these two 
features of an institution are closely inter-related (Ball et aI, 2002, Reay et aI, 2001. 
Robbins, 1991, p. 6). Ball et al argue that: 
... choice of university is a choice of lifestyle and a matter of 'taste' and further that social class 
is an important aspect of these subtexts of choice. (Ball et aI, 2002, p. 53) 
This implies that what I have called 'ethos' is a factor in student choice, and so in the 
make up of the student body of an institution. Ball et al's research suggests that to 
interpret 'lifestyle' as correlating in a direct way with social class and ethnicity is too 
simplistic. There is a correlation: a higher proportion of students at the post-1992 
universities are from working class and minority ethnic backgrounds than at the pre-
1992 universities13. This is in part a result of pragmatic choices: material and time 
constraints that are met by studying part-time and/or close to home. However, it is also 
a result of other less concrete factors. Reay at aI., describing the choices of the students 
in the same study as Ball et aI, say: 
The importance of choosing somewhere where one feels safe andlor happy raises the issue of 
risk in relation to university choice. Most of the students are applying to low risk universities 
where if they are from an ethnic minority there is an ethnic mix, if they are privileged they will 
fmd intellectual and social peers, and if they are mature students there is a high percentage of 
mature students. (Reay et aI, 2001, p. 865) 
13 Ball et aI, 2002, p. 54, , In our own work, using multiple regression analysis, social class was found to 
be the main predictor of the schools attended and GCSE attainment of the students in our sample, which 
were in turn the main predictors of choosing high status universities.' See also, Pratt, 1997, p.78/ch. 3. 
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These explanations of their choices of university, Reay et al. suggest, tended to be more 
explicit in the accounts given by 'non-traditional' higher education students. Several of 
the sample expressed discomfort at the idea of attending high status institutions such as 
London University, Oxford or Cambridge, and those who had visited these places 
appeared less than enthusiastic about what they had seen there: 'too traditional', 'too old 
fashioned', 'a complete shock', 'pompous', 'stuck up', 'a hard place to be if you're 
black, even if you're rich' (Reay et aI, 2001, p. 870). This self-stratification is not only a 
function of familiarity. It is also related to class-based knowledge about the implications 
of the choices being made: middle class students were far more likely to be aware of the 
gradations in status of different institutions and of how these gradations would be read 
in the job market after leaving university (Ball et aI, 2002, p. 60). It is where students 
from other social groups are more aware of these gradations that the complexity of the 
correlation between ethos and student body is revealed. Reay et al suggest the different 
implications in apparently similar judgments made by students of different class 
backgrounds: 
... the feeling that universities like Middlesex are not good enough signifies very differently for 
working-class Candice and Julia than it does for middle-class KeevaL The middle class students 
are not implicating themselves when they talk about avoiding the new universities ... (Reay et aI, 
2001, p. 868). 
Where the choices of middle class white students were relatively unreflexive and going 
to university was likely to be seen as automatic, simply doing what it has always been 
assumed that you would do, the choices of students from working class and ethnic 
minority backgrounds can be interpreted as a relatively explicit and reflexive re-
positioning either with or against their current social group. It is worth noting that Reay 
et ai's description of the repositioning students have to manoeuvre in relation to their 
choice of university is not dissimilar to Thomas' description of the difficulties some 
students experience in positioning themselves in relation to their discipline. 
It is not necessary to the point I need to make here to spend more time discussing 
features of the different types of university. The argument that forms the basis on 
which the sites for my data collection were chosen is that it is reasonable to expect to 
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find a different composition of student body and a different institutional ethos in 
universities selected from the two extremes of our higher educational system and with 
contrasting positions in relation to selection and educational inclusion. It is also 
reasonable to expect that these differences will have an influence on the kinds of talk 
that dominate classroom discussions, on who can speak and what can be said. As such, 
the institutions themselves while not the direct focus of my study,provide an appropriate 
context for my examination of disciplinary discourses and classroom interaction. 
1.8. Conclusions 
This chapter has set out a range of concepts on which I am drawing at different levels of 
analysis within the thesis. At the most abstracted level, the analysis will attempt to 
illustrate the overdetermination of student positions within undergraduate classrooms. It 
will describe the interaction between the discursive fields of gender, discipline and 
institution, within the four contexts that comprise the study, and the effects of this 
interaction in either fixing or destabilising aspects of each of these fields, in relation to 
which student positions can coherently be constructed. At more concrete levels of 
analysis, the thesis will provide an account of academic disciplines, gender relations, 
and higher education institutions which both draws on and refines the conceptual 
structures set out in this chapter. 
Bourdieu's analysis of the field of higher education in France provides an account of the 
multiple ways in which academic disciplines are embedded in the social. His analysis of 
the development of new disciplinary fields, the expansion in student numbers, and the 
application of disciplinary knowledge in the wider social field, reveals the multiple and 
inextricable relationships between social and intellectual activity. This general 
understanding of the interdependence between the intellectual and the social forms the 
basis of this study. However, the specific concepts taken from Bourdieu that this study 
will explore in more detail are the precise nature of Political Thought, as an example of 
a discipline that can be applied in the service of the dominant social order, in contrast to 
American Literature, as an example of a descriptive, critical discipline. While Bourdieu 
has analysed the relationship between social class and subject choice in relation to these 
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two categories of knowledge, my study aims to develop an account of the disciplines 
that incorporates both their internal structure and methodology and an understanding of 
their relation to, or constitution as both gendered and institutional discursive practices. 
As I have suggested, in addition to his persuasive presentation of the general case for 
the importance of the internal structure of knowledge in the constitution of social 
relations, Bernstein's categories of hierarchical and horizontal knowledge structures 
infonn my analysis of the transmission of the two disciplines in my study. American 
Literature and Political Thought provide examples of very different instantiations of 
horizontal knowledge structures. The analysis of the disciplines within this study thus 
constitutes an empirical example that provides evidence for the refinement of 
Bernstein's categories, and in the chapter six I will summarise the fonn that such a 
refinement might take. 
I am also drawing on previous studies of the relationship between academic disciplines 
and gender. The case has already been made for the existence of a conflict, or 
contradiction, between academic discourse and the production of hegemonic 
femininities. This study aims to refine the accounts provided in these previous works, in 
order to develop a more precise understanding of the relationship between hegemonic 
femininities and the specific disciplinary contexts of undergraduate classes in American 
Literature and Political Thought. To describe this relationship, the study draws on 
Lacanian definitions of the masculine and the feminine as contrasting positions in 
relation to language and the symbolic order. This conception of gender is explained in 
more detail in chapter three. It is also intended that by conceptualising the relationship 
between academic disciplines, gender, and higher education institutions within the 
context of the theoretical formulations of overdetennination and antagonism that I have 
outlined, a more unified picture of the interaction between these different discursive 
fields might be developed. 
The thesis is structured in the following way. Chapters two and three present the 
methods of data collection and the framework for analysis, and also attempt to suggest 
the limits of both of these processes of objectification. The analysis of the material is 
divided into three chapters. The first constitutes an account of the way academic 
disciplines are constituted at the margins of classroom activity, and describes the way 
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three individual students might be seen as constituting these margins. The second data 
analysis chapter describes less marginal positions within the Political Thought classes, 
and reveals some ways in which these 'included' positions re-iterate existing social 
relations of both class and gender. The final data analysis chapter describes the 
American Literature classes, and suggests that some contrasts between the positions 
available to students in these classes and those available in the Political Thought classes 
are related to specific features of the content and structure of the discipline. These 
points are then drawn together in a concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
THE UNSTABLE BOUNDARIES OF THE EMPIRICAL OBJECT: 
CASE STUDY, INTERVIEWS, PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
AND THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH 
2.1. The paradox of (comparative case study) research. 
There is a constant paradox in sociological research: the aim is to fIx meanings, at the 
same time as maintaining a sense of the limits and fragility of the processes of 
production of those meanings 1. In this chapter I want to make a case for the validity of 
my research design, while at the same time constantly noting its inherent diffIculties and 
limitations. The data collection took place on four sites, and was designed to allow a 
comparison across both disciplines and settings, in order to develop an understanding of 
the positions available to students in relation to socially positioned academic disciplines 
and institutions. In order to reveal the way student positions are dependent on social 
class, the design includes a comparison of institutions that may be expected to embody 
contrasting student groups and educational ethos. However, the distinctions between 
institutions are not homogenous and because of this the comparative positions of the 
two Politics departments are not exactly the same as the comparative positions of the 
two English departments in the study. Thus comparisons across the disciplines must 
take into account these institutional differences, which may limit the extent to which 
observations can be attributed to disciplinary differences alone. The study also explores 
differences in the structure of disciplinary knowledge. However, the identity of the 
disciplines is not fIxed, and is instantiated differently in the different settings. This 
chapter will make the case for considering the modules selected to be the object of study 
as similar objects, at the same time as indicating some of the distinctions between them. 
In addition, the precise nature of my participation in the classes that I observed and in 
the interviews varies according to both discipline and the institutional setting, and this 
variation must be accounted for in the analysis. All of these instabilities in the empirical 
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object and methods are inherent to a comparative case study research design. By 
identifying some of the limitations on the possibility of making comparisons across 
settings I hope to suggest that the analysis presented in the later chapters, also, does not 
ignore them. 
I use the term 'case study' with some hesitancy, since I think the term reveals fairly 
little about the nature of any individual piece of research. It seems plausible that, as 
Andrew Brown and Paul Dowling have commented, there is 'no such thing as "the case 
study approach" other than as constituted by the curricularizing of research methods' 
(Brown and Dowling, 1998, p. 167). However, some consideration of the broad 
implications of what it means to describe and analyse specific instances, or 'cases', may 
be useful in explaining the processes of sampling and data collection within my 
research. There are contrasting definitions of the meaning of 'case study'. Robert Stake, 
for example, suggests a distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'instrumental' case studies. 
'What we may call intrinsic case study', he argues, 'is undertaken because one wants a 
better understanding of this particular case' (Stake, 1994, p. 237). Deacon et aI, in 
contrast, say that to describe a piece of research as case study necessarily 'suggests it is 
an instance of some broader phenomenon' (Deacon et aI, 1999, p. 366). In relation to 
issues of sampling, the notion of 'intrinsic' case study is attractive, since it evaporates 
the problem: if you only want an understanding of the particular case then you do not 
need to demonstrate that the example you have selected has any generalisable features. 
However, at the same time this would evaporate any possible contribution to 
meaningful, or transferable, knowledge. The idea that we do in some sense want the 
'case' to provide insights that go beyond the specific instance appears to me to be 
essential to a meaningful conception of research. The problem we encounter in the 
detailed study of one or more cases is the mass of variables that threaten to confound 
either the validity or the generaliseability of our interpretations. In my study, for 
example, gender, discipline and institution constitute the main reference points that 
structure my interpretation of classroom interaction. I do not consistently factor in, for 
example, the age and experience of individual tutors, which may, in some instances, 
provide an alternative or additional valid interpretation. However, the attempt to take 
account of all variables in each interpretation would undermine the possibility of the 
1 It is in relation to this paradox that Bourdieu suggests that the writing of sociology should always aim at 
45 
study producing knowledge that can be applied beyond the case itself. The researcher's 
responsibility is thus to construct a theoretical framework that provides a solid basis 
both for interpreting the data and for moving beyond if. I present the main features of 
my interpretive framework in the next chapter. However, no matter how well articulated 
and coherent such a framework may be, the idiosyncrasies of the cases being researched 
inevitably provoke stomach churning moments of doube. 
To quell these doubts, I try to remind myself that this research does not make any 
claims about the wider application of specific interpretations of classroom interaction 
within the analysis, but rather suggests that the method of interpretation illustrated here 
provides a plausible and insightful perspective on classroom interaction more generally. 
However, despite all of this hedging, this chapter does argue that the design of the 
research enables comparisons to be made across the settings that constitute the empirical 
object of study with a reasonable level of reliability and validity4. 
2.2. Selection within comparative case study research. 
The problems with generalisation in relation to case study research are inescapable in 
the process of selecting both sites and, for example, interview participants within those 
sites. The available codifications of sampling strategies (see, for example, Wengraf, 
2001, p. 102 - 103) do not provide illuminatingly precise ways of thinking about the 
process of sampling within my research. According to these categories, my sampling of 
both settings and interviewees were to an extent opportunistic, and to an extent theory 
based. Theory based sampling, though, is a very vague category, perhaps best described 
simply as 'a reasoned process rather than a statistical formula' (Wallace et aI, 1998, p. 
90). An even less specific guide to sampling within case study research is to aim for 
balance, variety and an opportunity to learn (Stake, 1994, p. 244). There is some 
purpose to the citation of this relatively vague advice, since it is plausibly the case that 
'systematic circumlocution' (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 27). 
2 For one articulation of these different functions of the conceptual framework, see Bernstein's "Research 
and Languages of Description', in Bernstein, 1996. See also Brown and Dowling, op. cit. 
3 Sally Power's description of her 'dismay' at the extent of the idiosyncrasies of the case study school's in 
her research, and her concern 'that these would "interfere" with the search for generalities' (Power, 1998, 
p. 20), reflects this disconcerting aspect of carrying out research in a limited range of settings, or 'cases'. 
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where the potential sample group is small, ensuring variety across some pertinent 
features (age, gender, ethnicity) may be as much as it is possible, or necessary, to 
control in order to ensure that some valid learning takes place. 
The process of selection of the institutions 
The basis of the reasoning behind my selection of institutions was the relatively crude, 
yet still plausible distinction between institutions at the two extremes of our higher 
education system that I described in the introduction. Consistent with this distinction, 
the institutions I approached all fitted the category of either traditional, highly selective, 
pre-1992 university or new, access oriented, post-1992 university. Both of the Political 
Thought classes were in institutions that conformed very closely to the reputation, 
selection criteria and intake associated with this crude distinction. The contrast between 
the institutions where I observed the American Literature modules conformed slightly 
less closely with the stereotype. 5 
West University has an international reputation and attracts a very high proportion of 
fee paying international students while it is one of the universities with the lowest 
proportions of students from lower socio-economic groups. The Politics department also 
has an international reputation and appears in the top ten of university subject league 
tables. West University has the feel of a wealthy institution with a strong sense of its 
own identity: classrooms are well equipped; reception areas have been recently 
refurbished and reception staff are calm and helpful; electronic displays provide 
information about the days events; and students are familiar with the names and 
political interests of eminent individuals on the staff, in line with the institution's vision 
of itself as a centre of academic and political debate. Entry to the West University 
Politics course is highly competitive. The average student has an A level point score6 of 
29 and over eighty percent of students leave with either an upper second or first class 
degree. Students are required to write two essays each term, but the formal assessment 
is wholly based on an end of the year exam. 
4 The conception of validity used within the study is explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
5 The universities have been given pseudonyms, and I have also altered some minor details in the 
descriptions, in order to maintain the anonymity of both the institutions and the participants. 
6 An 'A' grade at A-level gets 10 points, a 'B' grade eight points, etc .. 
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South University has a poor academic reputation but a clear access mission and a very 
strong tradition of serving 'non traditional' students from the local community. 
According to university league tables, it has amongst the highest proportions of part-
time students, of students from lower socio-economic groups and from ethnic minority 
backgrounds. The university as a whole has amongst the highest university drop-out 
rates and the Politics department has come in the bottom ten of recent subject league 
tables. In contrast to West University's points score requirement of 29, the South 
University Politics course only requires an A level point score of 12 and only around 
thirty percent of students get an upper second or first class degree. Assessment for the 
Introduction to Political Thought is through written assignments completed at the end of 
the module. 
North University is a traditional university with an international reputation but also has 
a strong community mission. It attracts a high proportion of students from the ethnically 
diverse local community and has a relatively high proportion of students from lower 
socio-economic groups (30% in contrast to South University's 400/0 and West 
University's 12%). The North University English department has slightly lower A level 
entry requirements than the West University Politics department (23 points rather than 
29 points), but has a slightly higher proportion of students graduating with upper second 
and first class degrees (90% in comparison with West University's 83%). North 
University thus conforms to the stereotype of a traditional, highly selective university in 
terms of academic status and student achievement, but does not conform so precisely in 
terms of the social and ethnic composition of its student body. 
East University as a whole has a very poor academic reputation, but the English 
department scores relatively highly, coming in the top half of some subject leagues 
tables. However, this does not mean that it is able to attract students with higher entry 
qualifications than the rest of the university: the average A level point score for students 
in the English department is 13, and a significant number of students come in through 
clearing (i.e. they did not put North University down as one of their choices on their 
original application). While some staff in the English department found the entry level 
of students frustrating, admissions were in line with the access mission of the university. 
In East University as a whole, the proportion of students from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds is similar to that in South University, and the proportion of students from 
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ethnic minorities in the English department is slightly higher than in the North 
University department (30% rather than North University's 25%). The percentage of 
students graduating with upper second or first class degrees is 46%, higher than the 
South University Politics department, but significantly lower than either North or West 
University. So, in terms of its mission and student composition, East University is very 
similar to South University. However, overall the English departments at East and 
North Universities have more in common than the Politics departments at South and 
West Universities. 7 
The difference in the comparison between the classes in the English departments and 
the classes in the Politics departments illustrates the dangers inherent in an over-
simplistic use of institutions as a signifier of class. However, the data specific to each 
institution allows us to establish a picture of where each department is positioned in 
relation to the different criteria of reputation, student entry qualifications, and other 
features of the student body as a whole. 
The process of selection of the modules 
There were several criteria for selection of the modules that constituted the object of the 
research. First, as I have already explained, I wanted to contrast a temporally dominant 
discipline with a descriptive, or critical discipline. Secondly, I wanted to select 
disciplines in which I had at least some background knowledge, so I would be able to 
use my own judgement to assess and analyse disciplinary statements. Political Thought 
and American Literature fulfilled both of these criteria. Finally, I wanted the modules in 
each university to be as similar as possible, so I would, ideally, be able to compare 
discussions of the same texts in two contexts. 
The canon of Modem Political Thought is narrow and extremely stable and as a result 
the course outline and set texts for the first year Political Thought modules at the two 
universities overlapped to a significant extent. Both included as primary texts Hobbes' 
Leviathan, Locke's Two Treatises of Government, Mill's On Liberty, Marx and Engels' 
The Communist Manifesto and Rawls' A Theory of Justice. The West University 
7 The main source for the data in this section is the Guardian University Guide, 
www.educationGuardian.co.ukiuniversity guide, retrieved 30/5/2002. Some statistics have been slightly 
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Introduction to Political Thought was spread over two tenns, and the Modem Political 
Thought section of the course took up a whole tenn. In contrast, in South University the 
Introduction to Political Thought module lasted for one tenn, and the Modem section 
took up eight out of the twelve weeks. In West University the lectures tended to take a 
slightly more philosophical approach to the discipline while the South University 
lectures were, relatively, more historically based. In South University, in addition to the 
set texts that were shared with West University, there were also sessions on Hegel, 
Feminism, and Radical Political Movements. Thus, while the majority of the set texts in 
the classes that I observed represent the perspectives of either Liberal or social contract 
theory, Marxism was also studied in both universities, while other radical streams of 
Political Thought were only introduced in South University. The differences between 
, 
the modules reflected the political position of both the course lecturers and the 
institutions. West University as an institution might be said to identify closely with 
dominant political institutions, and the fact that it had recently cut option modules in 
Radical Thought and that the Political Thought lecturers could all be categorised within 
the paradigm of liberalism would clearly be consistent with this close identification with 
the establishment. South University, in contrast, historically has a reputation as a radical 
institution and the Political Thought tutor was a politically active Marxist, which was 
reflected in his inclusion of radical political movements within the core first year 
syllabus. These differences were also evident, to a certain extent, in the presentation of 
the texts within the lectures, but the general presentation of the canonical texts was 
broadly similar in both universities. 
There is also an identifiable, if slightly less narrow or stable canon for American 
Literature courses. Sessions on slave narratives, Melville's Moby Dick and Twain's 
Huckleberry Finn provided a common core on both of the modules that I observed. 
Both courses also included texts by Henry James. As was the case in Political Thought, 
North University, the selective, 'old' university, offered a two tenn, rather than a one 
tenn course. This was presented as having the very general aim: 
adapted to maintain the anonymity of the institutions, i.e. some figures have been adjusted by one or two 
percentage points so institutions cannot be easily identified by reference to the source tables. 
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to read a range of significant American literature from the nineteenth century and thus be made 
familiar with the major themes and stylistic trends within this literature and the social and 
intellectual history of the period. (North University American Literature course outline) 
The East University tutor explained her course in slightly narrower, or more specific 
terms: 
I conceive of it as a thematic module. And the theme is the extent to which notions of American 
nationhood and notions of American identity are produced through experiences of movement, 
migration, exile, border crossing ... the concern is, how do we know what America is? (East 
University American Literature tutor, interview) 
This apparent difference was reflected to some extent in the set texts, which in East 
University included poetry by Chinese, Japanese and Mexican Americans, and prison 
writings by African Americans. However, in fact, the same questioning of what 
'America' means, and of what it means to be American, were central in both tutors' 
presentation of their courses. It is also worth noting that both tutors were graduates of 
American Studies now teaching in English departments, and the students were all 
studying either straight Literature or Literature and Drama courses. In an American 
Studies degree, history and geography are taught by specialists in separate modules, and 
so a certain level of contextual knowledge about America can be assumed in literature 
classes. Tutors teaching American Literature on an English degree cannot assume that 
their students have this type of background knowledge, and both of the tutors in my 
study felt a certain obligation to feed in historical information through their lectures. 
Table 1: Classes observed 
East Introduction Melville, Melville, Olaudah Prison Immigrant 
University to the course: MobyDick, MobyDick, Equiano, The writings poetry 
American Gary Soto I 2 Interesting 
Literature poems Narrative 
North Hawthorne, Slave Melville, Twain, Melville, Melville, Davis, 'Life in 
University The Scarlet narratives 'Benito Huckleberry Moby MobyDick, the Iron Mills' 
American Letter Cereno' Finn Dick,l 2 and Alcott, 
Literature short story. 
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West Hobbes Locke Rousseau, 1 Rousseau, 2 MiII Hobbes, + Marx and Revision 
University Social Engels session 
Political Contract 
Thought Theory 
South Locke, Mill Rousseau Essay Hegel Marx and Radical 
University and liberalism vs Burke writing Engels political 
Political workshop thought 
Thought 
In addition to the overlap in set texts, the format of the all four classes, while not 
identical, was at least comparable. In three of the four departments the seminar followed 
on from a lecture on the same topic. The lectures, which I also attended, took place 
either in the hour immediately before the class, or earlier in the week. In North 
University and South University, the lecture was given by the class tutor. In West 
University, the lecture was given by the course co-ordinator, rather than by the class 
tutor, who was a doctoral student in the department. In the East University American 
Literature class, the tutor integrated her lecture and the class discussion into one two 
hour session. In each case, the classes were designed to provide opportunities for 
student participation and discussion. I attended and in some cases also videoed the 
lectures, but based my analysis mainly on the section of the sessions that included 
student participation. 
The companson across disciplines might perhaps be affected by the fact that the 
Introduction to Political Thought is a first year module, while the American Literature 
option, in both universities, is a second/third year module. Clearly, students might be 
expected to have developed their fluency in disciplinary vocabularies and their 
confidence in the academic setting during additional years of study. This possibility was 
considered during each stage of the analysis, and the interpretations presented, I would 
argue, do not rely on this feature of comparability across the disciplines. Nevertheless, it 
is also worth noting that several students in both Political Thought classes were not in 
fact in their first year at university, some had already studied Politics and/or Philosophy 
at school while others had not, and several had direct experience of political activism. In 
the American Literature classes, few of the students had any background in the study of 
American History, which was relatively central to the presentation of the discipline by 
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both tutors. These complicating details suggest that generalisations about the level of 
induction of students into the discipline and culture of their classes require some care. 
The process of selection of the classes 
The selection of classes was largely opportunistic. As a part of the process of 
negotiating access, I spoke to all the class tutors and also to the West University 
Political Thought course co-ordinator before finalising arrangements for coming to 
observe their sessions. These discussions were fairly informal and mostly consisted in 
them explaining the background, structure and aims of their courses, as well as asking 
me any questions that they had about my research. However, in each case there was 
more than one class running that I might have observed, and the tutors and in West 
University, the course co-ordinator contributed to my selection of which class to go in 
to. 
In West University, there were several first year Political Thought classes running, 
taught by several postgraduate students. The classes had already been running for about 
half a term by the time the arrangements were being made. The course co-ordinator 
suggested that it would be best for me to contact the only tutor who was not teaching the 
course for the first time and who, on the basis of previous observations, she felt 
conformed very well to the preferred teaching style of the department. In addition, the 
particular group this tutor was teaching was considered to be particularly high level and 
to exemplify the type of seminar interaction that the department was aiming for. 
In both South and East University I had a choice between an evening and a morning 
class. The East University English tutor suggested that I come to the evening class, 
since students were often late for the nine a.m. session. The South University Politics 
tutor suggested that I come to the morning session, since people were often more tired 
in the evening class. I went along with the suggestion of both tutors. 
In North University, the tutor repeated the same session twice on Monday mornings, 
after giving his nine a.m. lecture. He was happy for me to attend either class, despite the 
fact that he found the eleven a.m. class slightly easier to teach. In the end, I went to the 
ten a.m. class, the group he was finding slightly more awkward to teach. 
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The process of selection of student interviewees8 
There were some minimal criteria that I aimed to fulfil in identifying students to take 
part in individual interviews. I wanted to interview both male and female students and I 
wanted to interview both students who spoke in class and those who did not speak. I 
also anticipated that there might be occasions where I would want to speak to specific 
students about specific interventions they had made in class, although in the event this 
was less significant than I had expected, and I planned interviews for specific students 
who had agreed to be interviewed, rather than selecting students to fit the interview 
schedule. 
The identification of student interviewees varied slightly in each setting. In East 
University, where we were a very small class and the atmosphere was quite relaxed, 
over the course of the sessions I approached all of the students to ask if they would 
mind being interviewed. All agreed, except for one who found it difficult to get time off 
work, the two students from the US, who also said that they didn't have time, and one 
student who had to start attending the morning class, because of work commitments. 
There was one other student who agreed to be interviewed, but we didn't manage to 
arrange a time to meet. So I interviewed four of the nine regular attenders. In South 
University, the process was similar, but it was harder to keep track of who I had asked, 
because the class composition was less stable, and because about half of the students 
would regularly leave after the lecture, before the seminar. I asked all of the regular 
attenders and interviewed six. In West University, the process was more or less the 
same: I approached all of the students who attended the class regularly and interviewed 
all those who agreed and could find the time. 
In North University, I found the process slightly more problematic. Because the class 
was larger, it took me longer to get to know the students in the group, which made me 
slightly more tentative about approaching people. In addition, as I have noted, the tutor 
had found the class slightly awkward, and although this was not excessive, the 
atmosphere was not very relaxed, people did not seem to hang about and chat, or to 
make general conversation at all during the classes. I initially approached students who 
had made some sort of contact, either by catching my eye or smiling, or who I had 
8 As with the universities, the participants have all been given pseudonyms, and I have occasionally 
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talked to in group-work during the session. I also approached one or two students who 
had either spoken a lot, or not at all. In this way, I did manage to cover my initial 
criteria, but when I had finished, I discovered that all of the students I had interviewed 
were third years, when in fact about half of the class were in their second year. I suspect 
that the additional confidence of the third year students, or the additional hesitancy of 
the second years, combined with the slightly tense atmosphere in the class, influenced 
my identification of interviewees. Some possible causes and effects of the slight 
awkwardness the tutor had noticed in the class will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter six. 
Table 2: Student interviewees9 
Number of students Student Interviewees 
who regularly 
attended seminar. 
East University 9 Helen Hamid Edward Monica 
American Literature 
North University 21 David Rajpal Ambia Rose Sevket Bashir 
American Literature 
West University 12 Rachel Tom Harrison Megan Charlotte Mark 
Political Thought 
South University 12 Will Gabor Laura Nadia Guy Waheed 
Political Thought 
2.3. Observation, participation and research ethics. 
Another paradox of research is embodied in the inevitable conflict between the desire to 
collect reliable data and the desire to maintain ethical relations with human 
'participants' in social research. In carrying out observational studies, the need to gain 
and maintain access and to elicit relevant data constitute quite different rationales for 
decision making to the need to be open and ethical, although sometimes the conclusions 
of these two reasoning processes may coincide or the distinction between the reasoning 
processes may become entangled. At an extreme it can be argued that all observation 
constitutes a form of symbolic violence in the construction of its object (see, for 
example, Chow, 1993). There are, however, persuasive practical justifications for 
altered minor details in describing the participants, in order to ensure their anonymity. 
9 Tables of anonymised details of all students can be found in appendix. 2. 
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observational research, which might even be presented as a way of mitigating some of 
the dangers of objectification: political claims can be constructed about the 
democratising potential of some ethnographic and observational research (Atkinson and 
Hammersley, 1994, p. 256); more pragmatic positions simply suggest that observational 
studies can increase the validity of research and thus reduce the distortions of 
objectification. I think there is some validity in both these positions, however it is the 
more pragmatic justifications of observational methods that motivated my research 
design. 
The most obvious pragmatic justification for observation is that it avoids over-reliance 
on second-hand data collected through, for example, interviews or questionnaires 
(Deacon et aI, 1999, p. 258 - 9). Kay Thomas's research into the relationship between 
gender and disciplinary identity in higher education (Thomas, 1990) was limited by its 
reliance on interview data. She was not, for example, able to evaluate any gap between 
her participants' reporting of their experience in the classroom and what had actually 
taken place, and thus she could not distinguish between differences in the ways in which 
male and female students participate in the classroom and the differences in the ways 
that female and male students represent their experience of the classroom in an 
interview setting. Another significant advantage of longer term observation is that it 
enables you to develop an understanding of what counts as 'normal' within the setting 
that you are observing, and thus to develop a reliable basis for identifying 'critical' 
cases, or what constitutes the margins of the practice (Deacon et aI, ibid, p. 260). This 
feature of longer term observation was particularly significant in relation to my 
objective of identifying the boundaries of legitimate classroom practice within different 
disciplines. It was only the analysis of transcripts of classes from a series of sessions 
that gave me a reliable basis for constructing a definition of 'marginal' practice. 
Although the interviews alone might have provided me with clues as to certain 
individuals or types of intervention that participants considered unusual or comment 
worthy, it was the observation data that provided a sound basis for such interpretations. 
Observational research does not necessarily involve videoing. However, the level of 
detail required in order to analyse the nature of disciplinary statements meant that I 
would need a full transcript of class discussions. My main reason for videoing the 
sessions, then, was to facilitate the transcribing process, and to help me to identify 
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speakers in relatively large group discussions. However, there was a secondary, aim 
connected to the difficulty of establishing what counts as informed consent lO. Even if 
you provide participants with a detailed account of the processes and possible outcomes 
of the research, the extent to which they can genuinely be aware of the ways in which 
you may interpret their contributions, and of how these interpretations may then be 
presented in the reporting of the research, is still arguable. I want to suggest that the use 
of video, which acts as a constant reminder of the active presence of the researcher, can 
facilitate the process of ensuring that participants in observational settings are aware of 
the material consequences of their consent to participate in the research. 
The student participants in my research cannot have had a very detailed or precise sense 
of what I was doing. The issue of informed consent was addressed most explicitly the 
first time I visited each class when I spent about five minutes at the beginning of the 
session explaining my project and answering any questions. I also provided an 
information sheet to all my participants (see appendix 1), and offered a variety of other 
opportunities for student participants to ask me about my research, either in person or 
through e-mail. None of the students took me up on these offers and I was left slightly 
uncertain of the extent to which they understood the kind of activity that I was involved 
in. However, a video does constitute a very visible intrusion into a classroom and in 
some way, I would argue, the presence of the video constituted another level on which 
students were constantly reminded of the research process in which they had agreed to 
participate. By remaining in the classes with the video recording, and, more 
importantly, by adapting their participation, if they wished to, in response to the video, 
the students could, in a sense, be said to have both re-asserted their consent, and to have 
taken some, limited, control over what they had consented to. Because the main subject 
matter of the class discussions was not of a particularly sensitive nature, I judged the 
risk that the camera would deter participation in a way that would seriously affect my 
findings was unlikely, while the limited control that it might give to participants was 
desirable. In this instance, then, the ethical and the practical justifications for the 
research method are distinct, but the decision to use a video in my data collection was 
consistent with both sets of considerations. In addition to using the video as a device to 
facilitate informed consent, I also provided all participants with the transcripts of the 
10 See Miller and Bell, 2002, for a detailed discussion of some of these difficulties. 
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classes each week, to give them a sense of the way in which their activity was being 
transformed in the process of my research. 
My participation in class discussions was also motivated by both pragmatic and ethical 
considerations. I have so far avoided using the term 'participant observation', which, in 
a similar way to 'case study', is used too generally to add much clarity to a description 
of research. However, Deacon et aI's definition of participant observation as 'intended 
to generate more information and data than would be possible without participation' 
(op. cit p. 251) provides a useful clarification of pragmatic motivations for researcher 
participation in observation settings. Ethical issues arise, however, when one of the 
methods of 'generating more information' involves explicitly setting out to establish 
rapport with your participants. The practice of 'establishing rapport' has been presented 
in standard research methods literature as an ethically unproblematic and essential 
research strategy (see, for example, Fontana and Frey, 1994, p. 367). Jean Duncombe 
and Julie Jessop, however, have argued against the neutrality of the strategy, describing 
'the 'commodification' of the skills of 'doing rapport" (Duncombe and Jessop, 2002, p. 
109) as an ethically ambiguous research practice. They are particularly concerned about 
cases where the professional construction of rapport can 'encourage or persuade 
interviewees to explore and disclose experiences and emotions which - on reflection-
they may have preferred to keep to themselves or even 'not to know" (ibid, p. 120)1l. 
However, I would argue that the issue of 'doing rapport' has more general repercussions 
in relation to informed consent, and there is an extent to which deliberately generating 
good relations with your participants inevitably reduces their expectation that you are 
going to analyse the data that they provide in a way that can be perceived as both 
academically and personally critical. In addition to the pragmatic objective of getting a 
better sense of the classroom interaction, then, I also saw my participation in the classes 
that I observed as an opportunity for students to hear me express opinions and to get a 
sense of me as someone who might disagree with them, so that they would also, 
perhaps, gain a small sense that in engaging in my research they were offering 
themselves up to some kind of critical analysis from someone who might not be wholly 
11 Valerie Hey, in her development of a more complex argument about the politics of research, suggests 
that theorising rapport as a commodity in this way can be over reductive. She argues that this 
conceptualisation of rapport ignores the constitutive excess of emotion, experience and psychic 
identifications that makes up instances of rapport and that also constitutes a basis from which to theorise 
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friendly or impartial. In this way a possible perception of me as an 'objective' 
researcher would, I hoped, be undennined. 
My participation consisted in my doing the reading for each session and trying to make 
sure that I contributed to class discussions in most, if not all of the sessions. I also 
joined smaller groups when tutors divided the classes for some specific activities. In 
this way I achieved my pragmatic objective of getting a sense of the class and of what it 
was like to listen and offer contributions within the group. My position in class 
discussions, however, was slightly different in the two disciplines. In the Political 
Thought classes I had a thorough grasp on the detail of the arguments from the outset, 
and so my participation was less natural, or, on some occasions, was more in the role of 
teacher than student. In the American Literature classes, where I was studying new texts 
within a discipline that I have not studied fonnally beyond A level, I felt that I was in a 
more similar position to the students: I had genuine questions to ask, and was genuinely 
tentative in offering my own interpretations. These discipline specific positions gave me 
different insights into the classes. For example, in one of the Political Thought classes I 
found myself articulating a point I wanted to make as a question to the tutor. The fact 
that although I was confident of my understanding, I still confonned to the convention 
of posing statements as questions revealed the strength of the classroom culture which 
constructed the majority of student interventions as questions. 
It is more difficult for me to evaluate the effectiveness of my participation as a way of 
enhancing infonned consent. A proper evaluation of this would have required another 
level of data collection, which was not incorporated into my research design. However, 
these reflections do seem to me to suggest a possible area for future investigation into 
the ethics of research methods. 
2.4. Some contextual features of the interviews. 
It is a truism within qualitative research that interviews are inter-subjective contexts that 
constitute their own modes of interaction. Labov's much cited analysis of two 
'sameness' as a basis for political engagement (Hey, 2000). This argument, however, does not suggest 
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interviews with the same eight-year-old boy demonstrates how the adult interviewer can 
manipulate the setting to increase the responsiveness of an un-talkative infonnant 
(Labov, 1969). The same point has since been developed and refined in the qualitative 
research literature. Tom Wengrafs detailed analysis of extracts from research 
interviews demonstrates not only how the researcher's interventions can be specifically 
formulated to facilitate informants responses, but also how each intervention, from both 
researcher and informant, combines in an interactive process that constructs the 
interview as a social event (Wengraf, 2001, ch. 2). However, the precise interpretation 
of this social event is problematic. Wengraf suggests that in most cases there will be 
alternative plausible interpretations of an interview transcript and that fuller infonnation 
about the precise vocal and emotional inflection of interventions within the interview 
can help to narrow down these multiple possibilities. He concludes that in order to 
interpret interactive interview processes 'it will be very important to know more than 
the words on the page tell us about the interview interaction' (ibid, p. 25). This does not 
mean that it is impossible to make any interpretations based on what will be inevitably 
an incomplete record of the context of data collection. It does however mean that 
possible contextual factors influencing the construction of the interview must be taken 
into account within our interpretations. One significant contextual factor in my 
interviews with students was the culture of the classes that we had both attended. The 
possibility of becoming 'too drawn into the view of the world constructed by those we 
are studying' (Deacon et aI, 1999, p. 256) and of the danger that this may lead to a loss 
of analytical distance has been discussed in the qualitative research literature. My 
suggestion is that my position within the cultures that I was researching may have 
affected my mode of questioning: that the culture of the classroom influenced my 
interaction with my interviewees. 
The interviews in my study were designed to elicit students' re-iteration of disciplinary 
ideas as well as some reflection on the sessions, the discipline, and the students' general 
experience of the classroom. The interview schedules (See appendix 3) were based 
closely on the observed sessions. During the period when I was observing a module I 
would attend the class, spend the next two or three days transcribing the video of the 
session, and then use the transcript to prepare the interview schedule for the next week's 
that the ethical implications of 'doing rapport' within specific research projects should be ignored. 
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interviews. The interview began with some general questions about the classes and then 
I would show the student a list of concepts discussed in the previous session. I would 
ask them to explain or define a selection, including some they found easy or interesting, 
and some they found more difficult. Then I would give them a transcript of the previous 
session, and we would discuss some short extracts that I had marked on the text12 . I 
used follow up questions, to try to identify and clarify students' own opinions on 
disciplinary concepts and claims, and also to explore the possible origins of these 
opinions. Although I had prepared prompts for some stages of the interview, most 
follow up questions were constructed spontaneously during the interview. It seems 
plausible, then, to suggest that the nature and quantity of follow up questions may have 
been influenced by the culture of the class that I was observing. Indeed, during my 
analysis of the interviews, it seemed to me that my questioning on conceptual issues 
was more rigorous and challenging with students from the West University Political 
Thought class than with students from the South University class. This difference 
correlated with the more confident and combative nature of the West University 
students' classroom discussions. 
In relation to the analysis, what is important is to ensure that such differences as, for 
example, greater quantities of data or fuller explanations of individual positions, are not 
interpreted as representative of students' ideas or abilities, but rather as representative of 
the way such ideas were expressed in the particular contexts of the classroom and of the 
interview. Thus while it may be a feature of qualitative data collection that involves 
both observation and interviews that the culture of the research site influences the 
interview interaction, as long as this is factored into your interpretations, it need not 
affect the reliability and validity of the analysis. 
12 In the initial interviews I carried out, in East University and South University, I also took in the video, 
so that students could watch and listen to the extracts as well as reading them in the transcript. However, 
following the video took more time than simply reading the transcript, and seeI?ed to pro~uce only 
minimal additional information, so in the final interviews I only provided students wlth a transcnpt. 
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2.5. The tutor interviews, the object of research and the process of 
analysis. 
The tutor interviews 13, like the student interviews, included discussion of extracts from 
the transcripts, and thus, in themselves, constituted one stage of feedback to participants 
on my research. However, the ethical issues that arose in this stage of feedback were 
more complex than those that arose in the feedback to student participants. The first of 
these issues relates to a sense in which I was breaking an un-stated confidentiality with 
students when I discussed their interventions with their tutors. The second issue relates 
to the extent to which I was willing to accept tutors' interpretations of the classes or, 
alternatively, I was simply using their interpretations as additional data. 
One or two of the students I interviewed seemed a little surprised or uncertain when I 
asked them to comment on interventions by other students in the class. I interpreted this 
as either a lack of interest in other students' opinions, or an unwillingness to cast 
judgement on their peers. However, I did not find these responses ethically problematic, 
since any judgment they might make was not made from a position of authority. In 
contrast, the tutors' judgements carried some authority, and thus when I was asking 
them to articulate evaluations of students that they might not have formulated without 
my prompting, there was a sense in which I was responsible for making students 
vulnerable to unusual scrutiny by their tutors. This was particularly apparent when I 
introduced issues relating to problematic or marginal students into interviews with 
tutors. On several occasions I felt a sense of complicity with the tutors in discussing 
interventions that in some ways went counter to the culture of the classes. This sense of 
complicity was enhanced because I tended to share more of my initial interpretations 
with the tutors than with the students. This was partly because these interviews took 
place later than the student interviews, at least a few weeks after the end of the period of 
observation. It was also because, in relation to questions about the discipline, the tutors 
would be more likely than students firstly to understand the point of my interpretations, 
and, secondly, to offer pertinent alternative interpretations. Thus while both the student 
and tutor interviews constituted a part of the process of analysis of the class transcripts, 
this was more explicit in the interviews with the tutors. 
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At the same time, I felt that, precisely because their position in the classes constituted an 
element of their professional authority, the tutors were in some ways more vulnerable 
than the students. I was opening up aspects of their professional practice for 
examination in a way that they might not have anticipated or desired. There was also a 
certain level of deceit, or 'doing rapport', in my discussions with the tutors: I was 
asking for their opinion on extracts of the classes, and thus apparently involving them in 
the process of analysis, while in fact I wielded ultimate authority as to the extent to 
which I either incorporated their interpretations into my analysis or, alternatively, 
analysed their interpretations as exemplifications of their practice. So, when a Political 
Thought tutor provided an insightful analysis of the way a student's interventions 
conformed to her expectations of academic discourse within class discussions, I 
incorporated this into my analysis of the discipline, but when an American Literature 
tutor analysed his approach to issues of gender in the classroom, this became a part of 
the object of my analysis of his position as tutor. It can, perhaps, be self indulgent to 
make too much of these ethical conundrums. The tutors I interviewed were aware of the 
general processes of academic analysis in the social sciences, and all of them had also 
shown an interest in the analysis of their practice, which was why they had agreed to 
participate in the research in the first place. Nevertheless, despite the fact that 
participants may understand and consent to the ambiguities inherent in the interview 
process, it is desirable to maintain some clarity in conceptualising the function of each 
stage of the research, and to be aware that the distinction between generating data and 
generating analysis is not always easy to maintain. 
In addition to the scheduled tutor interviews immediately following the observation 
period, I also arranged additional meetings with two of the tutors about mid-way into 
my analysis, and then, as I was nearing completion of the research, I sent a summary of 
my findings both to tutors and also to student participants. There was more clarity about 
this final stage of consultation, and the feedback I got from tutors on the summary was 
used solely to clarify points in the analysis, and not as further data to be interpreted. 
\3 An example of a tutor interview schedule can be found in Appendix 4. 
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2.6. Transforming the data into the thesis: field notes, transcription 
and the process of analysis. 
I have already partially described some of the processes by which the events that 
constituted the object of research began to be transformed into the research itself. Notes 
taken during interviews and classroom observations constitute, perhaps, the fIrst of 
these processes. The transcription of talk into text is also a signifIcant stage in the 
transformation of the data. The interview discussions, as I have already described, were 
also a part of the process of translating the events that took place in the classroom into 
the analysis that constitutes the research. The most signifIcant stage of this process of 
translation, however, came after the main period of data collection, reading, annotating, 
comparing and analysing whole transcripts and extracts of the transcripts. 
I took notes during the classes and also after interviews. The class-notes recorded both 
the disciplinary content of the session and also any initial thoughts on signifIcant 
interventions or features of the interaction. I also usually made some brief notes after 
the interviews to remind myself of my general impressions, and points that I thought 
would be significant in the analysis, and, similarly, I annotated transcripts with initial 
interpretations as I was transcribing. However, I am generally fairly dubious about the 
value of such impressionistic analysis. It is at this point, I feel, that the researcher's 
position is most likely to lack distance from the material, and so such observations 
should be treated as data, rather than as analysis carried out with appropriate critical 
distance. My initial responses to a comment, an individual, or a setting may point me in 
the direction of a fruitful line of analysis. They should not, however, be treated as more 
reliable or valid than later interpretations. For example, during one interview, a slightly 
reticent student, speaking in a slightly monotonous voice, commented with some 
scepticism about the supposed increase in openness in relation to issues 0 f 'race' and 
sexuality. I asked her if she included herself in her scepticism, and she replied 'Oh, I 
think I'm a very open person'. Although I laughed when she said this and so she was 
clearly being relatively light hearted, I initially took her comment at face value, and 
interpreted it as an indication of a certain complacency and lack of reflexivity in relation 
to the issues we were discussing. In fact, though, I did not have enough data to support 
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this initial interpretation. Perhaps her comment was intentionally ironic. There is, I 
would argue, a limit to the usefulness of field-notes as an interpretive tool, and they 
should be used with care in guiding, rather than providing, the process of interpretation. 
Some people clearly work in a different way from me, and make far more use of stream 
of consciousness, impressionistic recording of their own responses to data. Tom 
Wengraf is almost evangelical in his enthusiasm for 'self debriefing', and he suggests 
'free associating' onto tape or paper immediately after an interview (Wengraf, 2001, p. 
138), or writing down the 'flood of memories that will be provoked' when you listen to 
your tapes for the first time (ibid, 209). He argues that this stage of note taking is 'as 
central to understanding the interview and advancing your professional competence for 
interviewing in general as is the recording and analysis of the interview' (ibid, p. 138). 
My reticence about this method is undoubtedly connected to my almost complete 
inability to 'free associate' at any time, including when I have just fmished an 
interview, or when I have just listened to a recording of my data. I don't really want to 
deny that this approach to data processing may yield significant insights, but equally, I 
am unwilling to accept that my inability to work in this way invalidates my own 
analysis. 
The main consideration in carrying out the transcription of recorded data must always 
be the level of analysis that is needed to meet the objectives of the research (Wengraf, 
ibid, p. 223). The structure of my research required two different levels of analysis. 
Firstly, distinguishing and describing disciplinary statements typical of Political 
Thought and American Literature, required accurate transcription of the ideas and the 
way that ideas were developed and related to each other in the participants talk: the 
precise vocabulary, intonation and other paralinguistic features were unlikely to 
influence this level of analysis. The second level of analysis of the transcripts was 
intended to identify the way students positioned themselves within the classroom. At 
this level of analysis the interpretation of paralinguistic signals is more likely to be of 
significance than in the analysis of disciplinary statements. In an ideal situation I would 
have systematised my method of recording of such signals before I began my research. 
In practice, my transcription was not so systematic, and I used a variety of different 
methods to record non-verbal information within my observation and interview data. 
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I fully or very nearly fully transcribed all my video and aUdio-tape data, creating 
sentences out of the recorded speech. I occasionally summarised the gist of what 
someone was saying, rather than transcribing word for word, usually when a tutor was 
speaking at length, perhaps giving several explanations of the same point. I used a 
variety of methods for recording non-verbal infonnation. I sometimes used footnotes to 
record observations, about, for example, groupings within the classroom that were 
visible in the video footage, or a sense of a particular mood or atmosphere. I also 
inserted comments into my transcripts, if a speaker was, for example, notably hesitant, 
or if participants were, for example, inattentive. I did not use any systematic methods 
for transcribing pauses, interruptions or overlapping speech, although I did record these 
features when they appeared to me to be significant, either as individual instances or as 
a feature of a particular setting. During the process of analysis, if I felt that an 
interpretation was reliant on an interpretation of paralinguistic features, I returned to the 
original tapes to check the meaning of my notations. Thus, although not wholly 
systematic, the combination of transcription and re-checking within the analysis 
provided enough detail to ensure the reliability of my interpretations. 
As I have said, the main stages of the analysis, and the most difficult to describe, came 
after the majority of the data had been collected, when I was reading, annotating, 
comparing and analysing whole transcripts and extracts of transcripts. In the first stage 
of this process, I was largely familiarising myself with the data, although I was also 
continually looking for ways to make comparisons across the settings. My first attempts 
at writing an analysis of the data did not incorporate a clear definition of the disciplines. 
Instead it picked out some instances of students' discussion of issues within the 
discipline that they were studying, at the same time as making comparisons across the 
sites in relation to the extent to which the tutor controlled the discussion and in relation 
to the overall 'academic' or 'less academic' nature of interventions. While some 
individual interpretations from this initial stage were incorporated into the final 
analysis, the initial categorisation of 'academic' and 'non academic' interventions did 
not meet the objectives of the study, which required a more specific definition of the 
disciplines. 
The final stage of data processing included two distinct modes of analysis. The first 
mode of analysis constituted the development of a definition of the disciplines. I began 
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with some sense of the structure of arguments in Political Thought, while I was less 
familiar with the structure of arguments in American Literature. During the analysis I 
identified interventions in the class transcripts that constituted disciplinary statements, 
or knowledge claims, and compared the structure of these statements across and within 
the disciplines. When I began to construct a definition of each discipline, I checked it 
against other examples from the transcripts. However, I did not carry out a 
comprehensive analysis of every intervention in each session, to see whether they 
conformed to structure of the discipline as I had defined it. There were two reasons for 
omitting this level of analysis. Firstly, the nature of the discussions in the classes meant 
that some interactions were more social than academic, and so it would be difficult to 
decide which interventions should be counted in a quantitative analysis of statements 
that conformed or failed to conform to my definition of the discipline. Secondly, my 
definitions were not inconsistent with definitions of the disciplines provided in external 
sources, the tutor interviews and academic textbooks, for example. These external 
sources, then, provided an additional check on the reliability of my interpretation of the 
features of the disciplines. 
The second mode of analysis was intended to identify students' positioning within the 
classes. To some extent, then, each interpretation stands alone as a description of an 
individual student's positioning within a specific context. However, I was also 
identifying similarities in these positions that would enable me to make generalisations 
about groups of students within and across the different settings. My main strategy for 
constructing these generalisations was to identify similarities between individual 
interpretations, rather than to check one interpretation across the whole data set. The 
level of detail involved in the close textual analysis of talk and cross checking across 
interview and observation data made this kind of comprehensive analysis of the whole 
data set somewhat unfeasible. Having begun to identify similarities in the positioning of 
different groups, however, I did then check across the relevant class and interview 
transcripts to see if other examples in the data supported my generalisations. While this 
process was not comprehensive to the extent of checking that every intervention 
conformed to one of the categories I was constructing, it was comprehensive to the 
extent that I referred to examples across the whole data set to check the limits of the 
claims I could make based on my interpretation of specific extracts of data. This 
enabled me to check the validity of these interpretations as a representation of larger 
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groups of students. These two different types of analysis, the construction of definitions 
of the disciplines and the interpretation of student positions, are explained in more detail 
in the next chapter. Here I have merely been evoking a sense of the practical processes 
that correlated with the development of the analysis at a more abstract level. 
Finally, it is worth noting that some of the data collected was not sUbjected to the full 
process of analysis. I collected example student essays, reading lists and course 
handouts from each of the modules. These materials were used to develop a fuller 
understanding of the context, and were only rarely drawn upon in specific 
interpretations within the analysis. 
2.7. Conclusions. 
This chapter has attempted to provide a clear picture of the empirical object of the 
research, while maintaining a sense of the fragility and permeability of its boundaries. I 
have argued that, despite their idiosyncrasies, the institutions selected for comparison 
can reasonably be taken to represent distinct social and educational cultures and thus to 
provide an adequate basis for comparisons made within the study. Similarly, although 
the disciplines are constituted in slightly different ways in the different institutions, the 
objects represented in the observed modules are similar enough to provide a valid basis 
for comparison of interaction in the different settings. The boundaries of both the 
institutions and the disciplines, I have suggested, are constructed by the study and are 
neither stable nor autonomous entities. Similarly, I have suggested, the process of data 
collection is constitutive of the data that is its object and the methods of data collection 
themselves are constituted in relation to both pragmatic and ethical considerations. By 
exploring the limits of the sites, objects and methods of data collection and of the 
discursive rationales for the use of the chosen methods, I hope to have both provided a 
plausible account of the research design and also demonstrated that the liminal features 
described in this chapter have been taken into account in the analysis of the data. 
The next chapter will set out the framework for analysis that was both developed and 
applied in processing the data. It will also present an initial objectification of the 
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disciplines and a Lacanian conception of gender, each of which constitutes a reference 
point for the analysis of student positioning within the study_ 
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Chapter 3 
THE INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS, 
GENDER AND AN OBJECTIFICATION OF THE DISCIPLINES 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I am going to attempt to set out, as far as possible, my methods of 
analysis and to explore the validity of the particular interpretive approach that I am 
using. The full process of construction of each specific interpretation is, inevitably, 
beyond description. Nevertheless, it is possible to construct a general account of the 
approaches being used. Very generally, then, the argument that will be developed in this 
chapter is that interpretations are valid on the basis that they aim to explore the 
construction of meaning, rather than to describe 'external reality'. This exploration of 
meaning, however, cannot take place without recourse to certain founding concepts that 
are external to the text under analysis. Most generally, a conception of coherence and 
consistency is used to identify where the stories or explanations presented in a text are 
suspect or incomplete. However, the process of constructing coherent meanings within 
interpretations also requires reference to other concepts that are external to the initial 
text. It is clearly not possible to justify all concepts used within all interpretations. 
However, certain ideas that structure the overall interpretive framework do require some 
exegesis. Within this chapter, therefore, I attempt to clarify my conception of gender, or 
'the feminine', and also my definition of the disciplines of American Literature and 
Political Thought. These concepts require specific definition because they constitute 
central reference points within my interpretive framework. 
The modes of analysis that I am describing can broadly be categorised as 'narrative' and 
'content'. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify what is meant by the distinction 
between these two modes of analysis and the way that data is conceptualised within 
each mode. I am beginning with three ways of conceptualising data. The first two of 
these are implicit and explicit narratives. Although these two look different, in terms of 
some of their surface characteristics, they can be analysed in similar ways: as 
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representing the subjective position of the speaker. The third way of conceptualising 
data is as content rather than narrative. This is data that I am interpreting as an instance 
of itself, rather than as representative of inter-subjective relations between speaker and 
context. Content analysis is used within the thesis to define and identify the two 
disciplines and their methodologies. 
In the first section of this chapter I will present a definition of 'narrative' and exemplify 
what is then involved in 'narrative analysis'. I will also explain how a conception of 
validity can be constructed in relation to this type of analysis. Finally, I will present two 
of the concepts that I will use to structure my interpretation of narratives within my 
data. The first of these is a de-essentialised conception of masculinity/femininity, 
derived from Lacan's definition of the feminine position within the symbolic order. The 
second structuring reference point within my analysis is an objectified conceptualisation 
of the two academic disciplines. The second section of the chapter sets out the processes 
of objectification of the disciplines through content analysis of my data. 
3.2. Analysing SUbjectivity and gender: defining narrative analysis 
. .. The foregoing text consists of a sequence of propositions that is easily recognized as a 
narrative. But what makes it a narrative? Let us go back to the beginning of the story. First 
Boccaccio describes Naples, the setting for the action; next he presents the three protagonists; 
after that he speaks of Riciardo's love for Catella. Is that a narrative? Here I think we can readily 
agree that the answer is "no." '" The beginning of the text presents the description of a state of 
affairs. That does not suffice for narrative, however, as narrative requires the unfolding of an 
action, change, difference. 
(Todorov, T, 1990, p. 27 - 28) 
The narratives of the world are numberless. Narrative is first and foremost a prodigious variety 
of genres, themselves distributed amongst different substances - as though any material were fit 
to receive man's stories. Able to be carried by articulated language, spoken or written, fixed or 
moving images, gestures, and the ordered mixture of all these substances; narrative is present in 
myth, legend, fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, mime, painting (think 
of Carpaccio's Saint Ursula), stained glass windows, cinema, comics, news item, conversation. 
Moreover, under this almost infinite diversity of forms, narrative is present in every age, in every 
place, in every society; it begins with the very history of mankind and there nowhere is nor has 
been a people without narrative. 
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(Barthes, R, 1977, p. 79) 
Experience is meaningful and human behaviour is generated from and informed by this 
meaningfulness. Thus the study of human behaviour needs to include an exploration of the 
meaning systems that form human experience. This book is an inquiry into narrative, the primary 
form by which human experience is made meaningful. Narrative meaning is a cognitive process 
that organizes human experiences into temporally meaningful episodes. Because this is a 
cognitive process, a mental operation, narrative meaning is not an "object" available to direct 
observation. However, the individual stories and histories that emerge in the creation of human 
narratives are available for direct observation. Examples of narrative include personal and social 
histories, myths, fairly tales, novels, and the everyday stories we use to explain our own and 
other's actions. 
(Polkinghorne, D, 1988, p.1) 
A narrative - which I have defmed as a mark, which makes knowable an instance of 
intersubjective experience - is any minirnallinguistic or verbal act. 
(McQuillan, M, 2000, p. 12) 
Defining 'narrative' 
I am describing my methods of analysis as narrative analysis. In order to explain this, I 
need, fIrst of all, to explain what types of data I am counting as 'narratives' and then 
what I understand to be the methods of narrative analysis that I am using. As I have 
said, I am making an initial distinction between implicit and explicit narratives. Neither 
conforms to the narrower, conceptualisations of a narrative as a story, requiring, 
according to Todorov's defInition (above) 'the unfolding of an action, change, 
difference'. Such conceptualisations of narrative begin from the form, rather than from 
the function, of stories: they start from the assumption that narratives have, for example, 
a content (events, characters, ideas) and a style (the way events are related, the order, 
McQuillan, 2000). When this attempt to defIne narrative through form is challenged, as 
in Barthes' suggestion of 'an almost infInite diversity of forms', or in Smith's refutation 
of the dualistic division between structure and content (Smith, 1981), an alternative 
conceptualisation is required. An alternative is offered in defInitions of narrative based 
on their function in the production of identities, their function as, according to 
Polkinghorne, 'the primary form by which human experience is made meaningful'. 
McQuillan, using a similarly functional defInition of narrative as 'a mark which makes 
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knowable an instance of inter-subjective experience', follows through to conclude that 
'any minimal linguistic or verbal act' can thus constitute a narrative. This is the closest 
to the way I am using the concept of narrative in my analysis. 
According to McQuillan's definition, what is being narrated, in any example of 
narrative, is the SUbjectivity both of the narrator and of any other subjects connected to 
the 'story' they are telling. A narration is seen as an act of social positioning, 
constructing alliances and differences between individuals and the context within which 
they are speaking. What this means can be explained by examining some examples from 
my research. The first example comes from an interview with Rachel from the West 
University Political Thought class. This is an example of an explicit narrative. Here she 
is explicitly describing events that take place in the classroom. More specifically, she is 
responding to a question about whether she finds it easy to speak in class: 
Sometimes I do get a bit, I don't feel as eloquent as they are. So I'm a bit like, oh, like I said, I 
didn't study anything like this at A levels. It's completely new for me, whereas, what's his name, 
Mark, has done politics before, has studied philosophy before, and so he speaks, and I'm always 
a bit of a talker, so I'll speak before I think, whereas there are some people who are very good 
and keep quiet and then make a valid point .. , DefInitely the men speak more than the women, 
• 
but I don't know if that's because they're men, or just because they tend to be louder. Because, 
like I say, I speak quite a bit, but that's because you can never get me in a room with other 
people and shut me up. 
(Rachel, West University, interview) 
At one level, Rachel is simply describing her perception of her own and others' 
participation in class discussions. However, at the same time, she offers an explanation 
of her account that seems to suggest· that she feels her participation requires some 
justification. Her explanation constructs her participation in a way that is highly 
feminised. She says that 'there are some people who are very good and keep quiet and 
then make a valid point', constructing her own mode of participation, in opposition to 
this as somehow 'bad' and uncontrolled. She also describes herself as 'a bit of a talker , 
... you can never get me in a room with other people and shut me up'. This corresponds 
to the feminine stereotype of the chatterbox, whose talk is uncontrolled and 
inconsequential. Why does she feel the need to portray herself in such a negative way? 
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Indeed, despite her claim that she doesn't think before she speaks, her actual 
contributions in the sessions are intelligent and relevant. So what is going on here? 
This question can be answered if we consider Rachel's narrative as an attempt to 
produce a coherent account of her sUbjective position in the classroom. The 
inconsistency facing her in the context of the classroom is that she contributes relatively 
frequently in class - she describes herself as one of the students who tends to dominate 
class discussions - and that she also describes her frequent contributions as somehow 
'bad', when, presumably, she wants to be 'good'. One explanation of this inconsistency 
is the contradictory codes of appropriate classroom behaviour, which construct 
participation as a criterion of academic success, but at the same time condone, or even 
approve, female students' lack of participation, as conforming to codes of gender 
behaviour. Rachel's own narration of her participation would be consistent with this, 
since her description of her own behaviour foregrounds feminised features, which might 
thus mitigate her occupation of the masculine position associated with academic success 
in the classroom. Her account can thus be seen as an attempt to produce a coherent 
identity within which she is able both to speak frequently in class and to maintain an 
account of herself as feminine. 
There are, in fact, two different possible transgressions, two different sets of codes that 
Rachel has to negotiate. The first is the complex codes of the classroom: the 
combination of pedagogic and gendered discourses which both value participation and 
yet at the same time attribute different values to active participation by male and female 
students. The second set of codes is that of the interview, a conversation between two 
people. The interview setting does not require the same kind of performance as the 
classroom: it does not constitute the same kind of conflict between academic and 
feminine performance. As a conversation between two people it does, however, 
conform to gendered codes regulating legitimate modes of self-presentation. These 
complex and flexible codes might suggest, for example, that it is not appropriately 
feminine for a woman to appear too confident, or to brag about academic achievements. 
Conceptualising Rachel's story in this way, foregrounds the context of production of her 
narrative over its status as a 'true' or 'false' representation of her feelings. The narrative 
I have quoted, then, represents not only Rachel's construction of her subjectivity within 
the class, but also, and more directly, her construction of her subjectivity within the 
74 
interview. Her account identifies the masculine features of her performance within the 
class, but explicitly feminises these features by relating her feelings of inadequacy and 
lack of control. We cannot, of course, judge from her narration her 'true' feelings about 
her classroom participation. We might suspect that, since in fact her contributions in 
class are relevant and intelligent, it is likely that there are at least some occasions when 
she feels happy with what she has said, however she does not describe those occasions 
in her interview. While conformity with the criteria for success in the classroom 
requires her to produce what might be seen as a dominant, 'masculine' persona, the 
more flexible codes of the interview provide an opportunity for her to mitigate this 
ImpreSSIOn. 
Rachel's account is an example of an explicit narration of events she has experienced 
and an implicit narration of her subjectivity in relation to the codes of the interview, the 
context of production of the narrative. I also want to look at an example of a piece of 
data that is not explicitly narrating experience in order to explain how this too can be 
analysed as 'narrative'. This example is an extract of class discussion from the West 
University session on Rousseau. Ned is giving his opinion on Rousseau's ideas: 
Ned: Well, his aim is to find a society where you can have freedom, and he's not going to do it. 
Alison (tutor): Why not? 
Ned: Because as soon' as man's taken out of the state of nature, whatever happens, there's 
always going to be a certain degree of loss of freedom. He says you gain moral freedom and that 
can be swapped for the freedom in the state of nature. But it can't. It doesn't really make any 
sense. 
Alison: Why can't you? 
Ned: Because it just. Well, because you have to define what freedom is to you, I guess, first of 
alL But I took freedom in the state of nature to be the ultimate freedom you can have, in terms of 
basically you can do whatever you want, with no restraints. Not necessarily the best freedom you 
can have, but the ultimate freedom. And as soon as you put any restraints on how you can act, 
even though you say, you know, we're within the general will, you're acting in the wrong way, 
kind of thing. You're acting in a way which doesn't retain your freedom, there's still a 
constraint. 
(West University, Rousseau, p. 10) 
Here Ned is not explicitly relating either fictional or actual events. Instead he is 
asserting, or explaining his conception of freedom. Nevertheless, it is still possible to 
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interpret this as an example of narration. What is being narrated here is Ned's 
relationship to the discipline, to the class, and to the institution. In the context of the 
class, his interventions construct a position of authority in relation to Political Thought, 
firstly in his strong assertion of the impossibility of Rousseau's project, and then in the 
construction of his own definition of 'freedom'. This is what I am defining as 'implicit' 
narrative. The method of interpretation of implicit and explicit narrative is the same. 
Both involve analysing the way in which the narrative signals, or produces, the social 
positioning of the speaking subject in relation to the discursive fields within which they 
are situated. Thus, Rachel's narrative foregrounds, or produces, a feminine identity, 
within which she is conscious of, and thus constructs excuses for, possible negative 
associations that may attach to her participation in class. Ned's narrative foregrounds, or 
produces his identity as a legitimate speaker of the discipline he is studying. 
In my analysis of each of these narratives, I have had to use additional stories, or 
narratives, to produce my interpretations. In the first I am using a story about gender 
and in the second I am using a story about the relationship between individuals and 
language. The validity of my interpretations depends, therefore, in some way, on the 
reliability of these additional narratives and on the validity of their use as a tool of 
analysis. 
Narratives as a tool for analysis 
The concept of validity in narrative analysis requires clarification. Validity in research 
requires that the categories and descriptions you produce within your analysis constitute 
a plausible representation of you data. Whereas in some types of research, checking 
validity may be a matter of observation and measurement, in the case of narrative 
analysis such methods are clearly not applicable. As Polkinghome explains: 
Narrative research, by retaining an emphasis on the linguistic reality of human existence, 
operates in an area that is not limited by formal systems and their particular types of rigor. 
(Pollcinghorne, 1988,p. 176) 
This does not mean, however, that narrative research is not rigorous, but rather that it 
works with a different conception of rigor and of the type of "truth" that is the object of 
research: 
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The results of narrative research cannot claim to correspond exactly with what has actually 
occurred - that is they are not "true", if "truth" is taken to mean exact correspondence or 
conformity to actuality. Research investigating the realm of meaning aims rather for 
verisimilitude, or results that have the appearance of truth, or reality. (ibid, p. 176) 
If we are to accept this conception of validity, we need to explain both why 'the 
appearance of truth' might be an acceptable aim for research, and also, how we might 
recognise this appearance. 
Roy Shafer's account of the psychoanalytic dialogue both reveals the radical limitations 
of the attempt to conceive of one "truth" in the application of narrative analysis, and 
also suggests how a conception of rigour and validity might be constructed within such 
approaches. He describes the way that the deployment of certain concepts within the 
psychoanalytic dialogue imposes a new narrative structure on the talk of the analysand. 
For example, the concept of resistance, deployed in the analyst's interpretation, 
reconstructs the narrative presented by the analysand. Within analysis, resistance 
presents as an (apparent) non-compliance with the rules of free association within the 
psychoanalytic dialogue (Schafer, 1981, p. 41). Schafer argues that the interpretation of 
resistance can be narrated in a variety of ways within the analysis. The more traditional 
Freudian narration, Schafer says, narrates such non-compliance as fear of the self-
revelation that might lead to progress in the treatment. This fear is interpreted as a 'force 
in the mind', which thus constructs the analysand as the passive subject of animalistic 
drives. Schafer suggests that alternative ways of narrating the resistance can construct 
the analysand as a more active, constructive participant in the analysis, 'as doing 
something on his/her behalf, something that makes sense unconsciously though it may 
not yet be understood empathetically by the analyst': 
One young woman's spontaneously defiant insistence on persistently excoriating her parents had 
to be retold analytically in two main ways: as a turning away from the unbearable horror of her 
imagined inner world and as a firm assertion on her part that the problem resided in the family as 
a system and not merely in her infantile fantasies and wishes. On the one hand, there was a 
crucial strategy of self-prevention implied in her apparent resistance: as she said at one point, "If 
I let myself appreciate myself and see what, against all odds, I've become, it would break my 
heart." On the other hand, there was the analysand's search for the self-affirming truth of 
77 
parental madness. To have thought of her strident analytic activity simply as resistance would 
have been to start telling the wrong kind of psychoanalytic story about it (ibid, p. 42). 
In this example, Shafer suggests that too narrow an interpretation of resistance would 
ignore the possibility that the patient's judgement of her need to avoid excessively 
painful confrontations might be an appropriate diagnosis of her current needs. The 
narration of resistance simply as the refusal of treatment and the more complex account 
of resistance, in some specific cases, as an act of necessary self-preservation 
nevertheless start from the same conception of resistance as a failure to conform to the 
rules set by the analyst for the psychoanalytic dialogue. It is this basic structure that 
determines the form of the analyst's re-narration of the analysand's account. 
The different interpretations of resistance, then, are not necessarily better, worse, or 
'truer', than each other: they simply represent different ways of imposing coherence on 
the narrative being presented. Schafer says: 'In giving these examples, I am not 
presenting actual or recommended analytic interventions so much as I am making their 
logic plain'. It is the possibility of revealing the internal logic of the narratives 
constructed during analysis that, for Schafer, affords it its status as a valid mode of 
interpretation. Crucially, there are two different levels to the revelation of the mode of 
analysis that Schafer describes: first the initial narrative structure being imposed on the 
data, in this case the concept of resistance; and secondly the specific narration of this 
structure. A rigorous exposition of a narrative interpretation must make explicit both of 
these stages of analysis: 
What have been presented as the plain empirical data and techniques of psychoanalysis are 
inseparable from the investigator's precritical and interrelated assumptions concerning the 
origins, coherence, totality and intelligibility of personal action. The data and techniques exist as 
such by virtue of two sets of practices that embody these assumptions: fIrst, a set of practices of 
naming and interrelating that is systematic insofar as it conforms to the initial assumptions; and 
second, a set of technical practices that is systematic insofar as it elicits and shapes phenomena 
that can be ordered in terms of these assumptions (ibid, p. 26). 
The first set of practices described here refers to the identification of events as instances 
of theoretical concepts. These concepts are the initial assumptions of the practice. Thus, 
the identification of an event as an instance of 'resistance' is based on a prior 
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understanding of and commitment to the validity of the rules of the psychoanalytic 
setting l . Without this assumption, the analysand's claim, for example, to have forgotten 
something, may be interpreted as a simple act of forgetting; their refusal to speak about 
topics the analyst feels relevant may be interpreted as an appropriate rejection of an 
intrusive and unhelpful line of questioning. It is only when the rules of analysis are 
taken for granted that these events are necessarily interpreted as instances of resistance. 
The second set of practices described above refers to the construction of interpretations 
that attempt to build a coherent story out of the specific instances of 'resistance' 
identified through the first set of practices. The difficulty in attempting to explicate the 
practices involved in every instance of interpretation with this level of rigour, however, 
should also be noted. As Schafer's examples of interpretations of resistance suggest, 
the technical application of the conceptual structure in specific contexts will always 
produce new narratives and new structures. Schafer observes, 'No version of 
psychoanalysis has ever come close to being codified to this extent' (1981, p. 26). What 
I am trying to do here is to provide as full an account as possible of the principles and 
assumptions underlying my interpretation of my data. 
In relation to my interpretation of Rachel's narrative, then, the same two stages of 
analysis can be identified. First I must have an external criterion for identifying her 
narrative as an example of gender performance. I will explain the criteria I use for 
describing gender in the next section of this chapter. This constitutes an initial 
assumption of my interpretive practice. Secondly, having identified her narrative as a 
performance of gender, my interpretation of how this specific instance of gender 
performance must be rigorous and systematic. All interpretations must thus move 
between externally defined conceptual structures and the specific contextual conditions 
that must be taken into account to produce a coherent re-narration of the original text. 
There are two possible problems with Schafer's account of validity in narrative analysis. 
The acceptance of a mUltiplicity of acceptable versions as valid interpretations might 
1 Juliet Mitchell quotes Freud's own assertion of this same position: 'The assumption that there are 
unconscious mental processes, the recognition of the theory of resistance and repression, the appreciation 
of the importance of sexuality and of the Oedipus complex - these constitute the principal subject-matter 
of psycho-analysis and the foundations of its theory. No one who cannot accept them all should count 
himself a psychoanalyst.' (Freud, 'Two Encyclopaedia Articles' quoted in Mitchell, 1974, p. 343). 
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appear to break the link with 'reality' or the actual historical context of the analysand's 
story. Morris Eagle (cited in Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 180) has argued that accounts such 
as Schafer's prioritise the persuasiveness of the analyst's narrative over the historical 
facts of the patient's experience. Within the analytic setting, it is undeniable that the 
analyst's interpretations rely on the analysand's narration rather than observation of 
events, and there must, therefore, be a great likelihood that there will be factual 
inaccuracies in the versions offered by the analyse. A defence against this criticism can 
be constructed in a more precise explanation of the relationship between the 'historical 
facts' (as far as they are available) and the persuasiveness of the analyst's narration. 
The purpose of the analyst's account is precisely to make connections between different 
parts of the account of reality provided by the analysand, and to suggest where the 
analysand's account may present reality in a way that is either internally contradictory 
or that constructs the roles of different participants in events unfairly or unrealistically. 
The analyst's account must be able to explain any inconsistencies or disproportion in 
what the analysand has related. The argument for the construction of a 'second reality' 
in the psychoanalytic narration does not, therefore, ignore the 'facts' of the matter, but it 
does recognise that the data it is working with is at the level of narration, not at the level 
of first hand observation. Thus what is foregrounded is the role of the narrator as 
reliable or unreliable, rather than the events as true or false. And the evidence on which 
judgements of reliability or unreliability are founded, are conceptions of 'coherence, 
consistency and comprehensiveness' , rather than empirical data about the events: 
To -speak of an unreliable narrator, one must have some conception of a reliable narrator, that is, 
of validity; and yet the trend of my argument suggests that there is no single defInitive account to 
be achieved. Validity, it seems, can only be achieved within a system that is viewed as such and 
that appears, after careful consideration, to have the virtues of coherence, consistency, 
comprehensiveness, and common sense. This is the system that establishes the second reality in 
psychoanalysis. The analysand is helped to become a reliable narrator in this second reality 
which is centred on transference and resistance (Schafer, 1981, p. 47). 
The aim of psychoanalysis, according to Schafer, is not to establish a 'true' history of 
the patient, but rather to transform the patient into a more reliable narrator of their own 
2 Irvin Yalom's novel, Lying on the Couch (1997), provides a very revealing and enjoyable account of 
how both the unreliability of the analysand's narrative and the fallibility of the analyst are inherent to the 
analytic relationship. The case histories he presents in Love's Executioner (1989) raise similar issues. 
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history, according to the criteria of the clinical setting. The history related in analysis, 
he argues, is not the life history of the patient, but rather: 
... it is always and necessarily a present account of the meanings and uses of the dialogue to date 
or, in other words, of the transference and resistance. The account of the origins and 
transformations of the life being studied is shaped, extended and limited by what it is narratively 
necessary to emphasise and to assume in order to explain the turns in this dialogue (ibid, p. 49). 
'This dialogue', the dialogue between analyst and analysand, is thus about the way the 
analysand, as a narrator, produces a meaningful account of their own history, rather than 
about the events of the life history itself. It is in this sense that narrative analysis 
explores the process of production of meanings rather than the 'primary reality' that 
those meanings appear to describe. 
Within its own terms, this argument does seem to me to construct a plausible conception 
of what validity might mean in narrative analysis3• The final step that it is also 
necessary for practitioners of psychoanalysis to justify is the beneficial therapeutic 
effect brought about through the construction of this second reality. The argument that 
the construction of coherent narratives helps to explain experiences does not provide 
evidence of the therapeutic value of such activity that Schafer goes on to claim for it. 
Eagle makes the obvious, but nevertheless persuasive point: 
... merely claiming that creative myths, coherent meaning schemes, narratives are curative and 
therapeutically effective does not automatically make them so. Whether or not they are in fact 
therapeutically effective (and if they are, what makes them so) is a crucial empirical question 
(Eagle, quoted in Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 213, n. 57). 
A clear distinction can, and should, be made between the use of narrative analysis as a 
valid method for establishing a description of the world and the use of narrative analysis 
as a valid therapeutic practice. 
3 An additional way of justifying the use of a single source might be to suggest that the notes of the case 
history built up over the course of the analysis constitute an objective reference point for later 
interpretations. Thus although there would be no verification of the events external to the clinical 
sessions, there would be an external source of evidence to validate the analyst's interpretations of the 
psychoanalytic dialogue itself. It is this external reference point that is necessary to avoid interpretations 
that are little more than fantasy. 
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This examination of the validity of narrative analysis provides me with an approach to 
conceptualising my own data analysis. There are, however, significant differences 
between my research and the psychoanalytic setting. Firstly, and most obviously, my 
interpretations of my participants have no therapeutic role. Secondly, my data is in some 
ways far more limited than the data available to the psychoanalyst, since I have not had 
the opportunities to discuss, check and revise my interpretations in a series of 
discussions with my participants over a period of months or years. It is this intensity and 
detail of the psychoanalytic relationship, I believe, that makes plausible Schafer's claim 
for the validity of interpretations made without any external, or third party 
corroboration. The final difference between my research and the psychoanalytic setting 
is that my data does come from at least two distinct sources: interview and observation. 
This means that when, on occasion, my interpretations suggest gaps and inconsistencies 
in the narratives in my data, I have an external reference for my interpretation. What I 
take from the conception of validity that Schafer offers is its foregrounding of narratives 
as the narrators' construction of themselves in the present, with the consequence that 
this can help to explain the selections and emphases that constitute their accounts. This 
provides a way of understanding Polkinghorne's suggestion that narrative research is 
investigating the production of meaning, rather than history, and thus aims for 
verisimilitude, the appearance of truth, rather than an accurate representation of a life 
history. In identifying a coherent story to explain an incoherent one, narrative analysis 
can help us to understand the processes of production of the original story. Thus when I 
suggested that Rachel's narrative about the Political Thought class might be related to 
codes of gendered behaviour, I was offering a way of understanding the process of 
production of what appears to me to be an inconsistent story about her participation in 
class. 
Schafer has also provided a precise account of the way prior conceptual commitments 
shape narrative interpretations and of how this should be made explicit in the analysis. I 
will try to make some of my own conceptual commitments explicit in the next section. 
A de-essentialised conception of gender: Bernstein's 'unthinkable' and Lacan's 
'jouissance' 
In my interpretation of the two examples from my data that I discussed earlier in this 
chapter, I suggested t~at I was applying a story about gender and a story about the 
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relationship between language and the individual. In fact, the conceptual basis of my 
analysis brings these two stories together. I am using gendered terminology, the terms 
'masculine' and 'feminine', to describe specific positions within language. In this 
section I am going to outline the derivation of this terminology. I am going to argue 
that Bernstein's conception of the unthinkable4 as that which is excluded from codified 
knowledge, and Lacan's conception of jouissance as that which is excluded from the 
symbolic order, are describing the same empirical object. Bernstein's work, his 
articulation of the different codes regulating entry into legitimate forms of knowledge, 
tends to prioritise the role of class in the social production of the unthinkable. In 
contrast, Lacan's work dramatically foregrounds gender in the production of 
subjectivity within the symbolic order. I will try to explain why I think that Lacan's 
gendered vocabulary is both more precise and more evocative than Bernstein's, as a 
description of the excluded knowledge that both are taking as their object. 
Both Lacan and Bernstein are concerned with the way the production of codified 
meamngs - knowledge, language, systematisation simultaneously produces or 
reproduces the differential positions occupied by social subj ects5. Bernstein's 
'pedagogic device' encapsulates the rules that determine what counts as knowledge in a 
specific social context. These rules determine the form and status of meanings within 
society. They also determine which meanings, from all potential meanings, will be 
excluded. The relationship between potential and actual meanings, or knowledge, he 
says, is indirect: there is a gap between possible meanings and codified meanings. This 
gap enables codified meanings to describe objects beyond the context of the experiential 
meaning potential. In contrast, potential meanings that are not actualised are 
indistinguishable from the context in which they are experienced: 
.. .if meanings have a direct relation to a material base, these meanings are wholly consumed by 
the context. These meanings are so embedded in the context that they have no reference outside 
that meaning ... They lack the power of relation outside a context because they are so totally 
consumed by that context (Bernstein, 1996, p. 30). 
4 Bernstein uses this tenn in different ways at different times. I am referring specifically to his use of the 
tenn in 'The Pedagogic Device' (Bernstein, 1996). 
5 There are also, of course, many differences in the overall conceptual frameworks provided by these two 
theorists. Here I am only interested in this fundamental similarity in the objects they are researching. 
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Thus, the gap between experience and meaning is essential if a concept, or language, is 
to wield power beyond its own context. The gap itself, the space between potential and 
actualised meaning, Bernstein describes as: 
.. , a site for alternative possibilities, for alternative realisations of the relation between the 
material and the immaterial '" This potential gap or space, I will suggest, is the site for the 
unthinkable, the site of the impossible, and this site can clearly be both beneficial and dangerous 
at the same time (ibid, p.30). 
The strong boundary between the physicist's laboratory and the mechanic's garage is 
maintained in a boundary that codifies physics and leaves the mechanic's knowledge 
relatively embedded in context. Bernstein's 'gap' is a place where the boundaries 
between the knowledge of the physicist and the knowledge of the mechanic might be 
weakened. Similarly, the failure to codify the experience of racism legitimates racial 
thinking. The gap between the experience of subordinated ethnic groups and knowledge 
that is codified and articulated in policies and institutionalised practices, helps to 
maintain the position of dominant ethnic groups. These context-bound experiences that 
constitute the unthinkable can be codified through research or political activism. The 
gap, then, is both 'beneficial and dangerous' because it both maintains and at the same 
time offers the possibility of a change in current social relations. The 'unthinkable', for 
Bernstein, is that knowledge which is context bound, experiential and un-codified. This 
is precisely how Lacan conceptualises feminine jouissance. 
Lacan argues: 
There is a jouissance that is hers (a elle), that belongs to that "she" (elle) that doesn't exist and 
doesn't signify anything. There is a jouissance that is hers about which she herself perhaps 
knows nothing if not that she experiences it - that much she knows. She knows it, of course, 
when it comes (arrive). It doesn't happen (arrive) to all of them. (Lacan, 1998, p.74) 
This suggestion that woman does not know her own jouissance, or orgasm, can easily 
be misread. It can be (mis)interpreted as suggesting that jouissance is mysterious or 
literally unknowable. This interpretation conforms to stereotypical essentialised 
conceptions of 'woman' as closer to some primordial, ethereal or non-rational way of 
being. Diana Fuss makes this mistake when she claims that Lacan suggests that men 
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who occupy a feminine position are 'specifically male mystics' (Fuss, 1989, p. 11). 
This fails to take account of Lacan's very precise definition of the mystic. Lacan 
defines mystics, not as mysterious or beyond rationality, but as those who can reveal 
what language excludes: 'It is clear that the essential testimony of the mystics consists 
in saying that they experience it, but know nothing about it.' (Lac an, 1998, p. 76). In 
fact, Lacan is not here saying that male mystics occupy a feminine position, rather, that 
they, along with some women, are able to identify the way the feminine is excluded 
from representation. It is on this basis that he claims his own work as mystical (ibid, p. 
76). Similar misreadings might be based on the fact that Lacan can appear to be 
criticising women themselves for their lack of understanding of their own experience, 
which again can appear to be re-inscribing women in a position of ignorance and 
passivity: 
The plausibility of what I am claiming here - namely, that woman knows nothing of this 
jouisssance - is underscored by the fact that in all the time people have been begging them, 
begging them on their hands and knees - I spoke last time of women psychoanalysts - to try to 
tell us, not a word! We've never been able to get anything out of them. So we call this jouissance 
by whatever name we can come up with, ''vaginal,'' and speak of the posterior pole of the uterine 
orifice and other such "cunt-torsions" (conneries) - that's the word for it! If she simply 
experienced it and knew nothing about it, that would allow us to cast myriad doubts on this 
notorious (fameuse) frigidity. (Lacan, 1998, p. 75) 
What can we make of Lacan's use of jouissance as the exemplar of the feminine 
position? If Lacan is not blaming women for their inability to describe jouissance, and if 
he is not suggesting that women are somehow mystical, or outside rational language, 
what is the point of his crude pleas to women to tell him (us) about their (our) orgasms? 
Lacan's suggestion that in the end 'we' (men? analysts?) have to label what women 
refuse to name - 'we call this joussance by whatever name we can come up with' -
echoes Virginia Woolfs ironic question, as she is reading the British Library catalogue 
of male writing listed under the subject heading 'women': 'Why does Samuel Butler 
say, "Wise men never say what they think of women"? Wise men never say anything 
else apparently' (Woolf, 1994, p. 34). Lacan, too, is demanding to know why men, or 
psychoanalysts, rather than women themselves, are left to define what 'woman' means. 
His crude references to jouissance are, of course, battering away at the social codes that 
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forbid (open, respectable) discussion of such subjects. It is not Lacan, but the codes of 
the symbolic order that exclude knowledge of women's jouissance and thus exclude 
woman from the possibility of becoming a whole subject6. Jouissance is beyond the 
knowledge of women in precisely the same way that Bernstein's unthinkable is beyond 
knowledge. It is not that it is essentially unavailable to codification, but the moral codes 
and interests of the current social order do not provide it with a means of articulation. 
It is useful to think a little more about Lacan's choice of women's jouissance to 
exemplify his description of that which is excluded from language. As we have seen, 
Bernstein describes a similar object - that which is excluded from knowledge - with far 
less specific or evocative terminology. In choosing jouissance as the defining instance 
of exclusion, Lacan foregrounds the central function of gender in our production of 
ourselves as (sexed) SUbjects. To understand this, we should take at face value Lacan's 
claims about the reticence or inability of women to describe their sexual experience. 
While it is clearly not true that women do not experience orgasm, it is equally self 
evident that there is a powerful taboo against women describing their experience of it. It 
is arguable, however, whether this taboo is as strong now as it was in the early nineteen 
seventies when Lacan was writing this series of seminars. Since then, along with the 
production of various studies that codify women's sexual experience there have also 
been social changes such as, for example, the weakening of codes regUlating female 
sexuality, evidenced in the Ubiquitous discussion of sex in women's magazines and the 
development of, for example, 'laddette' micro-cultures. These developments have 
shifted the codes within which female sexuality can be discussed and performed, 
although, arguably, even these new codes still restrict explicit references to women's 
sexuality to carefully bounded fields within social life. Even in these cases, arguably, 
women are constructed as the objet a, the cause of desire, at least as much as they are 
expressive of their own desire (Lac an, 1998, p. 92, see also Lacan, 1979, ch. 20). While 
the extent of the social changes that have taken place in women's lives is debatable, the 
general picture that Lacan presents of (some) female patients' unwillingness or inability 
to describe their own experience is still relevant, and is plausible as a description of 
6 He says, 'if she (woman) is excluded by the nature of things, it is precisely in the following respect: 
being not-whole, she has a supplementary jouissance compared to what the phallic function designates by 
way ofjouissance.' (Lacan, 1998, p. 73). Arguably, I suppose, it is indeed Lacan who excludes 'woman', 
since in the act of describing her, he is fulfilling the 'phallic function '. He, however, would argue the 
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many aspects of women's lives today. The fact that women's desire, whether purely 
sexual or otherwise, should be so thoroughly hidden, ignored, or repressed, suggests 
that conformity to codes of acceptable gender behaviour is in some way necessary, 
essential to women's sUbjectivity. In order to be a woman, there are some parts of 
experience that must be kept securely hidden and unspoken. Since it is impossible to be 
a subject without at the same time being a sexed subject, the codes regulating gender 
behaviour wield excessive power. The lack of knowledge about female jouissance and 
women's inability themselves to talk about the subject, represent simultaneously both 
production of and conformity with the historically specific gender codes of the symbolic 
order. Transgressing these codes incurs a loss of femininity, and therefore a possible 
loss of position as a social subject. Jouissance is thus the prime example of that which is 
beyond language, equivalent to Bernstein's unthinkable, because it reveals what is 
ultimately at risk in attempting to articulate what is excluded: at risk is a stable position 
as a gendered social subject.7 
Women, then, have a lot to gain from keeping hidden that part of their experience that is 
uncodified, unrecognised within the hierarchies of the symbolic order. Ultimately, the 
symbolic order dictates that it is far more important to maintain your gender position-
masculine or feminine - than any other position. Individual members of the working 
classes have less to gain from the maintenance of their subordinate position. Similarly, 
subordinated or oppressed ethnic groups gain less from their subordination. There are, 
of course, huge risks in transgressing codes of class or ethnicity8, but women, in 
contrast, risk the loss of the primary point of identification as a human subject each time 
they transgress the gender codes of the symbolic order. As Lacan comments (1998, p. 
79), the limit to all meaning is 'provided by the meaning in which you live.' If, 
opposite: that in revealing 'woman's' exclusion from the symbolic order he is in the position of the 
mystic, rather than in the position of the phallic function. 
7 Judith Butler describes the material effects of this risk in her interpretation of the death of the pre-
operative transsexual, Venus Xtravaganza, a participant in the documentary 'Paris is Burning'. The fact 
that Venus is killed 'apparently by one of her clients, perhaps after the discovery of those remaining 
organs', demonstrates, Butler argues, the fmal risk of transgressing gender boundaries within the 
symbolic order. This, she argues, 'is a killing that is performed by a symbolic that would eradicate those 
phenomena that require an opening up of the possiblities for the resignification of sex' (Bulter, 1993, p. 
131). 
8 See, for example, recent accounts' by 'working class' female academics of the pain and contradictions 
involved in taking on new 'middle class' identities, (Walkerdine, 1990b, Hey, 2003), or consider the fate 
of Delacroix, the black television executive anxious to succeed in white dominated mainstream TV in 
Spike Lee's Bamboozled. See also the personal interpretations of the concept of 'double consciousness' 
by African American academics in Lure and Loathing (Early, 1993). 
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therefore, his theory suggests that meaning is sexual, that is only so far as the sexual 
represents the limit to meaning, the limit to being a person or not being a person. In the 
society in which we live it is possible to recognise someone as a person without 
reference to their class, or their ethnicity. It is not possible to recognise someone as a 
person without identifying (or failing to identify) their gender. This is why the women 
Lacan describes put so much work into repressing any knowledge of jouissance. It is 
also why the unthinkable, outside, powerless position is most precisely called the 
'feminine' position. And this labelling also reveals precisely the additional loss entailed 
for men, of any class and of any ethnicity, in occupying this position: the uncodified 
position is inextricably associated with the feminine9• 
This use of the term 'feminine' is undoubtedly a crude descriptive tool. It is useful for 
my purposes, to help me to evoke the differential effects of similar marginalized 
positions on different social groups. I also believe that it is defensible in so far as, at 
least at the specific level of psychic individuation, it is still plausible to argue that 
gender is the primary mark of human SUbjectivity. This does not imply, however, that 
other levels of analysis, within which the effects of class and ethnicity are rightly 
prioritised, are any less valid or significant. It has become a truism within sociology that 
gender is always marked both by class and by ethnicity. There is a wealth of empirical 
studies that provides support for this position (e.g. Frosh et aI, 2002, O'Donnell and 
Sharpe, 2000, Fuller, 1980, Benjamin, 2000, Mirza, 1998). Literary writing is able to 
convey insights into the complex and ambiguous nature of the relationship between 
these reductive social categorisations and subjectivity with, perhaps, more subtlety than 
sociologylO. Sociology has to struggle to maintain what Bourdieu describes as 
'systematic circumlocution', while the literary mode of representation inherently 
constitutes the appropriate ambiguities in its layers of interpretive possibilities. Thus 
9 Additional gains incurred from such feminine performances have been described in a variety of work on 
gender and education. Shereen Benjamin, for example, has described how gendered performances are 
consciously produced by female students with special educational needs to manipulate classroom 
situations and to procure additional teacher support (Benjamin, 2000). Gemma Moss, in contrast, 
describes weaker boy readers choices of non-fiction texts that are not visually identifiable as for lower 
ability students as a 'flight from negative proficiency judgments', a strategy which might also restrict 
their access to teacher support (Moss, 1999, p. 519). 
\0 Bourdieu makes a similar point, stating in the final sentence of Homo Academicus: 'And only the 
techniques of the Bildungsroman could enable us to show how collective crisis and personal crisis 
provide each other with a mutual opportunity, how political revision is accompanied by personal 
regeneration, attested by the changes in vestimentary and cosmetic symbolism which consecrate a total 
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Maxine Hong Kingston's The Woman Warrior (1977), an autobiographical account of 
growing up Chinese American, depicts the glaring conflicts between the demands of 
Chinese femininity and American femininity, at the same time as maintaining an 
appropriate sense of ambiguity about the possibility of distinguishing either of these 
categories without erasing the individuality of her characters. Percival Everett's (2001) 
novel Erasure, narrated by a black American literature professor who claims, 'I hardly 
ever think about race', situates the narrator's sense of isolation and alienation not only 
within his refusal to identify with a hegemonic and reductive version of African 
American experience, but also within his family biography and his intellectual and 
literary affiliations. Both of these literary works explore similar territory to the 
contemporary sociologists cited: both narrators grapple with an insecure sense of their 
own SUbjectivity that is to a significant extent attributable to dominant codifications of 
class and ethnicity. 1 am not, therefore, suggesting that gender is a more universal or a 
more effective constituent of either subjectivity or of social exclusion. 1 would, 
however, want to argue that it is important to maintain a distinction between the analytic 
categories of gender, class, ethnicity and sexuality, in order to better understand the 
different ways such exclusions may be experienced at an individual level. Thus the 
particular connotations of the term 'feminine' that are consistent with certain effects of 
marginalized or uncodified social positions can help us to understand the gendered 
effects of the occupation of these positions. 
This conceptualisation of the feminine - as the most evocative and precise way of 
representing the inability to codify, or the unavailability of a codification of your 
experience - constitutes a basic assumption within my analysis. This concept is de-
essentialised to the extent that it has no fundamental relation to a naturalised sex. As 1 
hope 1 have explained, the gendering of the concept is based on the contingent but 
persistent social regulations that both construct women's experience as uncodifiable, 
and, more crucially, that define sex as the primary mark of subjectivity. 11 In my analysis 
of the narratives within my data, 1 am using this definition of the feminine as a stable 
commitment to an ethico-political vision of the social world, erected into the principle of a whole 
lifestyle, private as much as public.' (p. 193). 
11 Some feminist interpretations suggest that Lacan's system essentialises the relationship between sex 
and subjectivity. An alternative, equally feminist, and in my view more accurate reading views Lacan as 
using a necessarily historical, contextual vocabulary to describe a system that might potentially be 
instantiated with a different fIrst signifier (Cornell, 1995, Ragland-Sullivan, 1986, Rose, 1986). 
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reference point, In relation to which I can interpret the sUbjective positioning of 
participants. I am thus using the concept as if it is an objective structure in relation to 
which the narratives in my data can be analysed. Both Rachel and Ned's narratives can 
be interpreted in relation to this conception of gender: Rachel's narrative can be 
interpreted as distancing her from the codified criteria for success within the classroom , 
and thus as an identification with the feminine, uncodified position; Ned's narrative, in 
contrast, positions him not only as someone who succeeds by the criteria of the 
classroom, but also, in his rejection of Rousseau and construction of his own definition 
of freedom, as someone who is able to construct his own criteria for legitimate 
disciplinary concepts. 
3.3. The objectification of the disciplines 
Objectivism constitutes the social world as a spectacle offered to an observer who takes up a 
'point of view' on the action, and who, putting into the object the principles of his relation to to 
the object, proceeds as if it were intended solely for knowledge and as if all the interactions 
within it were purely symbolic exchanges. This viewpoint is the one taken from high positions in 
the social structure, from which the social world is seen as a representation (as the word is used 
in idealist philosophy, but also as in painting) or a performance (in the theatrical or musical 
sense), and practices are seen as no more than the acting-out of roles, the playing of scores or the 
implementation of plans. The theory of practice as practice insists, contrary to positivist 
materialism, that the objects of knowledge are constructed, not passively recorded, and, contrary 
to intellectualist idealism, that the principle of this construction is the system of structured, 
structuring dispositions, the habitus, which is constituted in practice and is always oriented 
towards practical functions. (Bourdieu, 1992 p. 52) 
Why objectify the disciplines? 
There are two reasons why it is important to construct an explicit objectification of the 
disciplines. The first is a concern with constructing a full empirical account of 
observations of higher education classrooms. I have already described my 
understanding of disciplines as socially situated, and I have supported this description 
by reference to previous studies by Bourdieu (1996), Huber (1990), and Hyland (2000). 
However, the objectifications provided in the other work I have referred to do not 
describe the specific features of the discipline relevant to interaction within the 
90 
classroom. Bourdieu and Huber obj ectify the relationship between social class and 
discipline, while Hyland objectifies the lexical and grammatical structures used in 
academic writing to reveal how they are constitutive of interaction within disciplinary 
communities. Within the classroom, the disciplines are presented in the fonn of 
statements, or knowledge claims, which confonn to a specific methodology for 
describing a specific object. I am setting out to objectify the relationship between 
academic disciplines and student in/exclusion within the classroom. My argument is 
that the form of academic disciplines constitute relatively stable, socially situated 
structures that define legitimacy, and thus contribute to student in/exclusion. The 
stability of these structures is dependent on the literature of the field as well as on the 
departmental appointments, curricula, reading lists and text-books which influence 
interaction in the classroom. Interventions within the classroom can then be defined 
both as constitutive of, and also as either conforming or failing to conform to, these 
disciplinary criteria. Failure to provide a clear definition of how to recognise the 
disciplinary status of interventions would mean that the link between the student 
in/exclusion and the disciplines as socially situated objects could not be established. 
It is perhaps worth noting that much work in the field of academic literacies conflates 
knowledge in the different disciplines into one category of academic language (e.g. Lea, 
1999, Lillis, 2001). This loss of the specificity of disciplinary objects and 
methodologies leads researchers in this field to make what appear to be slightly 
superficial interpretations of communications between tutors and students. Lillis (2001), 
for example, is unable to relate her interpretation of essay questions and tutor feedback 
to any objective account of the discipline. This makes her conclusion, that 'tutors seem 
to have different views about the nature of the task' (p. 71), and that 'what is assumed to 
be "common sense" is in fact only one privileged literacy practice' (p. 76), somewhat 
less than convincing, since it seems likely that the tutors' different comments on an 
essay question and their assumptions about what constitutes 'common sense' are not 
merely the result of random privilege, but rather are both related to an identifiable and 
socially positioned disciplinary discourse. An understanding of these disciplinary 
discourses and of their structural position within the social would provide a better 
picture of the nature of the exclusions Lillis is attempting to describe. It is for this 
reason that I am setting out some of the features of the disciplines before I begin the 
presentation of my analysis. 
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The second reason for setting out an explicit objectification of the disciplines is more 
theoretical. My argument is that in the field of undergraduate studies, disciplines act as 
relatively objective structures, constructing a reference point, or boundary, for the range 
of positions available for students to occupy within the classroom. This reference point, 
then, needs to be defined, in order to identify the way that students position themselves 
in relation to it. However, in defining disciplines in this way, I am objectifying them, 
just as Bourdieu has described: prioritising my own 'relation to the object' and ignoring 
other 'practical functions' of disciplinary statements within their context of articulation 
(Bourdieu, 1992, p. 52). The paradox of carrying out this act of explicit objectification 
is that it is both supposed to constitute a convincing object, and at the same time it is 
supposed to reveal the choices and ambiguities involved in the act of definition, in order 
to maintain a sense of their status as relatively stable, rather than wholly objective and 
detennining. 
Disciplinary statements articulated in undergraduate classrooms are fragile discursive 
objects that can be conceived of as legitimate or illegitimate only within the specific 
context of classroom, institution and curriculum. However, here I am defining them as 
if they exist outside the context of articulation. In describing how to identify the 
disciplines, I am constructing categories which (appear to) provide rules for the 
identification of 'the same' object in any context. I am not going to give a complete set 
of rules for the categorisation and identification of disciplinary statements at this point. 
More of these rules will be revealed in the development of the analysis. What I wish to 
do here is to set out the processes by which I have identified some initial features of the 
disciplines that will be used as a reference point in the first data analysis chapter. 
Differentiating the disciplines 
Here, then, I am going to define two initial features of the disciplines. The first of these 
is their contrasting modes of reasoning that I am calling 'metonymic' and 'metaphoric'. 
The second feature identified here is the different ways that the disciplines construct and 
use examples. 
The difference between metonymic and metaphoric reasoning processes rests on a 
distinction between core and associative definitions: core definitions provide the 
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essential criteria for the use of a term; associative definitions identify secondary features 
and connections that the use of a particular word may suggest, but that are not an 
essential criteria for correct usage. Alternatively, while metonym is based on a 
relationship of contiguity, metaphor is based on a relationship of semantic association. 
Briefly, Political Thought tends to look for 'internal' accounts of concepts: features that 
can be identified through analysis of core definitions. This can be associated with 
metonymy because an analysis of core definitions is a movement from looking at a 
concept as a whole to looking at the parts through which it is constituted. The 
relationship between concepts is then constructed by taking a part to represent the 
whole: precisely the structure of metonymy. Although, it should be noted, I am talking 
about conceptual rather than linguistic metonymy. In linguistic metonymy a word for a 
part of an object comes to represent the object: 'a hand' represents 'a person'; 'the 
crown' represents 'the king'. In conceptual metonymy a conceptual part comes to 
represent the whole concept: the ability to make choices comes to represent freedom; 
economic equality comes to represent equality. Under this method, ultimately, the 
acceptance or rejection of a particular conception of a term will usually be made by 
reference to the intuition of the individual about the core meanings of a term 12. 
American Literature, in contrast, tends to develop 'external' accounts of concepts: 
accounts developed through the analysis of texts that are external to the core definitions 
of a concept. The development of 'external' accounts of concepts often initiates or 
develops metaphorical relationships: associations or similarities between apparently 
unrelated objects. So, for example, reading the story of Noah's Ark initiates a 
relationship between 'dove' and 'peace', and thus changes the meaning of both terms. 
In a metonym there are only two components (you move from the whole, to a part of a 
whole), while in a metaphor, there are three components (the two wholes and the 
external object through which they are connected). 
From this initial definition, it should appear plausible to suggest that metaphorical 
reasoning is in general a more radical methodology than metonymic reasoning, with 
12 John Christman (2002) offers a similar definition of the method of Political Thought. He says: 'The 
reigning method for moral and political philosophy ... proceeds basically by analysing the meanings of 
key concepts (such as "freedom", "rights", or "neutrality") and combining their analysis with logically 
structured arguments showing the implications of particular positions using those concepts. Reference to 
our 'intuitions' is also thought to be important in assessing specific moral principles. ' (p. 9). 
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respect to current understandings of words and concepts 13. It should also be noted that 
this distinction between metaphor and metonym is always culturally specific: an 
external connection, once accepted as obvious or necessary, may be interpreted as an 
internal or core definition. This has implications for the way it might be possible to 
understand and describe the political, the conservative or critical, positioning of 
disciplines using these modes of reasoning. 
Identifying examples of Political Thought 
The West University discussion of Rousseau can be used to illustrate the category of 
metonymic reasoning. Rousseau argued that on entering society: 
Each (man) became in some degree a slave even in becoming the master of other men: if rich, 
they stood in need of the services of others; if poor, of their assistance; and even a middle 
condition did not enable them to do without each other. (Rousseau, 1755, p. 202) 
This servitude, for Rousseau, can only be overcome within a participatory political 
system, as described in his vision of the social contract and the enactment of the general 
will. In the West University session on Rousseau, articulations of conceptions of 
'slavery' and 'freedom' constituted significant sections of the discussion. Following, to 
some extent, Rousseau's account of the lack of freedom in social life as a type of 
servitude, the students' discussion of the concepts could be described as an assertion of 
the equivalence of these two ideas: 
205. Lisa: I'm not saying slavery's good, but to what extent are we ever going to be free? ... I 
don't see how you can ever be free in society. 
(West University, Rousseau 2) 
Lisa's substitution of 'free' for 'slavery' within her initial question, exemplifies the way 
students tended, at times, to conflate slavery and a lack of freedom in their discussion. 
This suggests that it is precisely the overlap between the core definitions of these two 
concepts that is the object of discussion here. The following two short exchanges 
exemplify this. Very broadly, the question under discussion here is whether freedom 
13 David Lodge (1986) uses this distinction between metaphor and metonymy to describe the different 
features of, respectively, 'modernist' (radical) and 'anti-modernist' (more conservative) writing in the 
modem period. 
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exists anywhere, or whether it can be conceived of as an ideal that can guide action even 
if it can never be fully realised: 
231. Rachel: There's different degrees of slavery. What about people who work in factories for 
like ... 
232. Michael: Yes, exactly, what about the people who make our footballs in sweatshops. 
233. Rachel: Yes, you could say that's slavery. Just because they get paid ... (interrupted) 
(West University, Rousseau 2) 
Here the lack of freedom in employment that is a component of legal slavery is 
metonymic ally equated with the lack of choice produced by the requirement to work for 
subsistence level wages. This analogy is extended later in the discussion: 
253. Lisa: What does a salary do? A salary does the same thing doesn't it? Is that buying you into 
slavery? What about if your boss can reach you twenty four hours a day on your mobile? 
254. Jake: Well, you leave the job and get another one. 
255. Lisa: Yeah, but when are you going to fmd one? What about your pension and all of that? 
(West University, Rousseau 2) 
Lack of freedom, in Lisa's intervention described as 'slavery', is now extended to 
include the self-perpetuating obligations initiated in secure employment. Jake's 
objection to this, in contrast, suggests the need for a more precise definition of the 
distinction between core definitions of these two concepts. 
The context for this section of discussion was a broader question about the nature of 
freedom and the relationship between freedom and equality. These questions, addressed 
throughout the session, were articulated as a question by the tutor: 
149. Alison: ... Rousseau wants a free society where everybody is autonomous, but he also 
wants equality ... and what is coming out here is that there may be a problem between 
them But do you think both are equal? Do they have the same ranking in terms of values? 
(West University, Rousseau 2) 
In developing an answer to this question, the students come back to the problem of 
defining freedom, which is where the concept of slavery is introduced. The main basis 
for the claims in the student interventions I have quoted is the analytic connection 
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posited between slavery and lack of freedom. Having asserted this connection, the aim 
is to find a consistent way of applying the tenns. This is where a metonymic move is 
made in the reasoning process. The economic constrictions inherent in slavery - slaves 
have no property rights and are dependent on their masters for their subsistence - are 
used, metonymic ally, to extend the use of the tenn. The work context, too, is one of the 
core defmitions of slavery. Lisa's suggestion that other kinds of work can be viewed in 
the same way challenges the limits of this way of conceptualising the equation between 
slavery and freedom. However, the judgement of whether the examples given are 
consistent uses of the tenns is an intuitive one. The factory worker and the sweatshop 
worker, and, indeed, the salaried employee, are not in the same position as a legal slave. 
The implication of the examples is that economic strictures can come to represent the 
same condition as the legal and physical strictures of slavery: a suggestion that, without 
some empirical evidence, must be assessed with reference to individual intuition, rather 
than objective, analytical reasoning alone. The examples, hypothetical examples of 
slavery based on a metonymic relationship, are used to test out the relationship between 
slavery and freedom. 
The examples introduced into the discussion, then, are used to illustrate, or to test out 
possible usage of the tenns under discussion, rather than to provide evidence of the 
nature of freedom or slavery as empirical objects. Both of these elements, the search for 
linguistic consistency and the use of examples as hypothetical illustration, rather than as 
empirical evidence, are characteristic of the methodology of the Political Thought class. 
It is these features combined with an essentialised connection between slavery and 
freedom that constitute the boundaries of the concepts within the class discussion. In 
another of Rachel's interventions in the same session, for example, the analytic 
connection between slavery and lack of freedom is the basis for an analysis of her 
hypothetical example of a happy Roman slave: 
239. Rachel: And also, I'm not saying that I agree with slavery, but surely, like, in Roman times, 
when there were slaves. You can have happy slavers. (laughter). No, but, you're all laughing 
now, but slavery didn't necessarily mean misery. And yet there were people who were like, 
free, and yet they were starving. So, were they free? I'm not saying I agree with slavery at 
all. All I'm saying is: for the person who is starving in the street, looking at the slave who is 
in a nice house and looking after his master, is he freer than the slave? Or, he might be freer, 
but does he care? Would he rather be in there? 
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This intervention begins to problematise the use of slavery as a definitive marker of lack 
of freedom. The example of the hypothetical happy, well-fed slave displaces the 
metonymic connection that prioritises 'poverty', as a core definition of 'slavery'. The 
economic definition is replaced by the legal definition. As a move within political 
theory, this is an important insight, since it demonstrates how the value you attribute to 
freedom is dependent on your initial definition of the concept. If slavery defines 
freedom, Rachel argues, then the prioritising of freedom as a value within a political 
system can be put into question. This argument is based on the same type of metonymic 
reasoning as the previous points, but it uses a different core definition, the legal rather 
than the economic, as its starting point. 
This analysis of the metonymic structure and hypothetical examples used within 
Political Thought constitutes an objectification of the discipline as represented in the 
classes that I observed. Not all presentations of the discipline or schools of thought 
within the discipline conform to all of the features that I have described. Marxism, in 
particular, can be se.en as exemplary of a disciplinary boundary, where Political Thought 
can be recontextualised into other disciplines, such as economics, history, literature and 
cultural studies. Marxism's distinctive disciplinary position can be traced to some of the 
ways in which it does not conform to the objectification of Political Thought that I have 
constructed here. It differs most explicitly in its analysis of the concepts of freedom and 
equality, which it identifies as inventions of bourgeois morality, constructed to support 
the interests of capitalism. Thus a discussion of these particular concepts in a class on 
Marxism would probably not conform to the metonymic structure I have described. 
Nevertheless, within the classes on Marx that I observed, the general mode of 
discussion was not very different from the discussions of other theorists: arguments 
were developed through analytic rather than through associative processes, and although 
historical examples were introduced, they were either hypothetical or anecdotal, rather 
than based on an analysis of textual evidence. There are, then, enough similarities 
between the presentation of Marxism and the presentation of other theorists, within the 
Political Thought classes that I observed, to enable me to suggest that my objectification 
of the discipline provides a reasonable reference point for the analysis of student 
positions. 
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The objectification carried out here identifies interventions as examples of the discipline 
in relation to a-contextual categories: it foregrounds the disciplinary features of the 
interventions, rather than features of the interventions as subjective positioning of the 
speaker. An examination of the contrast between these features of the discipline and 
features of American Literature will help to clarify the nature of these disciplinary 
features as, to some extent at least, specific to Political Thought. 
Identifying examples of American Literature 
The discussion of conceptions of slavery and freedom in the North University American 
Literature class exemplifies the difference in the methodologies of the two disciplines. 
The two texts under study, the slave narratives of Harriet Jacobs and Frederick 
Douglass, raised issues relating to literacy and sexuality that initiated associative 
conceptualisations of freedom and slavery: 
Why does the slave ever love? Why allow the tendrils of the heart to twine around objects which 
may at any moment be wrenched away by the hand of violence? 
(Harriet Jacobs, 1716, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, ) 
"If you teach a nigger (speaking of myself) how to read, there would be no keeping him. It 
would forever unfit him to be a slave ... " .. , I now understood what had been to me a most 
perplexing difficulty - to wit, the white man's power to enslave the black man. It was a grand 
achievement, and I prized it highly. From that moment, I understood the pathway from slavery to 
freedom. 
(Frederick Douglass, 1845, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, 
Written by Himself, p. 2054) 
The associative conceptualisations of slavery initiated in these texts were explored in 
the North University sessions. 
The slave narratives studied within American Literature constitute empirical evidence of 
the experience of slavery. The American Literature class discussions of slavery as a 
concept are therefore, necessarily, more empirically and less theoretically oriented than 
the discussions in the Political Thought class. The discussion in the American Literature 
class is not about the theoretical possibility of maintaining freedom of the individual 
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within the state. It is, rather, about the historical meanings of slavery as an institution in 
the United States. These historical meanings provide the opportunity for the 
development of metaphorical, associative understandings of the concepts of freedom 
and slavery. The following section where the teacher, Duncan, is feeding back from 
small group discussions, illustrates this. Duncan asks whether the students are 
convinced by Douglass' suggestion that control over literacy is a key component of 
slavery. Sevket emphatically agrees: 
6. Duncan (tutor): I want to find out ... whether you were surprised by the emphasis given to 
literacy within Douglass' account, and whether you think that his account was plausible. 
Whether you think literacy can be as important as he makes it out to be? ... does that basically 
make any sense as analysis of how slavery was working? 
7. Sevket: Definitely. Because, we were saying, knowledge is power. If you don't know any better, 
if your level is so low, like, you're de-humanised, you aren't going to know any better to 
achieve any higher. But we're just looking at the line, 'the more I read the more I was led to 
abhor and detest my enslavers'. The more knowledge you get about what's going on. 
8. Duncan: Okay, right. And was the narrative as such, did the way in which events played 
themselves out corroborate that idea? 
9. Sevket: Yes, because he kept talking about different examples of cruelty, so he was getting 
knowledge, life knowledge. And then he was getting (can't hear) knowledge, so he could put it 
down for us to see. Now we know what happened. So it's not only what he learnt himself, but 
he's teaching other people. 
(North University, Slave Narratives) 
The relationship posited here between literacy, freedom and slavery is an exemplary 
contrast to the relationship between freedom and slavery discussed in the previous 
section. The methods offered by the two disciplines constitute two quite different 
approaches to constructing such relationships. Whereas in Political Thought 
hypothetical examples are used to develop a consistent framework based on metonymic 
relationships between the core definitions of concepts, in American Literature the 
empirical example introduces connections between concepts and apparently unrelated 
phenomena: literacy, or illiteracy, can be suggested as in some way definitive of 
slavery, despite the fact that it is not a core definition. The core definitions of slavery 
would make no reference to literacy, and, similarly, definitions of literacy would be 
unlikely to refer to either slavery or freedom. The extract of discussion quoted above 
can therefore be defined as an example of metaphorical reasoning because it prioritises 
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an associative connection between literacy and slavery over core definitions of the 
terms. 
A similar type of account is constructed in the discussion, in the same session, of 
Harriet Jacobs' narrative. A female student identifies a contrast between Douglass' 
account of his experience as a male slave and Jacobs' account of being a slave girl: 
64. Mary: We thought that she didn't actually use literacy to become free. We thought it was 
more her sexuality. She thought that if she had children with Sawyer, he'd free her, and free 
their children, and all that sort of thing. 
65. Duncan: Right, so you think that sexuality functions, perhaps, with Jacobs, the way that 
literacy does with Douglass? 
66. Mary: Well, she thought it would. 
(North University, Slave Narratives) 
Jacobs' narrative gives an account of her relationships with three men. The first of these 
is her master, who continually makes unwanted advances that she rejects. The second is 
a free born coloured man, who she falls in love with. He wants to marry her and buy her 
freedom, but her master refuses to allow this. The third man is another white man, 
whose interest flatters Jacobs. She believes that if she has his children, he will not only 
buy her, but he will also free her and their children. Her plan is not successful, and her 
master still refuses to sell her. Nevertheless, as Mary suggests, control over sexuality is 
-given some significance within Jacobs' narrative as a defining feature of slavery. As in 
the previous example, this section of discussion exemplifies the way that metaphorical 
reasoning processes prioritise associative over core definitions of concepts. 
I want to give one more example, to illustrate the way this kind ()f reasoning can be 
identified in discussion of a more explicitly literary text. The East University discussion 
of Moby Dick explored the metaphorical associations between sexuality and power. This 
part of the discussion began with an exploration of the relationship between Ismael, the 
novel's narrator, and Queequeg, a harpooner from the Pacific Islands. This relationship 
develops near the beginning of the novel, when Ismael is staying at an inn, before 
finding work on a whale ship. The innkeeper tells him that he will have to share his bed 
with a 'dark complexioned' harpooner, who is currently out trying to sell some 
embalmed heads he has bought (Melville, 1992, ch. 2). Ismael is very afraid as he waits 
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for his bedfellow to arrive, and even more ill at ease when he does arrive, and starts 
perfonning unfamiliar religious rites before getting into bed with Ismael. However, very 
soon, the two men develop a liking for each other, and share their bed with great 
affection. During the class discussion of this incident, the possible homo-erotic 
implications of this relationship were discussed. One student observed that, in 
comparison with a heterosexual couple, 'Ismael is Queequeg's wife' (East University, 
Moby Dick, 104). This observation was developed by Hannah, the class tutor, to draw 
associations between gendered and racial power relations. The student's observation 
that Ismael, the white man, is in the feminine position is related to Melville's 
subversion, throughout the novel, of the white man's domination over the black man. 
This section of the discussion concluded with an analogy between Ismael's position as 
the dependent partner in his 'marriage' to Queequeg and the white men's dependence 
on the non-white men aboard the whale ship: 
114. Hannah (tutor): ( ... ) I think the fact that he (Ismael) is the wife is quite interesting, because if 
anyone's a hero in this book, it's Queequeg, he's always doing heroic things, he rescues 
people all the time, and he's this great big kind of heroic superhero, harpooning whales. I 
mean, the other two harpooners. 
115. Hamid: One's a red man. 
116. Hannah: Yes, One's Native American, Queequeg's Polynesian, he's from the Pacific Islands. 
Who's the third one, can you remember? ( ... ) The third one's Dagoo, he's an African 
American. So there's a Polynesian, a Native Americana nd an African American, they're the 
three harpoonists, and they are all huge and heroic. And they also have a really important role 
to play, they have the main job, they kill the whales. Do you think there might be any 
significance to that? 
117. Hamid: With the help of them, it's kind of complementary to the white masculinity. If they 
weren't there, they couldn't do anything. They couldn't kill the whales, so with their part, 
with their masculinity, they could do their job, so it's complementary, Queequeg to Ishmael 
and the rest of the ship, and you can expand it to other things in the universe at the time. 
(East University, Moby Dick 1) 
Hamid's final intervention makes the metaphorical associations constructed within the 
novel explicit. He suggests that the inversion of expected racial and gendered power 
structures in the relationship between Ishmael and Queequeg is repeated in the 
relationships on the ship, which reveal the white man's dependency on the non-white 
man, and that these repetitions can be interpreted as a critique of contemporary America 
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and of slavery: ' ... It's complementary, Queequeg to Ishmael and the rest of the ship, 
and you can expand it to other things in the universe at the time.' This interpretation 
uses metaphorical reasoning processes to identify similar features in different parts of 
the novel and to construct an association between gendered and racialised relationships 
at both a personal and a political level. What I have suggested is that the identification 
of this type of reasoning can be used to define when someone is 'doing' literature, in the 
same way that the identification of metonymic reasoning processes can be used to 
define when someone is 'doing' Political Thought. 
The comparative legitimacy of these approaches in the two disciplines 
I want to offer one more illustration of the way different methodologies were 
constructed as legitimate or illegitimate in the two disciplines. The foregrounding of 
associative over core definitions is consistent with a concern for the effects of language 
and imagery. The metaphorical reasoning processes that constitute a part of the 
methodology of American Literature are more suited than metonymic reasoning 
processes to identify and explore the figurative power of language that constitutes the 
reproductive force of stereotypes and of racist or sexist language. The final two 
examples I am going to present here demonstrate this difference in the legitimacy 
afforded to similar student interventions in the two disciplines. 
The first example comes from the North University class on Melville's story 'Benito 
Cereno' (Melville, 2003). Benito Cereno is the story of a slave ship that has been taken 
over by the slaves. However, the main part of the story describes an episode where the 
slaves are pretending that they are still enslaved, in order to hide the truth from Delano, 
the white captain of another ship, who has come on board. The reader is in the same 
position as Delano for the first half of the story, and, despite various anomalies on board 
the slave ship, which make him uncomfortable and suspicious, Delano does not suspect 
the truth of what has occurred. In its portrayal of Delano's position, and more generally 
in sustaining the mystery for the reader,the story repeats stereotypes of black people in 
a way that the class found disturbing. Jonathan here describes sections of the story that 
he found uncomfortable, and the tutor, Duncan, concurs that it is possible to interpret 
some aspects of the text as racist: 
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41. Jonathan: Just in general, when you talk about animals. Throughout this whole novel, or story, 
he gives black people also animal characteristics, and not just, they have some human qualities, 
but at the same time he calls the black women negresses, and that's like lioness. And there's, on 
page 2293, he's talking about how the hands are like paws, and that, in this story, I felt kind of 
bad because it was (can't hear). 
42. Duncan (tutor): Right. This is a sort of animalisation of black people, isn't it? Those ideas are 
certainly being given forward ( ... ) There are various stereotypes that circulate in the text and 
it's not always clear to what extent they belong to the narrative or whether they are what the 
narrative is critiquing, if I can put it that way. And I think the sort of disagreement, not 
disagreement, but the uncertainty in the room about that issue is good as a response to the text, 
because I think there is that uncertainty. (to another student) Catherine, that worried you? You 
thought it was harmful, it was racist? 
(North University, Benito Cereno) 
Jonathan's analysis of the language of the text appears to suggest that this kind of 
representation is inherently hannful, regardless of context. His intervention (41) implies 
an inherent process of metaphorical effectivity that is set in chain by the use of animal 
characteristics to describe black characters in Melville's story. In this case, the effects of 
the metaphor move from a, plausibly unobjectionable, identification of a similarity 
between a human being and a lioness to further, and more objectionable associations, 
which are the basis of the claim that this use of figurative language can be seen as 
politically dangerous, or racist. Jonathan's suggestion is taken seriously within the 
American literature class, and the same issue is raised several times in relation to 
different aspects of the story. 
An extract from the West University Political Thought class demonstrates the different 
legitimacy afforded to this type of reasoning in the two disciplines. Here Michael 
attempts to evaluate Mill's use of language using similar reasoning to that used by 
Jonathan in the American Studies class: 
111. Lisa: I think Mill says barbaric society is okay if you have a despotic government. Whereas 
a society where you can actually sit down and discuss things, you should have this ... 
112. Michael: A racist argument, basically. 
113. Alison: It doesn't have to be directly racial. But yes, it's built on the idea of progress and the 
enlightenment. 
114. Michael: But he talks about barbarians. 
115. Mark: You can have barbarians and free intelligent people of the same race. 
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116. Michael: But barbarians are ethnically inferior, right? 
117. Alison: No. 
118. Mark: No. Does barbarian have an ethnic definition? It doesn't. Historically, perhaps. 
(West University, Mill) 
Michael's suggestion that 'barbarian' signifies racial inferiority interprets the tenn as 
having metaphorical connotations beyond the neutral designation of 'people not open to 
reasonable debate'. Mark's refutation of this interpretation (118) suggests that it is 
possible to distinguish between essential, or core, definitions and historical, context 
specific or associative definitions, and implicitly prioritises core definitions over 
associative ones. Alison, the tutor, appears to concur with Mark's prioritisation (113 and 
117). This marginalisation of an issue that constituted a major section of the discussion 
in the American Literature class can be explained in relation to the metonymic 
processes that, I have suggested, constitute the main mode of analysis in the Political 
Thought class. It can also be related to the object of the discipline: the relationship 
between the state and the individual. An exploration of the metaphorical connotations of 
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Mills writing would not respond to the substantive questions about Mill's political ideas 
~ 
that are the main focus of the class. This effect of the disciplinary methodologies and 
objects in legitimising or failing to legitimise interventions within the classroom will be 
explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
3.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has set out two different modes of analysis. The first mode of analysis 
interprets a piece of data as representative of a context, and of the positioning of the 
speaker as a subject within that context. This is my definition of narrative analysis. I 
have also explained the de-essentialised conception of the feminine, as representative of 
those positions that are uncodified within the structures of the symbolic order. I am 
using this definition of the feminine as a reference point, as if it is an objective 
structure, in my analysis of the subjective positioning of individuals within narratives. 
The content analysis of the disciplines identifies data as representative of categories that 
are independent of the context, and thus constitutes the disciplines as if they are 
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objective structures. I have outlined some of the disciplinary features that will be used 
to identify American Literature and Political Thought as objective structures in relation 
to which students position themselves within the classroom. However, as I have 
indicated, it is the process of analysis that constructs these disciplinary features as if 
they are objective, when in fact they are historically, geographically and institutionally 
contingent. This self conscious objectification is legitimate because the disciplinary 
structures are indeed relatively stable, and do in fact act as a point of identification for 
both students and teachers. 
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Chapter 4 
DEFINING THE MARGINS OF THE CLASSROOM: 
DISCIPLINARY METHODOLOGIES AND GENDERED SUBJECT 
POSITIONS AS BOUNDARIES TO CLASSROOM INTERACTION 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter and in the following two chapters I am describing the array of subject 
positions available to students within the classrooms that I have observed. In this 
chapter I am going to describe marginal classroom positions. In the following two 
chapters I will describe the array of 'included' positions available for students to take up 
within these margins. The marginal positions that I am going to describe here define the 
boundaries of legitimacy within structures of disciplinary methodologies and how these 
structures inter-relate with structures of gender. 
The first two marginalized positions that I am going to describe are structured in 
relation to disciplinary methodologies. In the previous chapter I identified some tools 
for describing disciplinary methodologies through their use of empirical or hypothetical 
examples, and their development of metaphorical or metonymic relationships between 
concepts. I am going to use the examples of two students, one from Political Thought 
and one from American Literature, to exemplify how marginalized student positions are 
produced in the failure to conform to the appropriate disciplinary methodologies. 
However, this disciplinary marginalisation is mediated, and possibly, in the case of the 
two male students described here, mitigated, by the simultaneous positioning of students 
within structures of gender. Another structural feature revealed in discussion of these 
marginal examples is the contradiction that sometimes exists between legitimate 
disciplinary methodologies and the avowed pedagogies of the tutors. 
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The third example of a marginalized position foregrounds the relationship between 
gender and language, and the marginalisation of certain 'feminised' subject positions 
within institutional and disciplinary structures. The 'feminine' position is that which is 
uncodified and therefore unrecognised within the context of the classroom. The 
example described exemplifies a marginalized 'feminine' position as one from which 
the subject is unable to produce their own language, and thus either fails to speak or 
borrows from the dominant language in an attempt to construct a coherent identity. I 
will suggest that the requirement to construct a language that can unify personal and 
disciplinary positions is peculiarly marked in relation to Political Thought, because its 
methodology prioritises the articulation of conceptual convictions unmediated by 
reference to external texts or data. 
The marginalized positions that I am describing can be identified in contradictions 
between the subject and discourse at different levels. In relation to the discipline, these 
contradictions can, at one level, be described as a result of the selection that takes place 
in the transmission of segmentally structured disciplines (Bernstein, 1996). The effects 
of this selection are slightly different in each discipline. In the Political Thought 
departments, the institutional or tutor prioritisation of, respectively, Liberal or Marxist 
perspectives can, in some cases, be seen to marginalize students with a strong prior 
conviction to an alternative position. In the East University American Literature class, 
the foregrounding of politicised interpretations of texts and of egalitarian approaches to 
the analysis of gender, sexuality and racial thinking can be seen to marginalize students' 
attempts to interpret texts using more traditional or conservative paradigms for literary 
criticism. Thus it is possible to identify conflicts between the methodology of the 
discipline and the methodology used by individual students to support their claims. At 
the level of gender, contradictions that act to marginalize students can be identified both 
in the expected mode of participation or interaction with the discipline, and in students' 
identification either with or against the discourse of both the discipline and the tutor. 
This combination of factors will determine whether it is possible for the student to 
produce a coherent, articulated subject position, within the specific context in which 
they arise. This in tum suggests, or can be used to define, a contradiction between 
uncertain or divided student subjectivities and the requirement to produce a unified 
position from which to speak within the classroom. 
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4.2. Marginalisation of a dominant student: Michael, West University 
Political Thought 
In the West University Political Thought classes, Michael spoke by far the most 
frequently. In one typical session (Hobbes and Social Contract Theory) where there 
were ten students present plus the seminar tutor, all of whom contributed more than 
once to the discussion, Michael contributed 125 out of a total of 380 interventions 
during the hour-long class. He would respond almost instantly to the tutor's questions, 
which made it difficult for other students to articulate a response before him. He would 
also frequently interrupt both the tutor and other students. The speed and frequency of 
Michael's interventions, it could be argued, also appeared to make it difficult for him to 
organise his thoughts coherently: his individual contributions were frequently confused 
and imprecise. However, there was significant consistency in the overall political 
position he articulated throughout the course. This position might be described broadly 
as representative of critical-left politics: he criticised liberalism and descriptions of 
politics based on the individual rather than on class, and he viewed liberal political 
systems as working in the interests of those in power. He also viewed both West 
University and the Politics Department tutors as a part of, or complicit in, the liberal 
establishment that he was criticising. There was some basis to his description of the 
University and the Department as a part of the liberal establishment: the Political 
Thought lecturers were academically positioned within contemporary liberal thought; 
and option modules the department had previously run on Radical Political Thought had 
recently been cut. 
Michael's inclination to participate combined with his explicit criticism of the course 
makes the contradictions in his position particularly visible. In this section I will try to 
describe the precise nature of the contradiction between Michael's personal political 
position and the disciplinary language of the West University Political Thought course. 
I will also suggest that Michae1' s strong identification with or against some of the set 
authors on the course represents how this position is mediated through gender, and 
therefore not describable in purely disciplinary terms. 
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The first example I am gOIng to describe exemplifies the inconsistency between 
Michael's interventions and the framework for class discussion provided by the 
lectures, the set reading and the interventions of the class tutor and other students. In the 
class on Mill, the discussion of whether pornography can be said to contravene Mill's 
harm principle l developed into a discussion about other parameters on state 
intervention. It was suggested that the state has more right to intervene in cases 
involving children, or people identified as having a mental illness or learning disability, 
than in cases involving responsible adults. The question posed by the tutor, just before 
this extract, is: which groups of people might qualify as special cases in this way? 
Several students respond. The first two audible responses suggest possible ways to 
define which groups the state should consider as responsible for themselves. Then 
Michael, in contrast, suggests that this act of definition is in fact always determined by 
the interests of the specific state involved: 
92. Several: (can't hear) 
93. Mark: ( ... ) do they have to choose their government, if not ... 
94. Rachel: When they can't fend for themselves, basically. 
95. Michael: No, the question is before that, the question is, ifl'm individualistic, society will think 
that I'm insane. That's what being an individual means, and the whole thing about ... 
96. Alison (tutor): How far can you take your individualism? 
97. Michael: Mill says, as long as you don't harm anyone else. But the problem is that if you're 
holding up a sign saying 'I love Osarna Bin Ladin' then people will say, no, you're (can't hear) 
our children. Or they will say lots of things and they'll probably hang you, so. But for Mill, that 
would have been okay. And he doesn't actually talk about this point ... 
98. Mark: The question is to what extent do we take the limits of harming someone? If someone 
preaches in the street, 'go fight in Afghanistan, go save your brothers and kill Americans', the 
question is, does he directly harm the people who are going to go to Afghanistan, or indirectly, 
the American soldiers ... 
(West University, Mill) 
The issue I want to explore in relation to this extract is the positioning of Michael's 
interventions (95 and 97). Michael is questioning the basis of this section of discussion, 
arguing that the definition of 'insanity' is dependent on, rather than a condition for, the 
definition of citizenship. Further, he suggests that any expression of individuality will 
1 Mill's harm principle states that the only justification for state intervention in the liberty of the 
individual is to prevent harm to others. See, Mill, 1859 
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be categorised by society as insanity, 'if I'm individualistic, society will think that I'm 
insane'(95). The tutor's response (96), 'How far can you take your individualism?' does 
not acknowledge the precise point Michael is articulating here: from what Michael has 
just said, he clearly thinks there is no room for individuality. Thus, I would argue, the 
disciplinary lmowledge claim he is making is effectively marginalized within the class 
discussion. 
This lack of response can be related to the metonymic structure of lmowledge claims 
within the Political Thought class. The tutor's introduction of the example of people 
with mental disabilities was based on the core definition of mental disability as a lack of 
reason. This is then distinguished from the definition of a responsible citizen as an agent 
capable of reasoned action, since reason, or lack of reason, is a core definition of both 
terms. What Michael says, however, challenges the use of reason as a core definition of 
insanity and thus undermines the structure the tutor has attempted to impose on the 
discussion, and, further, undermines the position of reason as a primary, universal value 
on which to base a theory of government. This is contrary to most liberal approaches. 
The course handout for the Mill lecture, for example, states, as if categorically: 
Mill's defence of freedom of speech is incomplete, flawed in some ways but appealing in others 
as it rests on the view that human beings are rational, and as such capable of making up their 
own mind about moral, philosophical and aesthetic issues. 
(West University, lecture notes) 
What is assumed to be appealing is the fact that Mill's theory is based on 'the view that 
human beings are rational', a view whose significance is undermined in the suggestion 
that judgements about rationality are socially constructed. While students are free to 
argue with the position articulated in the course handout, it does nevertheless constitute 
a part of the regulative framework of the course. Michael's position at this point is 
similar to his position in the example quoted in the last chapter, when he argued that 
Mill's use of the term 'barbarian' is 'racist'. In that example, while Michael was 
referring to the social and historical construction of the term 'barbarian' as used to 
objectify other ethnic groups, the immediate responses given by Alison, the tutor, and 
Mark, another student, referred back to core definitions within which the term 
'barbarian', they suggested, 'doesn't have to be directly racial' (Alison, Mill, 113). 
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Here, Michael is suggesting that the meaning of 'insanity' is also socially constructed, 
in such a way, he argues, as to define those the state disagrees with. In both cases he is 
looking beyond 'core' definitions to provide an account of the meanings of words. His 
comments are clearly not excluded or silenced, but they are marginalized in relation to 
the framework, the methodology and central assumptions, of the course. 
In the extract of discussion of Mill quoted above, the contrasting interventions of the 
two students are exemplary of contrasting methodological approaches. While Alison's 
response is fairly neutral, it does not directly acknowledge what appears to be Michael's 
central point. In the next intervention (97), Michael re-iterates his point in relation to a 
current political example, suggesting that support for Bin Ladin is socially constructed 
as criminal or insane. Implicit - though poorly articulated - here is the suggestion that 
what counts as harm is socially constructed, not an abstract concept. This argument, as 
Michael suggests, constitutes a serious problem for Mill's harm principle. Mark's 
response (98) ignores this implication of Michael's intervention, and, in contrast, begins 
to explore how the harm principle could be articulated to account for the scenario 
Michael has introduced. These constitute two quite different approaches to an analysis 
of Mill's thought. Mark is examining the possibility of interpreting Mill as an internally 
coherent system. In contrast, Michael is constructing an extemalist critique, based on 
the argument that Mill's basic premise - that a conception of harm can be constructed to 
guide government - is flawed. Further, Michael's rejection of Mill's premise might also 
be construed as a rejection of the premise of much of the political philosophy studied on 
this part of the course: i.e. that it is possible to construct a theoretical justification for 
government. Michael explicitly rejected this position during another session, arguing, 
'When you're in government you do what's best for your interest: you tell everyone 
you're following your ideals' (Rousseau 2, 182). While Mark's approach is framed 
within the agenda of the course, lecture and the suggested reading, Michael's response 
does not conform to the framework of legitimate knowledge offered by the West 
University Politics department2. Because of this, within the Political Thought classroom 
2 In her research in the field of academic literacies, Lea (1999) describes students in a similar position, 
i.e. where their prior experiences and/or political commitments put them in an oppositional position in 
relation to their course. She, too,· suggests that the conflict between students and the knowledge presented 
on their courses are 'concerned with issues of epistemology' (p. 116). However, she does not present a 
detailed analysis of the different epistemological assumptions of the discipline and the students, and while 
she is sensitive to the social positioning of the student, she is less explicit about the way the discipline, 
too, may be socially positioned. This lack of recognition of objective contradictions between the position 
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Michael is forced to occupy an uncodified, feminine position. This position appears to 
cause him some discomfort. 
This discomfort was evident in Michael's frequent articulation of his awareness of the 
misfit between his position and that of the course. He raised this issue on several 
occasions during my observations, arguing that discussion of some points of view was 
not encouraged on the course. I introduced Michael's suggestion in my interview with 
the course co-ordinator. The particular instance we discussed came during the 
discussion of the essay question on Hobbes' understanding of moral obligation. The 
class tutor had initiated a discussion on the difficulties involved in constructing a 
definition of morality, and Michael contributed the following point: 
149. Michael: I think the problem is that living with this system which uses morality to justify 
itself, the political system disallows you to question that too much, and as such you can't 
redefme morality because it would completely ruin the legitimation of the current system So 
that question is so politically charged that I wouldn't go near it, is what I'm saying. And that's 
why we're not supposed to discuss morality in this class, because they don't really want us to 
think about it too much. 
(West University, Hobbes and Social Contract Theory) 
In her response to Michael's suggestion in the final sentence that there are some things 
the course does not encourage the students to discuss, Cheryl, the course co-ordinator, 
appears emphatic in her rebuttal3: 
Cheryl: That's bullshit. You know, if that's the impression he goes away with then either he has 
failed to see what the point was, I mean the point is exactly the opposite, or we collectively have 
really failed to impress on him that we want him to actually question points. 
(Cheryl, West University course co-ordinator and lecturer, interview) 
The main point Cheryl makes, that the course views critical questioning of ideas as 
completely desirable is clear, and, I believe, indisputable. However, as she herself 
suggests at different points in the interview, there are different levels on which such 
of the discipline and the position of the student leads to the production of an oversimplified account of 
both the observed situation and of possible ways of remedying such exclusions. 
3 N.B. I don't think I introduced the quotation very effectively. If! had explained my interpretation of 
Michael's point a bit better, she might have responded more sympathetically. 
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criticisms can be made, and these are not all viewed equally within the course. She 
positions herself as a political philosopher, someone who, she says, 'will have to be 
interested in abstract questions, such as what is equality, for example; who will spend 
more time analysing words, looking at the logical relationships between different bits of 
argument.' And she explicitly rejects some other academic approaches to the material 
taught on the course: 
Cheryl: Continental philosophers would not only focus on the history ideas, but they also would 
not, if you went to a lecture on Locke in Paris it would be completely different from the one you 
attended here. Continental philosophers do not like pointing to contradictions, internal 
contradictions in a big philosopher's work. For all sorts of reasons. You would go away from a 
lecture on Locke in Paris thinking that Locke is one of the most coherent thinkers to have 
existed. Whereas I try to convey the impression that his argument, in particular about property, is 
riddled with problems. 
(Cheryl, West University course co-ordinator and lecturer, interview) 
Here Cheryl is very explicit about her preference for a metonymic analysis of 
arguments. What she is ideally looking for is an analysis of the internal coherence of the 
theories and concepts articulated by the philosophers studied on the course. Michael's 
argument against Mill, contrarily, does not address the internal coherence of Mill's 
harm principle, but the premise on which the development of the principle is based, 
which, more importantly, closely resembles the premise of the whole course: that it is 
possible to construct rational justifications for government policies. Arguably, then, his 
whole approach is inconsistent with the discipline that Cheryl is setting out to teach. 
Further, if teaching is believed to have any effect, then the approach taken in the 
lectures and the seminars must have some sort of regulative function. The reading lists, 
the lecture course and the seminar discussions are based on the Political 
Theory/Political Philosophy approach to analysis that Cheryl has described. Other 
approaches, while not explicitly 'disallowed' as Michael tries to suggest, are not 
supported within the framework of the course. A student who feels more comfortable 
with an approach to analysis that does not come within the framework of the course 
must put in extra work to construct arguments consistent with their own position. 
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Michael's discomfort in occupying an uncodified, feminised position in relation to the 
course was also symptomised in his explicit and personal rejection of the position of the 
(female) course lecturer and, perhaps, his concomitant identification with Hobbes and 
Marx, the two set authors he found most persuasive. The West University course was 
divided into the lecture, given by the course co-ordinator, and the seminar, taught by a 
different tutor, a postgraduate student. This division of labour possibly facilitated 
Michael's objectification of the position of the course co-ordinator, since he didn't ever 
hear her articulate and refine her positions in discussion or in response to his objections. 
These objections were made explicit several times during the observed sessions, 
perhaps most dismissively during a general discussion of the course at the beginning of 
one of the sessions: 
Michael: ( ... ) In the Hobbes lecture Cheryl was saying 'this is wrong' ... 
Rachel: Yes, she didn't like Hobbes very much. 
Michael: She didn't like him, but that was irrelevant to the situation. The fact that she didn't like 
him is a fact that is of no interest to me whatsoever. She was not engaging with the actual 
argument. 
(West University, Marx and Engels) 
Michael's presentation of himself as able to judge, and therefore equal, if not superior to 
his lecturer, has connotations of both class and gender positioning. Although he claims 
to be making a statement about the argument, in fact Michael's statement that Cheryl's 
opinion is 'of no interest to me whatsoever', is at least as much a personal as an 
academic judgement. His discussion of Hobbes is similarly personalised. At the end of 
a lengthy discussion of an exam question on Hobbes, Michael observes: 
20. Michael: ( ... ) I think if you defend Hobbes in that question they'll fail you, personally. 
21. Alison (tutor): No, it's not defending Hobbes ( ... ) 
(West Gniversity, Hobbes and Social Contract Theory) 
The question under discussion is 'Does Hobbes understand political obligation as a 
moral obligation to abide by the covenant?' This is an exegetical question about 
different possible interpretations of moral obligation in Hobbes' thought. It does not 
imply an attack on Hobbes' position, in the way that Michael suggests (20). This kind of 
personification of arguments as their authors is not uncommon. However, in this case I 
think it is possible to interpret Michael's strong personal identification and rejection, of 
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Hobbes and the course lecturer respectively, as symptomatic of his position within the 
course. 
Michael's rejection of the course lecturer and his identification with Hobbes then can , , 
be read as signifiers of positioning within structures of gender. While it would be 
precipitate to read the single instance of Michael's vehement dismissal of the lecturer's 
opinions as 'of no interest to me whatsoever' as evidence of sexism, when this instance 
is read in juxtaposition with other comments about female teachers made by male 
students during my study, the case for a gendered interpretation can be made more 
persuasively. For example, another male student in the same class, perhaps accurately 
but also dismissively, identified Alison, the class tutor, as a student on a similar level to 
the rest of the class: 'We're not philosophers ourselves, maybe Alison will be sometime, 
but not yet'. These comments, taken together, and especially when read alongside the 
more explicitly sexist comments made by Edward, in the East University American 
Literature class (see next section of this chapter), suggest that the gender of the tutor is 
not irrelevant to the way male students position themselves within the classroom. 
These observations of male students resisting occupation of feminine positions, or 
subordination to female tutors, are consistent with studies of gender differences in a 
range of disciplines (Walkerdine, 1998, pp. 63-64, Millard, 1997). Elaine Millard, for 
example, argues that 'from an early age, most boys can be shown to fear the 
'contamination of femininity' (ibid, p. 26). In Michael's case this threat of 
contamination with the feminine comes from two sources: firstly his occupation of an 
uncodified position in relation to the discipline of Political Thought within the West 
University course; and secondly in the requirement that he defer to the authority of a 
female lecturer. As I suggested in the previous chapter, then, Michael's identification 
with the legitimate, codified position occupied by Hobbes can also be read as a move 
within gendered linguistic structures. 
In a very different context, Jacqueline Rose argues that sexuality is central to Elliot's 
conception of artists' development of their identity as artists: 
Only by capitulating to the world of dead poets can the artist escape his oppressive individuality 
and ~nter into historical time ( ... ) Just as in the psychoanalytic account, the son pays his debt to 
115 
the dead father, symbol of the law, in order fully to enter his history, so in Elliot's reading the 
artist pays his debt to the dead poets and can only become a poet by that fact. Elliot's conception 
of literary tradition and form could therefore be described as a plea for appropriate mourning and 
for the respecting ofliterary rites. (Rose, 1986, p. 129 - 130) 
What Rose is suggesting is that the mode of engagement with a tradition that demands 
conformity, respect, and 'mourning' for that tradition is analogous to the moment of 
entry into the symbolic order, at which point the infant must identify with and re-iterate 
the existing regulative order. This identification is gendered, because the existing 
regulative order is that of 'the father', patriarchy, and the subordination of feminine 
positions. The deference to dead artists is personal, as well as purely academic or 
artistic, since it is a mechanism by which the living artist can take up a position within a 
recognised tradition. Michael's personalisation of his defence of Hobbes can thus be 
read as a gendered move, in which he positions himself in identification with a 
dominant academic tradition and thus marks out a place from which to speak as a 
subject and creator of language. This position, while not necessarily 'male' can, within 
the Lacanian framework I have set out, be described as 'masculine'. As you will see, 
this move of identification with a critical tradition and against a female lecturer is 
repeated by Edward in the East University American Studies class. 
What I am suggesting is that while Michael's disciplinary interests are marginalized 
within the structure and methodology of West University Political Thought, this 
marginal, feminised position is mediated through Michael's identification with 
masculine codes that enable him to construct a coherent subject position from which to 
speak. 
4.3. On the margins of the discipline: Edward, East University 
American Literature 
The American Literature class at East University was a small group. Of nine fairly 
regular attenders, five were mature, part-time students, and the other four were full time, 
younger students, two of whom were visiting students from an American University. 
The two American students tended to sit together, but the other students spread out a bit 
more around the class, so the fact that Edward also sat apart from the other students 
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does not necessarily mark him out as 'excluded' or as 'an outsider' in any significant 
way. He was one of the four or five students who contributed most frequently to class 
discussions, and was one of only two students who occasionally contributed fairly 
lengthy interventions. However, his contributions were sometimes quite rambling and 
difficult to follow, and after several weeks it appeared that the tutor and some of the 
students had become aware of this. On one or two occasions the tutor interrupted his 
interventions to say she was having difficulty following what he was trying to say, and 
in one session, the two American students were giggling as he was speaking. 
Edward's ideas are difficult to describe precisely because of the slightly rambling and 
incoherent nature of his contributions, both in class and in the interview. There are, 
however, three fairly consistent features of his position in relation to the class 
discussion of Moby Dick that exemplify the disciplinary boundaries of the American 
Studies class. These positions can be identified in Edward's discussion of masculinity 
and heroism, of race and slavery, and in his interpretation of Moby Dick as primarily an 
adventure story, rather than as a metaphorical exploration of political issues in 
American history. Edward's position in relation to each of these issues puts him in 
conflict with the central approach of the course, the course tutor, and most of the other 
students. Additionally, it is possible to identify several ways in which Edward identifies 
with academics and against 'the common man'. 
Edward's first intervention in the class on Moby Dick, giving his general impressions of 
the novel, exemplifies his interpretation of the novel as a literal story about men 
working together on a ship: 
40. Edward: ( ... ) Isn't it more about the individual, about his sense of being at work and his 
interplay with his friends and his work colleagues more than anything else, on the ship. All 
the other, the dysfunctional images, the homosexuality and all of those things are just ways 
of tensing the story, I found ( ... ) 
(East University, Moby Dick 1) 
Edward's description of the book as about 'being at work', and 'his interplay with his 
friends and work colleagues' identifies the significance of the novel in the literal events 
of the narrative: the work of the whalers aboard a whale ship. Other issues that had 
already been raised in the class discussion, such as the suggestion of homoeroticism in 
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the relationship between Ismael and Queequeg, are described as 'just a way of tensing 
the story', which I take to mean that they are details that might make the story more 
exciting but that they are not central to the 'meaning' of the novel. This literal reading 
of the events of the novel is consistent with Edward's interpretation of the text as 
primarily about heroes, male friendship and men working together. 'It's a hero's world', 
he says: 
108. Edward: ( ... ) but whatever job has to be done, like they have to go and catch this whale, 
even though they have this ethical argument about it, whether they should chase this big 
whale, chase monsters and become this monster and sort of that comes, is a bit beyond. I 
think it's important to them that the team, the survival is the team, similarly, I'm the 
leader, you're my second man, we can't have two leaders, it's that kind of thing. 
(East University, Moby Dick 1) 
The idea of the heroic is re-iterated in the suggested association between chasing the 
whale and chasing monsters. The ideas of 'the team', 'survival', 'leaders' and 'seconds' 
can be associated with the ideals of boys adventure stories, or of the hierarchical 
masculine relationships of sports teams and armies. The suggestion that sections of the 
book might be read as homoerotic would clearly undermine these ideals of masculinity 
working together in a heroic endeavour, hence Edward's description of these images as 
insignificant and 'dysfunctional'. 
Edward's interpretation of Moby Dick as a heroic masculine adventure comes into 
conflict with the class discussion of its portrayal of sexuality, and, in a similar way, his 
conception of 'race' and the history of slavery come into conflict with readings of the 
novel which position it within the abolitionist politics that Melville was involved in at 
the time he was writing. This conflict was apparent in the second session on Moby Dick, 
when the class was discussing the chapter 'The Whiteness of the Whale'. This chapter 
first sets out, and then explicitly undermines the traditional associations of whiteness, 
argUIng: 
... for all these accumulated associations, with whatever is sweet and honourable, and sublime, 
there yet lurks an elusive something in the innermost idea of this hue, which strikes more of 
panic to the soul than that redness which affrights in blood. (Melville, Moby Dick, Penguin, p. 
205) 
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Hannah, the tutor, asks the class to explore the political significance of Melville's 
discussion of whiteness, and Edward responds. His response introduces ideas that are 
not wholly consistent with the preceding discussion. He suggests that there is a general 
understanding that white people were responsible for slavery, and that this is inaccurate, 
since Africans voluntarily sold their children into slavery: 
185. Hannah (tutor): I think it serves a particular kind of political function. I mean, why do 
you think that's an important association, perhaps, this idea of purity and whiteness? 
186. Edward: I think it's the common man's view. 
187. Hannah: What's the common man's view? 
188. Edward: The common man's view, the working class man's view is that white people 
were the people responsible for the slaves, which isn't true. I mean, you go to Africa, it 
isn't true. I mean the families sold their children into slavery. They were paid money for 
the slaves by the owners, I mean, the only people who, I mean the truth is that the ships 
were owned by a company, there were ten sailors called marines and there was one 
captain. And each marine was press ganged, from here, and served on the ship, and on 
each floor of the ship was 1000 slaves, and each slave was sold by his family ... 
189. Hannah: No. 
190. Edward: It's true. 
191. Hannah: No, the network of slavery in Africa was mainly based upon the principle of 
victors. It's mainly about conflict. 
192. Edward: There is that element of it but the emperors sold ... 
193. Hannah: People did not sell their children into slavery ... 
194. ( ... ) 
195. Hannah: Yes, but what has this got to do with purity and whiteness? 
(East University, Moby Dick 2) 
Hannah's categorical rebuttal of Edward's position (189) and, when this fails, her 
recourse to specialised academic language, 'the principle of victors', that might have 
precluded a further response, suggests her personal discomfort with the ideas Edward is 
expressIng. Her final intervention (195) both puts an end to her interchange with 
Edward, and also signals a boundary of appropriate discussion in the American Studies 
class. Edward's preoccupation with the African slave trade is illegitimate here for a 
variety of reasons. Firstly, the text under discussion relates to American slavery and the 
American abolition movement: it is not about African slavery. More precisely, the 
section of text they are looking at questions the social and linguistic connotations of 
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whiteness within American slave holding society, while Edward's intervention is about 
the economic organisation of the slave trade in Africa. More importantly though, while 
Melville's text attempts to undermine the hegemonic dominance of conceptions of 
whiteness within language and society, Edward's intervention begins from the opposing 
position. He suggests that the dominant ideology, the ideology in need of correction, is 
one of white responsibility for the evils of the slave trade, which he labels as 'the 
common man's view'. This contrast in approach contravenes not only a disciplinary 
boundary, but also a pedagogic one. It is a convention of contemporary educational 
practice that it is a part of the role of the teacher to police certain types of language and 
beliefs within the classroom. Hannah's explanation of her decision to intervene 
conforms to this convention: 
Okay. There are certain things I intervene with, if! think there's a problem with them, that they 
may be offensive. Here, I think what he's got is a slightly garbled version of the fact that there 
was a flourishing slave trade in Africa and that a European slave trade out of Africa couldn't 
have happened without it. That's not the same as saying that people sold their children. You 
know, he's kind of doing quite a racist thing here, I think, and it needed checking. 
(Hannah, East University, interview) 
Hannah suggests that she is correcting both Edward's possible misunderstanding of the 
history and also an underlying racism in what he is saying. The identification of such 
racism is not easy. Even in this instance, where I would agree with Hannah's 
interpretation, the 'racism' in Edward's intervention is not explicit. The underlying 
racism, I would argue, is evident in his over-generalisation of the practice of families 
selling their children. He says, 'the families (rather than 'some' families) sold their 
children into slavery', and similarly 'each slave was sold by his family'. Racism might 
also be identifiable in his concern about the 'misrepresentation' of white people as 
responsible for slavery, although, factually, his claim that less is known about the 
African slave trade than is known about the European slave trade might well be correct. 
While Hannah cites both factual inaccuracy and racism as reasons for intervening, it is 
the nature of the discipline of American Literature that defines the form of her 
intervention. Hannah brings the discussion back to the linguistic issues relating to 
Moby Dick, while in a History class on the topic of slavery, for example, the correction 
of the factual inaccuracies in Edward's account might have been prioritised, and this 
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might also have enabled some of the racist features of what he is saying to be addressed 
more directly. 
Edward's preoccupation with issues of 'race' and slavery was also evident during my 
interview with him. He spent a long time telling me about a trip he went on to the 
Gambia, where he had learnt, or confrrmed, much of his knowledge about the slave 
trade. His pre-occupation with race was also evident in other ways. For example, when I 
asked him to summarise the previous week's session, the session which included the 
extract quoted above, he began by saying, 'It was interesting that the two black 
members of our session couldn't turn up for it'. In a different context, when asked to 
explain what it means to study English Literature, Edward again returned to issues of 
ethnicity, here specifically in relation to the global linguistic dominance of English: 
CL: Can you defme for me what the study of English Literature is about? 
Edward: What's it about? It's about English. It's about communication. All radio ( ... ) Even 
though in other countries we speak on civilian radio in native languages, in all radio 
communications of any kind that are a controlling influence, so in airplanes ( ... ) it's legally 
bound by international laws to be spoken in English ( ... ) So, English for me, the study of 
English, the honest degree in English tells me what was special about English that people really 
wanted to keep alive, ethically, what's English? 
(Edward, East University, interview) 
What he appears to be suggesting here, what he appears to be looking for from his 
studies, is a justification of the dominance of English that is based on the inherent 
superiority of, 'what was special about', the language, rather than the now more 
commonly accepted explanation, which suggests that colonisation and exploitation are 
responsible for the contemporary global economic dominance of the English language. 
Clearly, if this is what Edward wants, then the English Literature degree at East 
University is not going to provide what he is looking for. However, later in the 
interview, in a slightly confused anecdote he also described another aspect of what he 
hopes the degree can offer him: 
You know, you go into a shop and you ask for ( ... ) the paper, and the guy says, instead of saying 
35 pence, he says 45 pence. And you sort of think to yourself, 'I'll kill that guy'. You know it's 
actually 35 pence for that paper, but, you know, people take advantage of you all the time. So I 
needed some way to actually deal with these kind of speculations. So the degree provided me 
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with evidence of what that kind of character is coming from and why it's a social problem and 
how I ethically deal with it, you know, with a laugh and a giggle, and the right sort of appraisal 
of it. So, in a kind of a way I saw it as that, more as a human skill ... 
(Edward, East University, interview) 
Here, Edward suggests, that he what he wants to learn from the degree is how to better 
understand and control his responses to situations that he finds difficult to manage. 
There is, it would seem, a conflict between the objective of an access oriented higher 
education institution to meet precisely this type of educational need and the more 
explicitly politicised content of the American Literature course, which necessarily 
marginalizes the racist elements of Edward's position. What is evident is that the issues 
that Edward wishes to discuss are not accessible within the codes of the American 
Literature course, and he is thus forced to occupy a marginal, feminised and 
uncomfortable position within the classroom. 
Edward very explicitly associates approaches to literature that prioritise political issues 
and issues of 'race', gender and sexuality with Hannah, the class teacher. In describing 
her reading of the Moby Dick he positions Hannah in opposition to other established 
critics: 
I found the analogy between the novel and the whale simple to understand in the one sense, you 
know, that the novel and the whale are the embodiment of an idea, and that embodiment, the 
teacher says, is America. The writer doesn't say that. Not all the critics say that. And the critics 
that wrote about it at the time, the newspaper reviews of the story don't say that ... Politics that 
are going on around him would have found their way into the writing, he would have found it 
very difficult not to have, but I don't think he deliberately wrote. I think he wrote specifically 
about a set of characters that he knew about or had feelings for, making their way through the 
story of work. 
(Edward, East University, interview) 
The insertion of 'the teacher says' to modify the description of the whale as a metaphor 
for America distances Edward from this interpretation. The teacher's position is then 
opposed to interpretations of other critics and also to Edward's own suggestion that any 
political references in the book are accidental, and irrelevant to the main story of the 
novel. Edward's reference to 'the critics' is similar to Michael's identification with 
Hobbes, and suggests his desire to align himself with academic discourse, and to 
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distance himself from the ignorance of 'the common man'. Edward made this move of 
identification with an academic tradition on several occasions during my observations. 
There is also a clear insinuation here that the teacher lacks credibility as a critic. This 
insinuation was repeated several times during the interview, for example in Edward's 
response to a question about the teacher's role and her position within the discipline of 
English literature: 
I think she's very lively. I think she tends to go out of her way to become part of the class. She's 
quite nice like that. I think that's good. She doesn't, I fmd maybe, a bit strange, everything in 
this particular topic is open-ended. I find everything is left open-ended. I fmd that even in sort 
of, some of the feminist writings that I'm reading that, you know, everything's open-ended. 
Nobody's prepared to put their foot down and say what they actually believe in. Like black 
feminist writers write about how they're excluded because they write about lesbians, et cetera. 
Ordinary people don't like that, so they won't read it. So you have to sort of think about a story. 
(Edward, East University, interview) 
Edward's initial description of Hannah, 'she's lively', she's 'part of the class', and 
'she's quite nice like that', emphasises characteristics that are personal and feminine, as 
opposed to professional and academic. He then attempts to modify the criticism that 
will follow, saying he finds it 'maybe a bit strange', before sweepingly categorising 
Hannah with 'feminists', 'black feminists' and 'lesbians', all of whom, he claims, fail to 
'put their foot down and say what they actually believe'. This attempt to describe 
Hannah in terms of a stereotype of women as less decisive and, implicitly, less clear and 
rational than men is not only crudely sexist, but also inaccurate and self-contradictory 
when juxtaposed with Edward's previous comments about her interpretation of Moby 
Dick. Although he described the interpretation of the whale as a metaphor for America 
as 'simple to understand', which is consistent with his stereotyping of women's, or 
feminist, ideas, he also identified it explicitly as what 'the teacher says', suggesting that 
her presentation of the topic was not in fact 'open-ended'. It would appear, then, that 
the content and methodology of American Literature, which coincide with the academic 
interests and position of the teacher, combined with the fact that she is a woman make it 
difficult for Edward to find a position that is consistent with those offered within the 
American Literature classes. 
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The West University Political Thought module is methodologically less diverse than 
East University American Literature, but it offers an explicit range of different political 
positions with which students may identify. East University American Literature uses a 
range of different methodologies, but is more restrictive than Political Thought in terms 
of the diversity of political positions developed and argued for within the course. 
Whereas in the Political Thought class Michael was able to identify positions that were 
both in opposition to the lecturer and still a part of the core curriculum of the course, the 
American Literature module was based on a consistent set of political assumptions that 
provided no overlap with Edward's political views. Although Hannah, the course tutor, 
referred to examples of literary criticism that offer alternative accounts, these were 
generally used to position her own argument rather than being developed and explored 
on their own terms. In addition, in the American Literature class the explicit overlap 
between gender and disciplinary content presents Edward with further conflicts to 
negotiate. Edward's already complicated, sexist, response to his female lecturer is 
further complicated by the discussion of masculinity and sexuality within the classes. In 
effect, the course starts from the assumption of a shared prioritisation of issues of equity 
in relation to 'race', 'gender' and 'sexuality', and because of this it does not explicitly 
offer a position from which Edward might begin to rationalise or alter his position. 
4.4. The construction of a non-participative student: Laura, South 
University Political Thought. 
Laura is doing Law and Politics at South University. This is the third degree that she has 
begun. First she did three weeks of a Law course, which she hated. Then she studied 
music for two years, which she also didn't enjoy. She decided to start again with Law 
and Politics on the recommendations of friends studying both subjects, and also because 
she wanted to develop a better understanding of current affairs. She felt that now she 
was older she would have a better experience than when she first studied law: 
I really want to learn what's happening because when I was doing music I felt like I just didn't 
know what was going on around me, in the news, I just felt like I didn't know anything ... Well, 
I'm twenty. I'm kind of more organised, I'm not rushing into things as much, and I think now 
I'm more settled to take on something more academic, more serious about stuff. 
(Laura, South University, interview) 
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Laura seems not to have considered the possibility of not doing a degree. She referred to 
the importance of education several times during the interview, and to the value she 
attached to the fact that she is educating herself, in contrast with other people who have 
worked less hard: 
... Personally, I think it's all down to education, if you want, say you're working class, if you 
want to get out of that hardship, it's all down to education, you need to educate yourself to get 
that far. . .. I'm from a working class background and I've educated myself (giggles) I would 
have gone through education and hopefully I would have got a decent job. 
(Laura, South University, interview) 
Despite her apparent commitment to education, Laura was not a very active student in 
the Political Thought classes. Laura asked a question in the very first session that I 
observed and that was the only time she spoke in class during my observations. In the 
video of one seminar, Laura is visible sitting next to the lecturer in the circle of chairs, 
staring down at her desk, silent and apparently unresponsive, throughout the seminar. 
Laura explained her lack of participation as resulting from what she perceived as the 
dogmatism of the course tutors, saying: 
... When I fIrst started off I thought this is really okay, and I put my point across, and now it's 
more diffIcult ... It was just so diffIcult to put your view across because obviously they (the 
course tutors) have their own opinions and if you say something they kind of jump down your, 
not jump down your throat, but say 'no, no, this'. 
(Laura, South University, interview) 
However, she also identified other problems she was having with her courses. Despite 
saying that she found Political Thought interesting, and less difficult than Political 
Institutions, she said that the last two lectures had gone over her head. She evaluated her 
own performance quite critically and identified specific difficulties she had 
encountered. She described giving a presentation in her Political Institutions class and 
thinking, as she was giving the presentation, 'Oh my god, I'm giving a presentation and 
I don't even know what I'm talking about'. She also explained what she felt had been 
some of the problems within her presentation: 
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· .. The thing is just breaking the information down and the lecturer said I had all the information 
there, but the thing was selecting the right bits of information. I mean, that I found difficult. So I 
just went on and on, and I didn't really know what I was talking about half the time and then 
people were asking questions and I only gave my view, I didn't give other views or opinions, I 
just thought my own views 'this is all I understand, this is all I know', so, yeah. 
(Laura, South University, interview) 
It appears that Laura's analysis of her perfonnance is at least partly derived from her 
Political Institutions lecturer's comments, and, further, it is couched in the language of 
de-contextualised skills: she talks about 'selecting the right bits of infonnation' and the 
need to 'give other views or opinions'. There is no evidence here of a connection 
between these skills and the substantive content of either the discipline she is studying 
or her own political opinions. This can be interpreted as an example of a displaced, or 
uncodified feminine subject position: Laura's account of herself uses the tenns of a 
language that is not her own. This interpretation is consistent with Freud's definition of 
neurosis, or with Lacan' s 'discourse of the hysteric'. In both these accounts the subj ect, 
unable to negotiate a coherent identity, is excessively reliant on socially constructed 
regulations. In Freud, this occurs when there is conflict between the ego and the id, and 
the ego, unable to resolve the conflict on its own, adopts to excess the language of 
social conventions (Freud, 1986, pp. 563 - 567). In Lacan, the position of the hysteric is 
produced when the divided subject speaks in the language of the subject supposed to 
know (Verhaeghe, 1999). The point is that in order to construct a coherent position as a 
social subject the individual must speak a language that unifies individual desires with 
socially acceptable codes and languages: in Lacan's tenninology, the symbolic order. 
The failure to do this produces the uncomfortable, and feminised position of the 
hysteric. 
Laura's relatively lucid accounts of her motivations for studying and of the skills that 
she needs to acquire are not consistent with her disaffection, her lack of understanding 
during some of the classes, and her hesitancy in expressing her views during the 
interview. Other parts of our discussion revealed a connection between the difficulties 
Laura was having with the course and her expectations about the nature of the 
discipline. Laura's approach to the study of Politics is positioned within her attempts to 
reconcile her own personal and political positions and her desire to understand 'the 
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news' and 'what was going on around me', but her experience in the classes is not 
consistent with these objectives. There are, then, several factors that contribute to the 
construction of Laura's non-participative position within the class, and these reveal her 
lack of a secure, codifed disciplinary position from which to speak. 
I spoke to Laura the week after the class on Hegel and immediately after the class on 
Marx. I want to describe Laura's positioning in relation to these two sessions, and also 
in relation to her account of a topic she studied on one of her Law modules. To do this, I 
want to begin by quoting at length an extract from the Hegel lecture (i.e. not the 
seminar) that I showed to Laura during her interview. She has a transcript to follow, and 
also listened to the extract on the video. In her response, she appeared unable to produce 
any language that might begin to relate to, or make sense of the tutor's text. 
I was uncertain whether to refer to the session on Hegel in the interview, since it had 
been by far the most difficult of the topics on the course. However, in the end I decided 
that I shouldn't prejudge, especially since Laura hadn't spoken in the class, and so I had 
no way of knowing what her response would be. The first extract I selected to discuss 
with Laura, and in the event the only extract we looked at in the interview, was a section 
where Bill, the lecturer, used the story of Antigone to illustrate Hegel's conception of 
history progressing through contradiction. What I want to do is to examine the 
methodology of the extract, and then to compare that with Laura's response to the 
extract during the interview. I am familiar with the story of Antigone and have some 
basic understanding of Hegel's ideas, and I very much enjoyed this section of the 
lecture. Bill began by offering his version of the Antigone: 
Let me give an example of a Hegel contradiction. It comes from Greek Tragedy, you'll see the 
point in a minute. In The Antigone, Antigone has a problem, and her problem is that her brother 
has fallen out with her uncle, and, for good or bad reason, it doesn't really matter, because her 
uncle is a tyrant, staged a rebellion and lost. Now, why is this a problem? Well, it's a problem 
because she fmds herself confronted by two moral rules which are central to Greek society. The 
fIrst is that of obedience to constituted authority. This is a moral principle endorsed and 
supported by the Gods of the state. So here we are in a society, a polytheistic society, where 
there are many Gods and they're all fairly equal. And the Gods of the state decree obedience to 
the king. The Gods of the family set certain moral rules about what you're supposed to do about 
your family. And the king, in order to make sure that the point is made about what happens to 
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rebels, says, this guy's body must not be allowed to have a proper ceremonial burial, it must be 
left there as an example to any other would be rebels. The Gods of the family dictate to Antigone 
that she has to do a proper ceremonial burial. And the reason it's a tragedy is that there is no way 
out. Whichever she does, she will have offended one lot of Gods, and she will therefore go to a 
tragic end. 
(South University, Hegel, lecture) 
Up to this point, I want to suggest, Bill is largely just recounting the story of Antigone. 
He does not relate the events of the story as a simple narrative, or in chronological 
order. His version is an interpretation that prioritises the ideological conflict between 
the Gods over the actions of the human characters. Nevertheless, up to this point he is 
telling a story. And, during the interview, listening to the video and following the 
transcript, up to this point Laura appeared relaxed and appeared to be following. 
However, the extract I had chosen continued. And from this point on, Laura's attitude 
changed, and she was no longer relaxed or engaged with what was being said. In the 
fmal part of the extract Bill explained the relationship between the story of Antigone 
and Hegel's concept of dialectical contradiction: 
She's stuck, because there's no moral arbiter between different equal Gods. The point that Hegel 
makes is that this is an in built contradiction in the ideological system of Ancient Greek society. 
There ain't no way out. There's no resolution. 'What does that lead to?' says Hegel. And what it 
actually leads to is debates as to which god is top god, as it were. So you get these debates about 
which god is going to be top god. Conflicts within the system, which will be reflected in - as in 
Antigone they are - in conflicts between institutions within the system. Because ideas are 
embodied. But that is a conflict, a contradiction, a dialectic, and it's build into the system: two 
sides. But what happens out of that conflict, says Hegel, is not that one god emerges as top god, 
but that a completely new system of religion emerges in which there is only one god, which 
solves the problem. So instead of saying a top god and a second god, you go to monotheism: 
Judaeism, Christianity, Islam, where there is only one god who is the ultimate moral arbiter. 
(South University, Hegel, lecture) 
In this section of the extract there is almost no direct reference to the story of Antigone. 
Instead, Bill is explaining why the story can be read as an example of Hegel's dialectic. 
As I have suggested, examples are used in different ways in the Political Thought and 
American Literature classes. My analysis of sections of discussion in the West 
University class has already shown that in Political Thought examples tended to be 
hypothetical and used to test out possible and consistent uses of terms, while in the 
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American Literature classes, in contrast, literary examples were treated as empirical 
evidence, and detailed analysis of these examples was used to develop new 
accounts/definitions of concepts. The way the example of Antigone is being used here, 
as might be expected, is consistent with the method of Political Thought. It is being 
used to illustrate the internal coherence of the Hegelian dialectic. It does not matter 
whether or not the story is true, nor whether the story can plausibly be interpreted, as 
Bill suggests, as an explanation of the genesis of monotheism. While Bill's account can 
be seen as an interpretation of Antigone, the individual characters and relationships 
within the story are not relevant to the point he is trying to make. This way of using an 
example, while typical of Philosophy or Political Thought, is not transparent to those 
unfamiliar with these types of disciplinary methodologies. 
Laura appears to have no language with which to respond to, or make sense of the 
discussion of Antigone. I asked her to explain what she had understood from this section 
of the class transcript: 
Laura: He was talking about Greek tragedy, and using that as an example, but I forgot what it 
was now, towards the end. 
CL: So the beginning bit, can you say, what was that an example of? 
Laura: It was in the Greek tragedy, obviously, there's no outcome to it. 
CL: If it was an example of a conflict, what was the conflict between? 
Laura: Was it between love and religion? Well most Greek tragedies, there's usually love and 
relationships. 
CL: Do you know the story of Antigone? 
Laura: No. 
CL: So that was quite difficult. He kind of explained it, but it's quite difficult to take in. 
Laura: Yes. Oh God. 
(Laura, South University, interview) 
Laura's response to the extract, although limited, does provide enough to suggest 
possible interpretations of her position. The fact that she doesn't mention Antigone - she 
first says that the tutor 'was talking about Greek tragedy', and later confirms that she 
doesn't know the story - suggests that this cultural reference was for her more 
exclusionary than explanatory. In fact, the reference to tragedy in general is, perhaps, 
distracting for Laura, since she positions the genre in relation to a set of ideas, 'love and 
relationships', that has no direct relation to the Hegelian concepts under discussion. It is 
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possible to speculate that an exploration of love and relationships in Antigone might be 
the focus of discussion in a school literature class. Love and relationships is not, 
however, likely to be pertinent to the development of a theory of the state4. In relation 
to this extract, Laura appears to be positioned outside the disciplinary discourse of the 
classroom at every possible level: she has no language that would enable her to enter the 
discussion as a discussion of Political Thought. 
Laura's response to Marx also reveals an internal contradiction between her own 
personal and political positions, which in tum produces a conflict between her language 
and the disciplinary language of the Political Thought classroom. Her main argument 
against Marx is that she doesn't believe in the idea of a universal class, she believes that 
people will always put individual interests before class interests. She bases this 
judgement on her observation of her own country: 
With the class structure there never will be one (a universal class) because people are constantly 
wanting to get ahead of each other. Especially in my country, Trinidad. One of the girls was 
saying, 'maybe it might work, a proletarian might work in a less developed country'. It wouldn't 
at all, because in Trinidad people are constantly wanting to move ahead of each other so 
nobody's going to be there to help each other out at all. 
(Laura, South University, interview) 
This observation IS also consistent with Laura's assessment of her own probable 
reactions: 
The reason I'm at university is that I want to educate myself. I want to do better, I want to get a 
decent job so I can, yes, buy things for myself. And I think if I had to give that up, I don't think 
that I could give that up just for - oh it sounds really bad - I don't think I could give it up for a 
cause, because it's not like it was given to me on a plate, I mean, oh, this is really bad, oh god. 
(Laura, South University, interview) 
Laura's observation that individual interests appear, empirically, to override class 
interests constitutes a coherent criticism of Marx's position. However she demonstrates 
4 This reminds me of the time my General Philosophy tutor suggested that next week we might look at 
Austen's Sense and Sensibility. I admit, I thought it was a bit odd, but I didn't question it, and I was quite 
pleased that it was something I would actually enjoy reading. Of course, (as my friend Rachel pointed out 
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considerable discomfort at having to articulate and justify her political instincts, which, 
she feels, appear selfish. As she explains her views, she frequently says, 'Oh, it sounds 
really bad ... Oh, this is really bad'. This perceived contradiction between Laura's 
articulation of her political beliefs and her desire not to appear 'bad' provides an 
explanatory context for her reluctance to participate in class. 
There are three ways it could be possible to conceptualise Laura's contradictory position 
as contributing to her non-participation. Firstly, it might be possible to argue that her 
contradictory feelings alone might make her unwilling to express her opinions, 
regardless of the disciplinary and pedagogic framework of the classes. This approach 
identifies the individual, rather than other structures, as constitutive of the events in the 
classroom. Secondly, it would be possible to argue that the pedagogic approach of the 
tutor, as Laura has suggested, does not encourage participation from students whose 
ideas oppose his own, and that this effect is particularly noticeable in a student such as 
Laura, who already has contradictory feelings about her position. Thirdly, it is possible 
to describe the lack of participation as resulting from the position of Laura's 
contradictory languages in relation to the disciplinary discourse and methodology of 
Political Thought. This last approach can also produce a description of the pedagogic 
approach taken by the tutors as constituted within the disciplinary methodology of the 
subject. This is significant, because an analysis that attempts to describe the teaching 
approach in terms of a decontextualised pedagogy undervalues the inherent 
contradictions between students' personal languages and the languages of academic 
disciplines. 
The individualising description that identifies Laura's contradictory languages as the 
key determinant of her actions cannot stand as the sole, or even the major explanation of 
her non-participation. Two features of the interview can be used to undermine this 
description. Firstly, Laura's repeated identification of her own inadequate use of 
research and study skills, suggests a desire to participate and take control of her learning 
that at the very least complicates a description of her as silenced by her own 
contradictory ideas. She describes interventions she might have made during the class, 
prefacing a comment, for example, with: 'I should have asked Bill this', and saying, 'in 
when I told her how pleased I was) he was actually referring to lL. Austin's book, Sense and Sensibilia 
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the semInars there's so much I want to say', demonstrating an awareness of the 
possibilities and advantages of participation. Secondly, and more conclusively, she 
articulates her ideas freely and articulately - although very hesitantly - during the 
interview. This indicates that the internal contradiction within her position is not enough 
to inhibit her from developing and expressing her ideas in all contexts. 
The argument that the pedagogic approach of the tutor inhibits Laura's participation 
can, perhaps, be developed more persuasively. However, an examination of the 
teaching methods reveals how they are always also describable within the tenns of the 
discipline. The pattern of the seminars was for Bill, the tutor, to ask for questions or 
comments. When comments or questions were offered, he would respond, frequently at 
some length. He did not, in contrast to all the other tutors I observed, direct questions at 
the students. His approach was the same when a student raised a point that he disagreed 
with, he would simply respond, expecting the student to argue their point, rather than 
first eliciting more about what the student was trying to say. Laura describes her 
impression of this approach to managing the seminars, which she associates with both 
of the course tutors: 
... Because, Bill's a Marxist, isn't he? Because sometimes their teaching styles, it's really 
difficult because they always give their views, more than anything. They don't give the other 
side of the Marxist view. 1 think it was when Will was arguing a point, and Bill was really 
defensive, they don't give the other side to it, you know, and sometimes you need that ( ... ) It's 
just quite hard sometimes when Bill's got his views and you want to say something against him 
and you're like, 'I hope he doesn't jump down my throat'. 
(Laura, South University, interview) 
Laura's interpretation of the tutors' approach is that they are not providing alternative 
viewpoints and arguments to their own. While there are some clear examples where Bill 
does argue for positions that are not his own, there are also examples that support 
Laura's interpretation. These are particularly marked in the session on Marx that took 
place immediately before my interview with Laura. In this session it is possible to read 
some of Bill's responses as 'defensive' of his traditionalist Marxist position. I want to 
explore one example of this, which I discussed in my interview with two other students 
(which 1 didn't particularly enjoy). 
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in the class. In this example, Bill objects to a student's suggestion that Marxism is a 
'belief. The intervention occurs as he has been explaining what it means to suggest that 
communism is the end of history: 
13. Bill: ( ... ) We will move into a history that we will shape ourselves ( ... ) it's not the end 
of history, but it's a qualitatively different sort of history. We will look back, or I won't, 
I'll probably be too old, I'll probably be dead by the time communist society has come 
into existence ... 
14. (intervention from Will, can't hear) 
15. Tamsin: So you believe it's going to happen do you? 
16. Bill: I don't believe, I analyse it as so. It's not a religion. 
17. Tamsin: Do you foresee it? 
18. Bill: You can't foresee it. There is the alternative, as Rosa Luxembourg put it: socialism or 
barbarism. And as we look around the post war world we know that it's tending more in 
the direction of barbarism at the moment ... ( ... ). 
(South University, Marx and Engels) 
Bill's rej ection of T amsin' s initial question, and then again of her reformulation 0 f her 
question can certainly be interpreted as 'defensive', and also as off-putting for an 
unconfident student. However, it is also a valid correction that suggests a more precise 
way of understanding Marx's thought that is consistent with the discipline of Political 
Thought more generally, both in methodology (the distinction itself constitutes an 
example of the type of linguistic analysis dominant within the discipline), and in 
content, (the assertion of the importance of reasoned analysis, rather than religious 
belief as the basis for a political position). My discussion of this extract in my 
interviews with Nadia and Guy, two other students in the class, re-iterated this dual 
interpretation. They both suggested that they would have made the same 'incorrect' use 
of 'believe', and to this extent they appeared to interpret Bill's interventions as 
authoritative and, potentially, intimidating. They also both interpreted the exchange as a 
clash between two languages: they suggested that Tamsin was asking a personal 
question about Bill's opinions, whereas his response uses a more precise, academic 
language. However, neither found this problematic, and both suggested that the 
exchange was useful and interesting. Bill's own strongly and very openly held personal 
political convictions, as Laura suggested, might also help to explain his vehemence on 
this issue. 
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Bill's interventions, then, should be read as a product of the disciplinary language of 
Political Thought and of his own political and disciplinary positions. As such, Laura's 
discomfort cannot be understood merely as a response to a style of teaching, but as a 
response to a style of teaching Political Thought: the interventions of the teacher are 
always simultaneously both examples of teaching methods and examples of the 
discipline. Furthermore, Bill's general approach of arguing against students' points, 
rather than eliciting and supporting them can also be identified with the discipline of 
Political Thought. This style is not dissimilar to the mode of discussion in the West 
University Political Thought group that I observed, which was regarded by the tutor and 
by the course lecturer as an especially good class. While asserting and debating 
positions are generic feature of academic discourse, they are particularly and 
distinctively central to Political Thought, which prioritises the development of 
definitions of concepts over interpretation of texts or other data. Indeed, Bill confirmed 
this in his interview, commenting, 'I'm trying to make them learn ideas. The texts are a 
good way of learning ideas ... but I'm primarily interested in people understanding the 
ideas'. And, he continued, a too textual approach could restrict students' independent 
understanding and application of ideas: ' ... there can be a danger of going down the text 
road. If you go too far down the text road people just largely repeat, rather than grasping 
ideas as things you can use and apply'. This conceptualisation of the discipline clearly 
prioritises students' expression of their own ideas and opinions and denigrates the use of 
texts as a means of mediation between the views of the speaker and the knowledge 
claims of the discipline. 
To exemplify this distinction between disciplines, I want finally to discuss Laura's 
account of a topic in her law course that she had found particularly interesting. She 
explained a series of legal cases following the Hillsborough football stadium disaster, 
which she had studied in a Law class. Several people who had not actually been in the 
stadium, but who had been watching on television at home, had attempted to sue for 
compensation. Laura appeared to be interested both by the fact that the case related to 
Hillsborough and also, especially, by the bizarre nature of the claims:. 
In legal issues we did the Hillsborough disaster case, ( ... ) and we had to write case notes on it, 
and it was just interesting researching into it and fmding out different views and how people 
were suing. I mean, the really fascinating thing was people who weren't actually there, who 
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watched it on TV, were actually suing. And we have certain things that you can sue by, you 
know, foreseeable reasons. It was just really interesting seeing that people think that they can get 
money out of the chief constable like that. 
(Laura, South University, interview) 
This example can be contrasted with Laura's experience of the Political Thought class 
in several ways. Firstly, it corresponds to Laura's stated reasons for choosing to study 
Politics and Law: she said that she wanted to find out about the news, and about what 
was going on in the world, and this example from a contemporary news event very 
precisely meets this requirement. Secondly, the structure of the example can be 
contrasted with the use of Antigone in the Political Thought class. As in the Antigone 
example, the cases brought in relation to the Hillsborough disaster are used to illustrate 
theoretical points: Laura talks about 'foreseeable reasons', for example. However, in 
the Hillsborough example the actual case is an essential empirical example, not merely a 
hypothetical illustration. Although the actual relationships and individual motivations of 
the litigants mayor may not be central to the point of law being taught, they are 
however more central than was the case in Political Thought, and it is the details of the 
individuals, 'that people think they can get money out of the chief constable like that', 
that Laura finds interesting. In contrast, her attempts to impose an interpretation in 
terms of love and relationships onto the reference to Greek tragedy in the Political 
Thought class were simply misleading for her. Finally, in discussing the motivations 
and moral dilemmas of the litigants in the Hillsborough case, Laura is not required to 
explicitly question or justify her own views, as she was in the Political Thought class. 
The example cases used in Law provide a buffer against the expression of your own 
views which is not available in the Political Thought classes. 
This disciplinary distinction can be related to my definition of gendered subject 
positions: the masculine position as one where the subject creates and speaks their own 
language and the feminine position as one defined by languages that are imposed on the 
subject. Of course, this is an oversimplification, and it is certainly not the case that any 
discipline that uses external sources as the basis of knowledge claims can be defined as 
'feminine'. Nevertheless, it is the case that different disciplinary methodologies require 
different kinds of relationships between the speaking subject and the claims they wish to 
make. 
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It appears that the contradictions between Laura's personal and political positions make 
her uncomfortable and unwilling to articulate her political opinions in the classroom. 
The nature of Political Thought, in which the articulation of your own ideas through 
narrow, metonymic chains of reasoning is the primary method of engaging with the 
subject, and which, therefore, does not prioritise the description and analysis of 
empirical evidence, exacerbates Laura's discomfort. The disciplinary style enacted in 
the tutor's precise articulation of his own academic/political position, further alienates 
Laura. Thus his articulation of disciplinary language can be read, at the level of teaching 
methods, as judgemental and exclusive. Laura's response to this, against her own better 
judgement, is to withdraw her participation from the class and to stop asking questions. 
I have suggested that these features of the South University Political Thought classes 
can be read as gendered, and that Laura's position is consistent with the feminised 
position of a subject unable to develop a coherent identity through the production of a 
language that codifies their personal interests and experiences within the legitimate 
discourses of their social context. 
4.5. Conclusions 
Boundaries of legitimacy within these classes are produced where there is a conflict 
between the political position of the student and the methodology of the discipline. Both 
Michael and Edward are able to speak in the classes, but experience frustration in their 
attempts to develop their ideas. In both cases, it is not simply that the tutor and other 
students disagree with these marginalized political positions. Rather, Michael and 
Edward's political positions can be associated with methodologies that conflict with the 
dominant methodology of their respective disciplines. In addition, in each of these 
cases, disciplinary methodologies and identifications produce teaching styles that are in 
contradiction with the avowed inclusive pedagogic aims of the courses, and which 
inherently and inevitably prioritise certain languages over others. In West University 
Political Thought metonymic reasoning processes were prioritised over Michael's more 
extemalist, metaphorical approach. In East University American Literature the reverse 
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was true, and metaphorical interpretations were prioritised over Edward's attempt to 
construct more literal, metonymic readings. In both Political Thought classes, the 
expression of individual opinion, conceptual disagreements and hypothetical examples 
were prioritised over the mediated presentation of texts and data. Thus, classroom 
interactions are regulated and restricted by legitimated disciplinary codes, which 
necessarily position other modes of reasoning as illegitimate, unthinkable and 
uncodifiable. 
I have suggested that these classroom interactions also represent moves within gendered 
hierarchies, which align the unthinkable, or the uncodified, with the feminine. Within 
this gendered hierarchy, it appears it is possible for male students to resist the feminised 
position by asserting their superiority over (female) tutors. Edward and Michael are 
both dismissive of their female tutors' views and both identify strongly with 
authoritative academics and critics in opposition to their teachers. Laura, in contrast, 
despite disagreeing with Bill, respects his superior knowledge, conceding 'I suppose 
that's Political Thought', to modify her criticisms of his pedagogy in deference to his 
position as an academic. Where Edward and Michael identify with academic 
authorities, Laura identifies with a language of academic skills within which she can 
describe her own failings5. And where Edward and Michael, to differing extents, 
articulate their opposition to the curriculum they are being offered, Laura, within the 
classes, is silent. 
5 Work within various fields has argued that contemporary skills discourses are reductive, atomising, and 
fail to help students to understand the cultural practices and epistemological assumptions that would 
allow them to become 'insiders' in relation to academic knowledge (see, for example, Hyland, 2000, pp. 
144 - 150. See also, Lillis, 2001, Lea and Street, 2000). 
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Chapter 5 
INCLUDED POSITIONS IN POLITICAL THOUGHT: 
TEMPORALL Y DOMINANT KNOWLEDGE, GENDER AND THE 
POSITIONING OF THE NEW UNIVERSITY STUDENT 
5.1. Introduction 
This thesis describes an array of positions available to students in undergraduate classes 
in Political Thought and American Literature. The previous chapter described student 
positions that might be described as marginalized, excluded or resistant. So far I have 
attempted to define these terms in relation to disciplinary methodologies and gendered 
hierarchies in the observed classes. Before I begin I want to clarify, very briefly, the 
definition of marginalized, or 'excluded' positions at a conceptual level, in relation to 
the alternative descriptions of student positions as coherent, dominant, included or 
conformist. 
The concept of overdetermination foregrounds the radically incomplete nature of social 
and subjective identities. Thus discursive fields, such as institutions, disciplines and 
genders, are not autonomous, but rather gain stability, or dominance within a specific 
context only in so far as each of the discursive fields that constitute the social overlaps 
with, or re-iterates aspects of others. Where, instead, there is a contradiction between 
two discursive fields, an antagonistic relationship exists in which each field sets a limit 
on the possible articulation of the other. This antagonism has been described as 'the 
"experience" of the limit of the social' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 125). This 
experience of antagonism is paradoxical in that it both re-iterates the fragility of the 
subordinate field, and at the same time reveals the possibility of subverting the stability 
of the dominant. Laclau and Mouffe suggest: 
We must consider this 'experience' of the limit of the social from two different points of view. 
On the one hand, as an experience of failure. If the subject is constructed through language, as a 
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partial and metaphorical incorporation into a symbolic order, any putting into question of that 
order must necessarily constitute an identity crisis. But on the other hand, this experience of 
failure is not an access to a diverse ontological order, to a something beyond differences, simply 
because ... there is no beyond. The limit of the social cannot be traced as a frontier separating 
two territories - for the perception of a frontier supposes the perception of something beyond it 
that would have to be objective and positive - that is, a new difference. The limit of the social 
must be given within the social itself as something subverting it, destroying its ambition to 
constitute a full presence. Society never manages fully to be society, because everything is 
penetrated by its limits. (ibid. p. 126 -7) 
Speaking at a purely theoretical level, Laclau and Mouffe suggest that antagonism 
constitutes an 'identity crisis' for the symbolic order as a whole. As such, we could 
interpret the case studies of marginal students presented in the previous chapter as 
putting into question the assumptions of objectivity and inclusiveness that are implicit 
in the curricula and teaching methods of the universities. However, as we have seen, the 
sense of failure, or identity crisis, is more directly embodied in the person of individual 
students than in the system or institution. This observation can be directly connected to 
Laclau and Mouffe's second point, that 'the limit of the social must be given within the 
social itself. The existence of discursive contradictions does not suggest an alternative, 
exterior position where such conflicts can be resolved, but rather reveals the limits of 
what can be encoded within the existing symbolic order. Such contradictions, then, must 
always be present within the social, to signify its limit, and therefore do not necessarily 
signify the imminent subversion of the field. 
All sets of positions, then, the contradictory and the coherent, the marginalized and the 
dominant, the excluded and the included, are defined by and conform to the same 
symbolic system. The difference between these positions is precisely, and only, one of 
position, defined in relation to the relatively stable discursive fields within the symbolic 
system as a whole. Defined in this way, inclusion cannot be seen as necessarily positive 
or desirable. Rather, included positions conform to and re-iterate oppressive codes. 
Excluded positions, too, are produced through the repetition of institutionalised codes. 
Laura and Michael thus represent the limits of Political Thought within the discursive 
field of the Political Thought class itself. Edward similarly represents one of the 
boundaries of American Literature. 
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In this chapter I am going to describe how repressive codes of gender and class are re-
iterated in the 'dominant', or 'included' positions available in undergraduate Political 
Thought as enacted in the two classes that I observed. To do this, I am going to outline 
an array of student positions that are consistent with the disciplinary methodology of 
their field. I will foreground several features of these positions. The first feature of these 
included positions is a conceptualisation of Political Thought as applied knowledge in 
the service of government. The second feature I will describe is the way the production 
of an included position involves the construction of a narrative that is able to disguise 
contradictions between the criteria regulating successful academic performance within 
the classroom and uncodified, subordinate or feminising positions. I will also argue that 
the specific instantiation of these contradictions is defined by the ethos and expectations 
of the institution: while the culture of the elite West University classroom prioritises 
students' academic performance and self expression, the culture of the South University 
classroom prioritises a more deferential positioning of students in relation to their tutor 
and to the academic texts they are studying. In the final section of this chapter I will 
argue that the position and teaching approach of the class tutor can also be understood 
as produced through these same discursive contexts of discipline and gender within 
higher education institutions. 
5.2. Included positions: Political Thought as applied knowledge. 
The marginalized positions produced in the Political Thought classes that I discussed in 
the previous chapter were defined, in part, by the different possible ways of approaching 
the central concepts of the discipline: either by analysing the meaning of concepts as 
internally consistent objects via core definitions or by looking externally to develop an 
understanding of these concepts as social constructs. Included positions, then, are partly 
defined by an acceptance of the significance of core definitions of the concepts within 
Political Thought. The distinction between these two approaches is illustrated again in 
the following brief extract from the West University class where the students are 
discussing the notion of 'ideals' : 
178. Lisa: ... Freedom and equality, it's so, it's not real. I don't think it applies to life. Freedom 
and equality they're just ideals, where shall we go? It can never happen. 
179. Mark: In order to have government you have to have ideals, to direct your will. 
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180. Michael: That's one way oflooking at it. 
181. Mark: What would yours be? 
182. Michael: The other way oflooking at it is that when you're in government you do what's best 
for your interest. 
183. Mark: Right. 
184. Michael: You tell everyone you're following ideals. 
(West University, Rousseau 2) 
The distinction, to re-iterate, is between the desire to define ideals such as 'freedom' 
and 'equality' as precisely as possible in order to guide action (Mark's position, 179) 
and the desire to reveal the way such supposed ideals are constructs manipulated by 
those in power (Michael's position, 182, 184). The student positions I am describing in 
this section are characterised by an interest in the first of these, which also corresponds 
to Bourdieu's description of temporal knowledge: knowledge in the service of the 
existing social order. The students tend to emphasise the applied nature of the 
discipline, over a conceptualisation of the discipline as the construction of a cpherent, 
rational conceptual framework that can provide a tool in the search for truth. While the 
'truth' of concepts is still seen as important, the role of Political Thought in developing 
an understanding of 'truth' is seen by the students as limited, both as an aim, and also in 
practice, since Political Thought is limited by its restriction to theoretical rather than 
empirical arguments. 
This general conceptualisation of Political Thought as applied knowledge is articulated 
in various ways by the students. Mark's articulation of this position is, perhaps, closest 
to that of the tutors, in that he identifies the importance of developing a consistent 
conceptual framework, which he describes as 'getting your ideas straight': 
... ultimately I would say that political theory is about getting your ideas straight. Because, 
essentially, for people like me, who want to do social sciences and perhaps politics later on, it's 
important to have a strong basis for your actions. Not only to convince others, but to convince 
yourself that you're doing the right thing. (Mark, West University, interview) 
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Mark emphasises the need to be clear about your conceptual framework, but prioritises 
the function of this as a basis for action, rather than its function as a way of 
understanding 'the truth'. Charlotte was more explicit about the limitations of abstract 
conceptual frameworks: 
I would never say that it's as clear cut as Mill's liberty principle makes it sound. And even when 
he says that actions which harm, unless they harm someone else, they're private choices, because 
actions can't be isolated like that, they start off a chain of events. And at some point you have to 
say, 'well, you started this. This is your fault'. And I'm not sure where you draw the line, really.' 
(Charlotte, West University, interview) 
She suggests that Mill's liberty principle cannot not determine political policy because 
it is too abstract, and requires re-interpretation in relation to each specific case: so, for 
example, the question of whether smoking is self regarding or other regarding is not 
answered by Mill, but must be argued out by policy makers. Later in the interview, she 
takes this point further, suggesting that these issues cannot be argued out at a purely 
conceptual level, but require empirical data to inform decisions: 
Like Mill, in On Liberty, addressed social opinion and social tyranny being a bar to what you can 
do in life, but then he didn't' really address poverty and education and health care ... as being a 
hindrance or a help to you obtaining freedom of choice and what you can do with your life. So 
that's defmitely something that goes beyond political theory in the philosophical way and takes 
you into political science ... Because it takes you into a question of which type of welfare systems 
and which type of state and government work best ... 
(Charlotte, West University, interview) 
She appears to suggest that you would need empirical evidence about the effects of 
particular political and welfare systems in order to evaluate the relationship between, for 
example, health, education, freedom and government. Thus she has a clear conception 
both of the function she requires Political Thought to perform, similar to that described 
by Mark, and of the methodological limitations that construct the boundary of the field. 
Nadia, from the South University Political Thought class, articulated a similar concern 
with the relationship between Political Thought and the workings of government. Most 
of the interview focussed on the previous week's session on Marx, and Nadia's doubts 
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about Marxism were expressed as a scepticism that it would provide practical political 
solutions to the problems that it diagnoses within capitalism: 
... Of course sweatshops are immoral, and I don't think anyone disagreed with that. But I think 
the point they were trying to make was that ... you can get rid of it without going to 
communism. Maybe there's another way of getting rid of it. 
(Nadia, South University, interview) 
There is a similar prioritisation of practical issues of government in her analysis of the 
concept of a universal class and the abolition of the state: 
I don't understand that theory about having no state, and how he envisages that to be, how you 
can't have a state and how it would run ... how will we go from this stage to not wanting 
competition and being able to do everything equally. Because in a way, I would believe you'd 
need to stop crime and things for it to run. 
(Nadia, South University, interview) 
Both of these comments raIse questions about the possibility and nature of state 
intervention to govern society, to provide the rule of law and to protect individuals from 
exploitation. In both cases Nadia moves from abstract descriptions, 'sweat shops are 
immoral', 'that theory about having no state', to concrete questions: how can we get rid 
of sweatshops; what would society look like without a state. Again, there is an 
expectation that Political Thought should, on some level, provide answers to this type of 
applied political question. The abstract is only useful in so far as it can be applied to 
real political questions. This position, already articulated above by Mark and Charlotte, 
was reiterated by Mark when he was asked to define the discipline of Political Thought: 
.. .it's not about reaching the truth or knowledge or religion ... it's more practical. It's about 
what we should do to reach the good society. And therefore the good life, but through society. 
(Mark, West University, interview) 
All of these three students, furthermore, had been, or planned to be, involved in 
mainstream politics in some way. Both of the female students had worked for MPs in 
their years off and Mark hoped to work in international relations. All three had also 
been involved in political campaigns of various sorts. These questions of how to 
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develop and justify political policy were therefore, for these students, not merely idle 
academic speculation. 
What I am going to suggest is that this explicit sense of occupying a position within the 
political system, combined with a conceptualisation of Political Thought as an internally 
coherent way of developing concepts that can contribute directly to political decision-
making, is necessary to the construction of a consistent and comfortable position from 
which to speak as a student within the discipline. These three students, and other 
students I will refer to in this section, share these characteristics, and because of this are 
positioned as 'included' within the Political Thought classes. 
5.3. The gendering of 'included' positions in Political Thought 
classrooms 
Mark was among the most active participants in the West University group. Charlotte 
was one of the least frequent speakers. At South University, Nadia did not speak at all 
during my observations of her class. Of the regular attenders in Mark, Charlotte and 
Michael's class at West University there was one female student, Rachel, who spoke 
relatively frequently and one male student who spoke relatively infrequently. In Nadia 
and Laura's class at South University, the most vocal participants were male students, 
but two female students contributed occasionally and several male students did not 
speak. 
I am going to construct an account of the gendered nature of 'included' positions within 
the Political Thought classes. This account is based on the fact that ethos and 
expectations within higher education attribute different values to different modes of 
classroom participation. Within the West University Politics department, active 
participation in classroom discussions, and students' expression of their own opinions 
are not only informally recognised markers of success, they are also formally codified in 
the requirements of the course: the West University class tutors fill in reports on their 
students which include a comment on classroom participation. This valued mode of 
participation can be described as gendered for several reasons. Merely by dint of its 
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codification, informal or formal, as a marker of success, active participation can be 
described as consistent with a masculine position, since the feminine position is, by 
definition, excluded from codification. From a similar theoretical perspective, legitimate 
participation and self expression can be described as gendered because it is consistent 
with the definition of the masculine position as subject of language, in control of what 
can be spoken and what can be codified. Speaking and expressing an opinion can thus 
be seen as, by definition, constituting a masculine position. At an empirical level, as I 
have indicated, these modes of participation are gendered because male students speak 
more frequently and at greater length than female students. 
However, neither Nadia nor Charlotte made any explicit reference to issues of gender in 
discussing their mode of participation in class. Both suggested that not participating in 
class discussions was not equivalent to not participating in the class, and both provided 
coherent explanations of how their chosen mode of participation either helped or did not 
impede their learning: 
... Through the whole lecture or seminar thoughts are going through my head, 'maybe I should 
ask that'. I don't have that tendency to ask, though. And a lot of the time the questions are 
answered, maybe not directly through the way I want to ask the question, but in the end I do feel 
'oh yes, now I understand what that is, or what it isn't'. 
(Nadia, South University Political Thought, interview) 
I think generally the way I approach classes is just to sort of sit there and work out what I 
thought and to sort of get things clear in my own head. So I tend to sit there with my pad of 
paper and jot down things that were said and then have all these little arrows and things coming 
out of it with what I thought. And that was quite good for me in getting it in my own head. 
Because when I left I had this page of notes and I was like, yes, I can go back to that. Whereas I 
think I knew that if I wanted to say something I wouldn't have a problem with it. And I think a 
lot of other people approached it in that they didn't really take notes, they wanted much more to 
discuss it out loud with other people. So, I think, because of the way I learn in classes anyway, I 
was never going to talk much anyway. 
(Charlotte, West University Political Thought, interview) 
From Nadia's account, her mode of participation appears less strategic than Charlotte's: 
she justifies her silence by suggesting that her questions tend to be answered at some 
point in the discussion. Charlotte, in contrast, has an explicit account that suggests that 
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joining in the discussions more might actually interfere with her learning style. At other 
points in the interviews, other factors influencing participation in discussions emerged. 
Nadia, again, was less precise than Charlotte, but her account explicitly suggests that 
her lack of participation is a function of something more 'personal' than either simply 
an effective learning strategy or simply a lack of confidence: 
I'm probably not a person to say a lot. I don't say more in other classes and I think it's a bit 
about my confidence, my personal confidence about saying something in class, and whether it's 
relevant, or, I suppose it probably is because it will show whether I understand something, but 
it's more of a personal thing. 
(Nadia, South University Political Thought, interview) 
While Nadia concedes to one plausible explanation, 'it probably is because it will show 
whether I understand something', she is clearly not quite satisfied with this. Her final, 
'it's more of a personal thing', is left un-clarified. 
Charlotte again provides a fuller account, and complex gendered positions can be read 
into the strategies that she describes: 
Well, on some issues (it seems important to discuss my ideas). In some classes when there was 
one big issue that we spoke about. But when we were moving quickly on from lots of different 
things, it was really 'well, if you say something then we'll get stuck on that, and really, that's out 
of the way for me, I don't want to talk about that'. Or maybe half way through the class I would 
come back to an issue that we'd dealt with right at the beginning. And the way I thought about it 
was maybe a lot more haphazard than maybe a lot of other people in the class, who would just 
think instantly when somebody said something. So rather than jot it down and get it straight in 
their head, they were able to respond much quicker orally, whereas I sort of jot it down, think 
about it, see how that bit related to another bit, and then I'd get it clear in my head. So I'm not 
sure that saying something would have been that useful for me, because I would have said it and 
then gone, 'oh, actually no, I've just realised'. So I think it helped me a lot more to get it straight 
in my head. 
(Charlotte, West University Political Thought, interview) 
At times Charlotte's account of her strategies appears to be very much directed at her 
own learning, identifying points where 'that's out of the way for me, I don't want to talk 
about that'. However, at other points, her strategies are based on a sense of an overall 
146 
order to the class discussion that she doesn't want to disrupt, thus putting the group 
before her own interest in making a particular point. She says: 
Or maybe half way through the class I would come back to an issue that we'd dealt with right at 
the beginning. And the way I thought about it was maybe a lot more haphazard than maybe a lot 
of other people in the class, who would just think instantly when somebody said something. 
(Charlotte, West University Political Thought, interview) 
Here she appears to take responsibility for not disrupting the discussion by coming back 
to an issue they have already discussed. So, arguably, Charlotte is demonstrating more 
sense of responsibility for the session as a social and educational event than some of her 
classmates. 
While this kind of sense of responsibility for seminars as a social event is clearly not 
confined to female students, it is gendered both empirically and also conceptually. 
Other studies of gender and schooling have identified similar prioritisation of social 
over academic responsibilities in female students both in classroom interactions (Kelly, 
1985) and in accounts given by girls of their 'ideal self (Walkerdine, 1998, pp. 105 -
109). The role of managing, or mediating, social relations within the class was adopted 
by female participants in my study on several occasions and was also foregrounded in 
the accounts they gave in their interviews. This apparently selfless attention to the 
interests of others has a strong association with conceptions of femininity, which is why 
it is important for women to demonstrate these characteristics, while the same 
characteristics can be read as a sign of weakness in men. Such attention to the needs of 
the group over the self can also be defined in terms of gender because it is not 
recognised as a criterion for academic success: it is uncodified within the practice of 
higher education classrooms. Thus this apparent repression, or, more precisely, the 
denial of self-interest is analogous to Lacan's description of female patients' refusal, or 
inability, to talk of jouissance. I would wish to reject absolutely an interpretation that 
suggests that women are more co-operative or less self-interested than men. My 
argument is that women have a huge interest in maintaining the performance of such 
selflessness. Charlotte's account can thus be read as a complex compilation of her self-
interested strategies as a learner and her unwillingness to transgress gender codes and be 
seen to impose her interests on the rest of the class. Her presentation of herself within 
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the interview as both conscious of the needs of others and as 'more haphazard than 
maybe other people' may be interpreted as part of a gendered performance, 
foregrounding the feminised features of caring and also of disorganised thinking. This is 
very similar to Rachel's narration of her classroom participation discussed in chapter 
two. However, Charlotte's position is the inverse of Rachel's. While Rachel had to 
counterbalance a successful but 'masculine' performance in class by fore grounding her 
femininity in the interview, Charlotte, in contrast, uses the interview to rationalise her 
failure to conform to the criteria for successful academic performance in the classroom. 
Her elaborate rationalisation of her learning strategies can thus be interpreted as an 
attempt to re-inscribe herself within a framework of academic success: she might be 
interpreted, here, as attempting to codify her own performance so that it might be 
recognised as a valid alternative to the more vocal performances of her (mostly) male 
peers. 
An analysis of the contributions Charlotte actually made in class will clarify both the 
overdetermining1 nature of her rationalising account of her participation and also the 
feminised nature of her contributions. 
To clarify this way of understanding classroom interaction, I want to examme 
Charlotte's claim that she would have no problem speaking in class, if and when she 
wanted to. In fact, each of her interventions in the classes I observed was facilitated by 
the tutor, either soliciting Charlotte's opinion when she hadn't yet contributed, or, in 
one case, intervening to interrupt another student who had not noticed that Charlotte 
was trying to speak (Rousseau 1, p. 19). This seems to me to suggest that Charlotte's 
qualification of her claim that she would have no problem speaking in class is very 
appropriate: 
I This use of the tenn overdetennination is derived from the Freudian or psychoanalytic concept. 
According to Freud, all symptoms - neurotic symptoms or elements of a dream, for example - can be 
traced to a variety of repressed and rationalising sources. See, for example, Freud, 1900. He suggests, 'A 
satisfaction which is exhibited in a dream and can, of course, be immediately referred to its proper place 
in the dream-thoughts is not always completely elucidated by this reference alone. It is as a rule necessary 
to look for another source of it in the dream-thoughts, a source which is under the pressure of censorship. 
As a result of that pressure, this source would normally have produced, not satisfaction, but the contrary 
effect. Owing to the presence of the fIrst source of affect, however, the second source is enabled to 
withdraw its affect of satisfaction from repression and allow it to act as an intensifIcation of the 
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'" I think I knew that if! wanted to say something I wouldn't have a problem with it. 
'I think', at the beginning of this, changes the modality of the claim, and as such 
undermines the explanatory force of Charlotte's rationalisation of her silence in the 
classes, revealing it as an over-determining, rather than a necessary and sufficient 
factor. What is suggested, then, is that it is valid to explore other possible explanations 
of Charlotte's limited participation in class discussions. This space for exploration, 1 am 
suggesting, is the same space identified in Nadia's earlier unclarified reference to 
something 'personal', to account for her lack of inclination to speak in class. And both 
may be understood in terms of students' need to maintain their gendered positions. 
The substantive form and content of Charlotte's interventions can also be interpreted as 
feminised. The following intervention was striking because it was the only time in the 
observed sessions at West University that a student participant attempted to summarise 
the different points raised in the discussion in this way. In general, as 1 have suggested 
elsewhere, the discussions progressed by different participants making claims that 
expressed their opinion, but which were rarely developed or backed up by sustained 
argument. In the cases where individuals did develop sustained arguments, these would 
usually only relate to their own position, rather than trying to incorporate the position of 
another student. In the following extract, then, Charlotte's reference to points made in 
the preceding discussion was untypical of the West University class discussion. One 
effect of this is that Charlotte avoids stating a clear independent view, even when asked 
directly for her opinion: 
266. Alison (tutor): Charlotte, you haven't made a comment. 
267. Charlotte: I think what you said earlier about different forms of freedom, everyone seems to 
be talking about absolute freedom. A lot of the philosophers seem to be talking about accepting 
that you have qualified freedom, so that you can live and decide and that was a more fulfilling 
freedom. But then you (to Michael) were saying earlier about how freedom: why is it? Or, 
explain why some people are freer than others. And then you were talking about slaves, so surely 
you must accept that you're freer than them. So you have a greater degree of freedom than 
slaves that still exist now. So there are differences in freedom. 
(West University, Rousseau 2) 
satisfaction from the first source. Thus it appears that affects in dreams are fed from a confluence of 
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This intervention validates Charlotte's description, quoted above, of her engagement in 
the class, illustrating the outcome of her jotting down points and making relationships 
between them. It also, as I have suggested, disguises her own position in references to 
what other people have said, both during the class ('you were saying earlier') and in her 
reading ('a lot of the philosophers seem to be talking about'), on the subject of freedom. 
By the time she gets to the statement of her own opinion, 'there are differences in 
freedom', she has already argued her case. This is, as I have suggested, the opposite to 
the norm in this class, where opinions are usually stated and then only later, on 
occasion, backed up by argument. 
A comparison with interventions from another student may clarify the point I am trying 
to make. The following extract is taken from the discussion of Hobbes' conception of 
morality. Tom intervenes: 
117. Tom: I think it's a problem using the word 'morality', because we've got all sorts of 
connotations ... 
118. Michael: That's what I'm saying, basically people have to ... 
119. Tom: You have to take that, it's a word ... 
120. Alison (tutor): Well this is what I'm trying to get at.. 
121. Tom: It's a word that we use in different ways, but Hobbes doesn't use it in that way. 
122. Alison: Well, be careful, how are we using it? and how is Hobbes using it? and is that open to 
interpretation? 
(West University, Hobbes and Social Contract Theory) 
As Alison's final questions suggest, Tom is making a claim about the ways the tenn 
'morality' is used without explaining or defining the different uses that he is referring 
to. Further than this, although he does not explain his terms, he appears to identify 
strongly with the 'we' to whom he is attributing this unspecified usage. This contrasts 
with Charlotte's exposition of first the general class discussion, then the philosopher's 
views, Michael's earlier point, and the example of slavery, in the construction of her 
own opinion. She takes nothing for granted while Tom takes everything for granted. 
several sources and are overdetermined in their reference to the material of the dream thoughts.' (p. 618) 
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It might be possible to interpret the difference between Charlotte and Tom's 
interventions purely in relation to stylistic or academic criteria. The structure of 
Charlotte's more developed argument might be read simply as a signifier of academic 
ability or inclination. However, as I have suggested, I think this would exclude relevant 
levels of social relations that can provide a richer account of what is going on here. My 
interpretation is based on an understanding of language as a product of power relations 
within which the assumption of shared meanings and a shared language is a luxury of 
the dominant, masculine, position. Tom's confident assumptions about the language he 
is using can be related to the fact that he conforms absolutely to the second feature of 
'included' student positions: he identifies strongly and optimistically with contemporary 
UK politics, seeing it as constitutive of a free and democratic system: 
'I think you can get involved and you can change things.' (Hobbes and Social Contract, # 268) 
'I consider myself free, in that 1 can think what 1 like and 1 can say pretty much what I like.' 
(Rousseau 1, p. 13) 
'When elections are called, politicians do try to appeal to people, as what they think they want. I 
still think the majority of people in the country will agree with ninety percent of what the 
government does.' (Hobbes and Social Contract, # 359) 
This last claim in particular does earn Tom some ridicule from the other students, but 
nevertheless, such a stable sense of his position within the dominant system ensures his 
inclusion. This is not just because he has an investment in the conceptual products of 
the discipline, as do the other included students described here, but also because his 
strong identification with the dominant political discourse enables him to assume the 
coherence of his linguistic position. In his interview Tom explained his enjoyment of 
the class: 
It's good fun. The debate is really high level, which is really interesting (oo.) And you can test 
out your ideas against someone else, someone who will argue back. 
(Torn, West University, interview) 
This confident assurance that he knows the rules of the game, analogous to the position 
of the subject of the dominant language, can be described as a gendered, as well as a 
political, identification. 
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Ned's contribution in the session on Rousseau provides another example of a student 
occupying this typical, masculine position within the West University Political Thought 
classes. Ned is emphatically un-persuaded by Rousseau's conception of a society where 
man can be free: 
Ned: Well, his aim is to find a society where you can have freedom, and he's not going to do it. 
Alison: Why not? 
Ned: Because as soon as man's taken out of the state of nature, whatever happens, there's always 
going to be a certain degree of loss of freedom. He says you gain moral freedom and that can be 
swapped for the freedom in the state of nature. But it can't. It doesn't really make any sense. 
Alison: Why can't you? 
Ned: Because it just. Well, because you have to define what freedom is to you, I guess, first of 
all. But I took freedom in the state of nature to be the ultimate freedom you can have, in terms of 
basically you can do whatever you want, with no restraints. Not necessarily the best freedom you 
can have, but the ultimate freedom. And as soon as you put any restraints on how you can act, 
even though you say, you know, we're within the general will, you're acting in the wrong way, 
kind of thing. You're acting in a way which doesn't retain your freedom, there's still a 
constraint. 
(West University, Rousseau, p. 10) 
Just as Tom argued from a position of certainty about his conception of morality, Ned 
here argues from a position of certainty about his conception of freedom, that 'as soon 
as man's taken out of the state of nature ... there's always going to be a certain degree 
of loss of freedom'. As in the example of Tom's use of the term 'morality', Ned does 
not initially offer any definition of what he means by the term he is deploying. When he 
does offer a more developed definition, in response to Alison's questioning, he 
constructs a relatively coherent justification of his original position, which does not, 
however, explore the more complex implications of the distinction between society and 
the state of nature. The definition of freedom that he constructs - 'basically you can do 
whatever you want' - enables him to sustain his emphatically articulated position in 
opposition to Rousseau. The culture of the West University Political Thought class 
legitimates and values this ability to construct and defend a position. This cultural 
demand was re-articulated by Alison, the Political Thought tutor, in her interview: 
'you've got to look at where you stand in addition to looking at purely textual 
problems'. The position she is advocating, from which the student appears to produce 
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and control their own language, as I have suggested, is consistent with a description of 
the masculine position in relation to language. 
The feminised position within the West University classroom is characterised by the 
prioritisation of gender performance, conformity with codes of femininity, over 
academic or disciplinary performance, and exhibits this prioritisation in the subsidiary 
position attributed to its own language, which therefore requires additional evidence, 
argument and authorities to support its claims. The interventions I have just discussed 
therefore exemplify contrasting gender positions in relation to the class discussion, and 
these positions are differentiated by their mode of legitimation in relation to the 
disciplinary discourse. The conceptual use of describing these positions as gendered, 
'masculine' or 'feminised', is that it provides some explanation of another level of 
performance, or positioning, in relation to classroom interaction. Although it might look 
like a position of 'weakness', female students have something to gain from the 
occupation of the 'feminised' position. The more 'masculine' mode of interaction 
entails a risk for female students in terms of their perceived 'femininity'. Male 
students, on the other hand, risk more in their silence. The relevance and usefulness of 
an intervention to the seminar as a social event is therefore a high priority in the 
feminised position, while in the masculine position, the importance of an intervention as 
a personal performance is prioritised. This was stated in fairly explicit tenns by 
Harrison, a the male student from the US, in his third year at an Ivy League university, 
and currently spending a term at West University and taking the Political Thought 
module: 
In all honesty ... if I need to speak in order to make myself look good, I'll speak about 
something that is kind of on the exterior, do you know what I'm saying? Because I don't know 
exactly what Rousseau said, so I'll kind of put in something that kind of relates. 
(Harrison, West University Political Thought, interview) 
Harrison interprets the seminar as an arena in which he needs to perform, 'to make 
myself look good.' And, as I have already suggested, for him this requirement to 
perform is prioritised over the need to ensure that contributions are relevant or useful to 
others in the group. This prioritisation is also consistent with criteria of academic 
success within higher education in general, and in his department in particular. For 
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Harrison, it appears, this requirement to perfonn is not problematic, but for a less 
confident male student, or for a male student who is less familiar with the codes of the 
academic context, the requirement to perfonn might become more difficult and 
uncomfortable. Charlotte, in contrast, might find the performance difficult, but she does 
not prioritise this demand to perfonn, and so is able to rationalise her lack of 
participation in class discussions in such a way as to construct a (relatively) coherent 
position for herself. 
5.4. Institutional differences in student positions 
Charlotte, Tom and Harrison are all students at West University. The West University 
Politics department has an international reputation and a highly selective intake. In the 
group I observed, all of the students had either been privately educated, or had at least 
one parent educated to post graduate level, or, for several, both of these descriptions 
applied. South University, in contrast, has an explicit 'access mission': in the group I 
observed at South University, none of the students for whom infonnation is available 
had been privately educated and one student had one parent educated to post graduate 
level. The mode of interaction in the classes at South University was not the same as 
that at West University. In the South University classroom students rarely, if ever, 
stated opinions in the way that was the nonn in the West University classroom. This 
difference can be described in many ways. The description of the South University 
classes that I want to foreground here is one that describes the classroom interaction that 
I observed in tenns of the gendered positions that I have identified in discussion of the 
West University data. The factors that I will describe as determining, in relation to the 
observed differences in classroom interaction, are institutional differences in mission, 
curricula and student body: which are effectively functions of class relations. These 
factors, I will suggest, are also intertwined with the different teaching styles of the 
tutors: the explicitly student centred approach of the West University seminar leader in 
contrast with the more didactic approach of the South University lecturer. 
In effect, what I am going to suggest is that the array of 'included' positions produced 
within structures of class and gender, within the field of undergraduate Political 
Thought, offer the most coherent and stable subject positions to male students from 
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educationally advantaged backgrounds. The positioning of socially and educationally 
advantaged male students in a dominant position in Political Thought classes can be 
directly associated to the other characteristic of 'included' students as those able to 
identify with decision-making positions within the Political system. Such positions of 
power are traditionally and consistently occupied by those already advantaged by class 
and gender. I am going to argue that in South University even the male students who 
contribute most to class discussions, in comparison to the modes of participation at 
West University, appear to occupy a feminised position in classroom interactions. In 
order to construct this argument I am going to describe the positions available to 
students in the South University classes. 
Some features of included positions, as already suggested in the introduction to this 
chapter, are applicable to groups in both universities. Both Will and Gabor, two of the 
students who participated most regularly in South University class discussions, had a 
personal interest in politics. Gabor mentioned an interest in politics as a possible future 
career. Will's interest was expressed more as a concern to develop and justify his own 
political commitments. He explained questions he had raised in class in relation to 
Rousseau and Burke in terms of questions he had about his own political affiliations. In 
the class he had suggested that 'Rousseau and Burke are almost products of different 
political conditions' (Rousseau and Burke, 52). He explained this intervention during 
his interview: 
... I'm kind of interested in, I suppose, because of my own political background, not that I've got 
a political background, but I mean, in my own personal views, I suppose, that influence my 
thought. If things aren't popular, if something is true but it's not popular, I'm sort of interested 
in the way that people, rather than making the ideas popular, in terms of infiltrating those ideas 
into a more popular consensus, or view. And that's why I'm sort of interested in New Labour 
things and stuff like that ... I thought that in terms of, whereas Rousseau might have appealed in 
revolutionary France, it wouldn't necessarily have appealed in England. And therefore, to a 
certain extent, you know. But liberals did adapt their thinking to include more social aspects in 
their philosophy. So I'm quite interested in that: how political thought adapts to circumstances of 
an electorate, or a citizenship.' 
(Will, South University, interview) 
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Will is explaining his interest in the relationship between historical circumstance and 
political thought in terms of own interest in, and he confmned later support for, New 
Labour's move away from some of the central tenets of socialism. As such, he is able to 
relate disciplinary issues within Political Thought to his own sense of his position 
within the political system. However, he is very hesitant about identifying himself with 
such a position, retracting his claim to political experience as soon as he has made it, 
saying, 'not that I've got a political background', and avoiding generalising the 
significance of his observations, saying 'I'm quite interested in', rather than claiming 
the obvious and universal importance of his personal interest. This contrasts with Tom's 
use of the universalising 'we' in the West University class. 
Thus, despite conforming to some of the features of inclusion, both Will and Gabor 
participate in the classes in a way that is very different from the (mostly) male students 
at West University. Both are hesitant in articulating their opinions. Gabor, for example, 
who appeared relatively familiar with some of the theories discussed in the classes, who 
had attended Soviet schools, and had already studied Politics for a year at a university in 
the US, nevertheless modifies his response to a question about Marx's conception of 
history: 
11. Bill (tutor): ( ... ) Marx doesn't, like Hegel, say that communism is the end of history. He says 
it's the end of pre-history. What might he mean by that? 
12. Gabor: It probably depends on your defInition of what history is. Probably he defInes it as class 
struggle, and that dies out with communist society and therefore ... (interrupted) 
13. Bill: Yes, that's our point here, yes ... 
(South University, Marx) 
There are several ways of explaining Gabor's insertion of 'probably' before each 
statement. It would seem plausible, for example, to suggest that he is responding to the 
use of 'might' in Bill's question, which to some extent limits the possible modality of 
the response. Also, the mere fact that he is responding to the teacher's question, 
arguably, requires some sort of a deferral, 'doesn't he say ... ?', 'could it be .. ?', 
'probably ... ,' to avoid suggesting either to the teacher or to other students that the 
answer is obvious. Both of these explanations conform to the description of the 
feminised position as prioritising non-academic criteria for performance within the 
context of the classroom. Where academic criteria dominate, the culture encourages 
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students to express their own ideas in relation to the text. Where, in contrast, academic 
criteria are subordinated to other curricula factors, cultural codes may encourage 
deferral on the part of students, in relation to both tutor and text. Within the classroom, 
Gabor is not able to produce the type of confident and assertive academic performance 
that dominates the West University classroom. However, his description of the classes 
constructs them as a place where such discussions do take place. He liked the classes 
because, he said: 
I like the discussions, and obviously I like understanding things, and since I feel I can understand 
it, a sense of accomplishment, I guess. 
(Gabor, South University, interview) 
The fact that there are relatively few discussions in the class, and that when Gabor does 
speak, he tends to be cut off fairly quickly by the tutor, suggests that his account here is 
highly selective. It may be possible to suggest that by emphasising his feelings of 
success he is able to resist the feminising effects of the limited opportunities for 
discussion actually available in the class. 
There is evidence of a similar feminisation of students in other interventions. The 
prioritisation of codes of deference is evident in the presentation of statements as 
questions, and in the excessive qualification of knowledge claims. Omar, another male 
student who contributed quite regularly in the South University classes asked a question 
about the interpretation of the state of nature in Rousseau's work. In a later intervention, 
the same point is presented as a statement. In both instances the lecturer responds as if 
he has been asked a question: 
42. Omar: Would you agree that in Rousseau the ideal society was savage society, as opposed to 
civilised society, because in savage society everyone was equal, but in civilised society, 
because of property and government, there are inequalities? 
43. Bill (tutor): He says, no. I mean, he has a particular criteria for a civilised society, he 
specifically talks (looks for section in book) ... let's read it .,. 'The mere impulse of appetite is 
slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty.' 
(South University, Rousseau and Burke) 
This interchange is repeated almost exactly some time later in the session: 
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50. Omar: I think he believes that man in a state of nature is stronger, healthier and happier. 
Civilisation brings about misery that makes man weaker and obedient. 
51. Bill: He says that in several places, but, it isn't civilisation, it's the societies based on inequality 
and lack of freedom that makes people like that ... 
(Omar does not contribute again on this issue.) 
(South University, Rousseau and Burke) 
There are several factors limiting Omar's interventions in these examples. Again, the 
culture of the class and the expectation of deference to the tutor's knowledge mean that 
even when Omar clearly states his opinion, it is corrected by the lecturer, rather than 
explored as a potentially valid interpretation. This effectively excludes two lines of 
discussion that are both evident in the West University classroom. The first is the 
exploration of different possible interpretations of texts. In the West University group, 
on several occasions, the students offer and argue for their own specific interpretations 
(notably in the sessions on Hobbes and Mill). The second line of discussion that is 
effectively excluded by the culture of the South University classroom is the 
development and articulation of the students' own views, or positions, in relation to the 
issues raised by the set authors. In the West University sessions on Rousseau there were 
several extended discussions of the meaning of freedom in the context of the state of 
nature. This type of discussion offers students an opportunity to take up the position of 
subject in relation to the concepts of the discipline. The lack of such opportunities is 
effectively, therefore, a feminised position. 
Will, the only student in the South University group to engage with Bill, the lecturer, in 
extended discussions of particular ideas, also tends to formulate points as questions 
directed at the tutor. This is exemplified in his identification of a contradiction in 
Burke's objection to progress and radical change: 
12. Will: How would Burke reconcile the fact that in order for. What's been built up by ancestors 
may have been as a result of the sort of change and progressive thinking that he's opposed to? 
(South University, Rousseau and Burke) 
The tutor responded to this question by constructing Burke's probable response to 
Will's criticism. During the session, Will continued to argue his point with the tutor, 
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and eventually, after a fairly lengthy dialogue, Bill acknowledged the logical point and 
conceded: 
25. Bill: ... No, he doesn't have an answer to your point, which is that the things that are natural 
change within the conservative social order may at an earlier stage have looked like extreme 
critique of it ... what was mad revolution-ism two hundred years before his day is now 
acceptable because it has come in slowly. He doesn't have an answer to your point. 
(South University, Rousseau and Burke) 
At this point in the discussion, then, it could be argued that Will has set the terms of the 
discussion and has produced an independent position in relation to Burke's concepts. 
However, slightly ironically since Bill in fact agreed with Will's argument, when we 
discussed this extract in his interview Will appears to move closer to the reconstruction 
of Burke's position that Bill had presented in class: 
Will: I can understand where Burke's coming from, but it's a contradiction, I think. But then 
again I could find myself agreeing with it to a certain extent, because I could relate it to things 
like the middle east and Israel being formed and things, which with hindsight, obviously quite a 
contentious issue (very hesitant) but in hindsight you could argue that it was wrong, or that it 
wasn't thought through properly. But then I would argue now that you can't go back, you can't 
change things. What you might have disagreed with then you've got to accept as the status quo 
now. 
(Will, South University, interview) 
Will's use of the contemporary example to develop his position conforms to the 
description of the included student position, using Political Thought as an applied 
discipline with which to develop and justify political opinions and decisions. His overall 
position, however, is more ambiguous. I think the change in Will's position in relation 
to Burke is interesting, but also indeterminable in relation to his positioning within a 
'masculine' or a 'feminised' subject position. It would be possible to argue that his 
change of opinion reveals an instability that constitutes a feminised position. However, 
it would be equally possible to argue that it is actually the active construction of an 
independent position that is visible in his development of his opinion. Nevertheless, 
despite this indeterminacy, Will's extreme hesitancy contrasts strikingly with the 
assurance of the claims asserted by (mostly) male students in the West University 
classroom. Even if you decide that in terms of disciplinary content Will's contribution 
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constitutes a defining, masculine position, the structure of his initial intervention as a 
question, his hesitancy and lack of confidence are nevertheless feminising traits. 
These instances of competent male students occupying feminised subject positions in 
the classroom can, speculatively, be explained in terms of the overall social relations 
that produce each interaction. Two main constituents of these social relations include , 
firstly, the educational backgrounds and approaches of the students, which constitute the 
social composition of the group, and secondly, the tutor's interventions and style of 
teaching, which can be related to his knowledge and expectations about their personal 
educational histories. Both of these are intertwined with the institutional history of the 
department and the university. 
5.5 Reading practices as an exemplar of institutional cultures 
The students' approaches to reading can be used as an exemplar of the difference 
between the two departments in the production of student positions. As I have 
suggested, the South and West University groups are vastly different in terms of the 
social and educational backgrounds of the students. These differences affect both 
individual and institutional practices in relation to course reading. In West University 
there was a clear and justified expectation that students would generally have done 
some reading for each of their seminars. One or two students were required to do a 
presentation each week, but a majority of the students who weren't doing the 
presentation also appeared to have done at least some of the reading, and those who 
hadn't would apologise or express embarrassment. Additionally, the structure of the 
course, with the seminar timetabled separately from the lecture, provided some support 
for students in their reading, since the seminar usually focussed on an author introduced 
in the previous lecture. In their interviews, West University students described their 
understanding of the reading as the basis for the seminar discussions: 
Tom: The classes are just to further your understanding of what you've read and take in other 
people's points of view, because it's always the case that some people read different things into 
it, or someone will have read a different secondary source with different criticisms. 
(Tom, West University, interview) 
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Charlotte: ... I'd read the primary text and then I'd read other sources, and you go into a class 
and I think you could kind of tell who had read what, because people echoed different readers' 
interpretations . .. In the second term I decided to be much more specific, so thinkers that I 
didn't think I'd get really well, or be really interested in, I'd just sort of scan over, read an essay 
in 'Plato to Nato' or something ... and then people that I'd done before and I thought, 'right, I'm 
really interested in them, I'll probably do them in the exam', I spent more than one week on 
those, and I would go through the whole set text and I'd make notes and I'd read other books and 
things. 
(Charlotte, West University, interview) 
Tom and Charlotte not only share the assumption that their reading will be the basis for 
class discussions, they assume that in most cases students will have read both primary 
and secondary sources. According to Charlotte, the very least reading she will have 
done will be to read an essay in a secondary source. 
The assumptions about reading in South University were dramatically different. Neither 
the lecturer nor the students assumed that the students would do any reading prior to the 
seminar. Both Nadia and Will suggested that they would find the reading too difficult: 
Will: I've got a lot of books out of the library and things, and I fmd, you know, even quite a 
general text book about Political Thought quite a difficult read, and that's before going to the 
source text, like for the Greek philosophers. And I just think that I'd not be able to make head or 
tail of them, you know, I've got to be honest. Although I might understand the general rules 
from the lecture, I can almost guarantee that if I read something by Aristotle it would just 
confuse me. 
(Will, South University, interview) 
Nadia: I do a bit of reading after the classes, but not generally before. I won't sort of research 
what we will be doing, which isn't a good thing, because then you can have more of an input and 
have a better argument. ( ... ) Maybe I wouldn't understand it. I mean, I haven't really attempted 
to, but I don't know if I would understand it, if I did the reading on my own. But I suppose that 
at least if you have an idea you can ask questions if you don't understand something, in the 
seminar, as opposed to reading it and thinking actually now I'm confused. 
(Nadia, South University, interview) 
Both of these students express an extreme lack of confidence in their ability to 
understand the reading on their own, but it also appears that neither of them has made a 
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sustained effort to do so: Will's suggestion 'I can almost guarantee that if I read 
something by Aristotle it would just confuse me', indicates that he has not in fact tried 
this; Nadia is more explicit, 'I haven't really attempted to, but I don't know if I would 
understand' . Nadia does concede that reading before the seminar would be useful, but 
the general lack of expectation that this will happen, I would imagine, makes it unlikely 
that she will alter her current practice. There is no evidence from my data that these 
students' extreme lack of confidence in their reading skills is simply or directly related 
to actual literacy abilities, and it is worth noting that Tom, the West University student 
quoted above, is dyslexic, and so both reading and writing are slow and difficult for 
him. 
There are various possible factors that may contribute to these low expectations in 
relation to student reading in the South University Politics department. Bill, the South 
University lecturer, suggested that there was a general decline in reading, but that this 
general decline was exacerbated by the continuous assessment system, which, he 
claimed, meant that students were less willing to do work that was not assessed: 
Bill: The problem is, there are two problems in pedagogic terms. One is, there is a decline in the 
reading culture among university students as a whole ( ... ) And you add that into the fact that 
modular semesterised schemes have a tendency to over-assess, because you have to assess 
everything, which puts pressure on people. So those two things coming together do seem to have 
lead to a decline in the amount of reading ( ... ) One is aware that the ideal situation probably, if 
you really want to make seminars work, would be to say everybody has to do a little 
presentation. But firstly, students won't do that unless it's assessed. It isn't in the culture any 
more. And if it is assessed in any way, you risk increasing the over-assessment problem. 
(Bill, South University tutor, interview) 
It is clearly arguable whether Bill is right about a general 'decline in reading culture 
among university students', The comparison between the West and South University 
departments would suggest that a better explanation would be that there are different 
reading cultures in the 'traditional' and the 'non traditional' student bodies, which may 
then need to be taken into account in course planning. The more plausible explanation 
that he offers is the effect of modularisation and continuous assessment on student 
reading practices. The suggestion that these innovations may have a negative effect on 
student reading might be seen as slightly paradoxical since one justification given for 
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the introduction of modular courses and continuous assessment was precisely that they 
would increase equity and access in higher education. If in fact they have the effect of 
reducing student reading, then they are having the opposite of their intended effect. (If, 
that is, you interpret the move to widen participation as driven by an interest in equity 
rather than driven by an interest in economics. If the aim is simply to increase 
qualification levels in the workforce, then we probably don't need to worry about the 
fact that students aren't reading widell.) The West University course has more 
traditional assessment practices. The students write four essays throughout the year, 
which are marked by their seminar tutor, but which do not constitute part of their formal 
assessment. The formal assessment is in the form of an end of year exam, in which they 
have to write four essays. As Charlotte's account of her reading practices indicates, the 
fact that students know that they will be eventually assessed in an exam does influence 
reading practices, and all students said that they did more work on the authors they 
expected to write on in the exam. Nevertheless, the students did still read, or feel some 
obligation to read in areas they were not going to write on. So this fact complicates, but 
does not necessarily completely negate Bill's account of the specific influence of 
continuous assessment on student reading practices. Assessment procedures, 
institutional culture and student social and educational background clearly all playa part 
in the production of such practices. 
Student reading practices, then, are evidently and inextricably bound up within both 
individual social and educational backgrounds and institutional missions and curricula. 
These interwoven factors affect the positions available to students within seminars, and 
ultimately contribute to the production of the feminised, deferential student positions 
visible within the South University Political Thought class. 
5.6. Tutor positions within classroom interactions 
A final factor to consider in the production of masculine or feminised student positions 
is the tutors' interventions and teaching styles. As with the reading practices, these can 
2 For a useful discussion of the contradictions within aims of 'widening participation' and the expansion 
ofthe HE system, see Taylor et al2002 (esp. p. 14 and p. 94). See also Robbins, 1988. 
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be related both to institutional factors and also to personal factors relating to the 
educational background and interests of the tutor. As I have suggested, Alison's style in 
the West University classroom is explicitly student-centred. She asks questions to elicit 
students' views, she encourages students to respond to each others' points, and she 
explicitly asks for the opinions of quieter students. Bill's approach is more didactic and 
teacher-centred. He begins each seminar by asking for questions or comments from the 
students and his responses to student questions focus mainly on exposition of the set 
authors rather than on the analysis of concepts. 
These differences can be accounted for in a variety of ways. West University put a 
strong emphasis on student participation in seminars: there was even a rumour that class 
tutors were explicitly directed not to intervene to fill silences if students didn't respond 
to a question. The rumour might have been a little extreme, but the ethos behind it was 
confirmed by the course co-ordinator: 
Cheryl: Some teachers are more proactive than others. I have one teacher in particular who, if 
there is a blank in the discussion is more than fearless, really. But the ideal class is one where the 
teacher says very little and where the students do the work. 
(Cheryl, West University course co-ordinator + lecturer, interview) 
Another possible factor that may have facilitated student participation is the fact that the 
seminar tutor was a post-graduate student, and not the course lecturer. It is certainly the 
case that the students did not feel intimidated by Alison: the more vocal male students 
interrupted and contradicted her frequently in the seminars and the quieter female 
students that I interviewed all commented on how well she had managed to facilitate 
their participation. Alison herself provides a more personal rationale for the approach 
she takes in the classes. She produced the following account in response to, or perhaps 
in explanation of, a slightly unfocussed extract of class discussion, where students had 
been expressing views on whether people are essentially group oriented, or whether 
they are essentially individual and only gather together to further individual interests: 
Alison: ( ... ) In so far as they have been talking about what drives political communities, it's an 
issue that's very important ( ... ) I don't think they will get it now, but hopefully later, as long as 
they think about it. I really am interested in getting people to think about certain issues. 
Sometimes the spelling out can be too much. If I just went there and· said 'you mean this and 
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this'. I don't want them to feel that they're being put in a box., I don't want them to feel 'this is 
where I stand'. Yes, once you're past a certain level you can do that. You can align yourself with 
this and that positions, but what I really want them to do, on this course, is to think about issues. 
To see that there are issues, and to see that they can deal with them, would be more important for 
me than saying 'I'm a liberal', 'I'm a communitarian' ( ... ) to come out understanding the things 
we're looking at rather than categorising them. 
(Alison, West University tutor, interview, p. 5 - 6) 
There are two aspects to Alison's account here. Firstly, she prioritises developing 
students' sense of real conceptual controversies over the precise detail of specific 
arguments and positions: 'I am really interested in getting people to think about certain 
issues. Sometimes the spelling out can be too much.'. This relates to the second aspect, 
which is her desire for the students to develop their own response to each issue before 
they begin to identify with generalised categories such as 'liberal', or 'communitarian'. 
Both of these aspects of her account can be related to her own academic position and 
educational experience. She describes her discomfort with the need to take up a 
position in her thesis: 
Alison: My position is quite unclear ... the position I take in my thesis is probably quite different 
to what I take as a person. The position I take in my thesis is quite left wing, I would say: 
egalitarian, liberal egalitarian, residual Marxist. Purely pragmatic so I can get it out of the way 
(Alison, West University tutor, interview) 
This sense of conforming to disciplinary conventions rather than expressing her own 
ideas is also evident in her description of her previous educational experience as 
'stifling', which has influenced her genuinely student-centred approach and her interest 
in eliciting students' own opinions: 
Alison: In their discussions there is a balancing act between not letting things go completely off 
and on the other hand not stifling them when they're eighteen, when they are still very eager and 
they're curious. And my personal experience has been of being stifled, and so maybe I tend to let 
them go on because I think, okay, practice in saying something, practice in just communicating 
to others what you think, because sometimes that's harder than stringing together logical 
sentences, is to make yourself understood ( ... ) at eighteen they're adults, they've got to work it 
out themselves. I don't see myself as being a pedagogue in that sense. I'd rather like to see 
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myself opening them up, saying, 'go on, go on, think something different'. (Alison, West 
University tutor, interview) 
The stifling that Alison described related to her experience as an undergraduate and also 
to her initial experience as a postgraduate student at West University, where: 
Alison: You felt you could never talk to them (the lecturers) because they would never, never 
take you seriously, because you'd always be a little puny student. 
(Alison, West University tutor, interview) 
This experience might be considered surprising in the light of the fact that Alison 
herself comes from an academic family, and so might be expected to feel comfortable in 
an academic context. However, she said that she felt her experience of academic 
Political Thought in the UK was very different from her experience of academic ways 
of thinking in her family, which is based in Europe: 
Alison: My very deep feeling is that now, sometimes I fmd political theorists very difficult to 
discuss anything with, because once they have a position, they have it, and, I suppose my 
personal training, I come from an academic family, I was trained to be more fluid. You don't 
have to come up with essences ( ... ) It's more like exercising the limits of your thoughts, what 
you can conceive of in a situation. 
(Alison, West University tutor, interview) 
Alison's experience of being 'stifled' can also be related to gender. When I asked her 
about gender in the classroom, she said she had never really thought about it, because 
she automatically accepted that she would be 'downgraded' because of being a woman: 
Alison: Perhaps I'm more oblivious to the gender issues, perhaps also because I'm used to, from 
my upbringing in India and also from my continental upbringing, already you just feel 
downgraded as a woman anyway. So my expectations are probably extremely low. 
(Alison, West University tutor, interview) 
Alison's strong sense of having been stifled both in her academic and in her educational 
experience contributed to her developing a teaching style that allowed students to 
express their ideas in a way which conformed with the pedagogic ideal set out by the 
department. It might almost be argued that she is allowing the 'stifling' she experienced 
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as a student to be re-enacted upon her by her (male) students, when they interrupt and 
contradict her. She is, perhaps, similar to Charlotte in having constructed an extremely 
coherent and justifiable rationale for re-occupying this highly feminised position. 
Bill, the South University Political Thought lecturer is almost the exact inverse of 
Alison in teaching style, in academic position, and in educational experience. He was 
from a working class family, but went to a very competitive grammar school, where he 
did A-levels early and then spent a further year in the sixth form preparing for his first 
year at Oxford. So by the time he arrived there he was already partially inducted into 
Oxford's elite academic culture. In addition, he was also already confident of his 
Marxist politics, and in support of this his college at Oxford arranged for him to take 
several of his courses with Marxist academics from other colleges. In discussion of his 
teaching he articulated an explicit commitment to principles of educational equity. 
However, his active political work was generally directed at the level of national policy 
rather than at the level of the classroom. Unlike Alison, Bill had a clear sense of 
boundaries for legitimate discussion in the classroom, and was uncomfortable when the 
discussion moved away from the academic agenda. The section of his account I am 
going to look at was given in response to, or in explanation of, a section of discussion in 
the class on Marx where several students who did not speak much in the classes had 
contributed, not only expressing their own opinions but also responding directly to each 
other. 
33. Bill: Does anybody else want to join in? 
34. Andy: Yes. I just want to say, if someone lives in a capitalist society, the proletariat, I don't see 
how they're going to have no self interest. Because who wants to give up their life in a capitalist 
society? I don't. I just can't see it. Because who wants to give up their lives to be equal? 
35. Guy: I just don't see how you can say that. Considering, just take, Gap for example, it's a sweat 
shop and it's like an institution. And it's fundamentally immoral. I don't see how, I don't mean 
to be rude, but to make that statement. How someone can be so ignorant for other people. 
36. Andy: Most people agree with what ... 
37. Tamsin: But I don't think he meant it in terms of that. Some people work hard for their material 
gain, and I think he means the person who makes it, why should he give up his earnings just for 
the sake of a communist state. I mean, you know, I didn't gain any of my material possessions 
on immoral gain, or whatever. 
38. Guy: I wouldn't have thought. No one's saying to give it up. I thought the whole point of it was 
to make it better without exploiting anyone ... 
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(South University, Marx) 
This type of general discussion only occurred twice during the sessions that I observed 
at South University, and on each occasion Bill fairly quickly drew the discussion to a 
close, returning to his own exposition of the set author: 
40. Bill: This is where it's difficult to debate it without Marx's political economy, because Marx in 
his political economy argues a number of things '" (Bill continues, explaining Marx's position). 
(South University, Marx) 
In his interview Bill explained his discomfort with this type of discussion, and the 
dilemmas it presented to him as a tutor: 
Bill: This is a very confused debate. I remember it actually. It didn't focus in on arguments, or 
rather, it was about people's gut assumptions about politics. ( ... ) That was where I deliberately 
sat back, because I could see it was chaotic and I wanted to let it go for a bit. Also because, 
being a Marx person, I was worried about taking it over completely ( ... ) I think you have to 
allow that space to happen, because if people are thinking in chaotic ways they have to have the 
opportunity for that to emerge. I think what I tried to do here was to allow people space, and then 
come in with a long and heavy bit, probably much too long, looking at this.( ... ) I'm letting it go, 
because people are actually cutting in and engaging, even if they're doing it in this rather chaotic 
way. And they're using the space for something in a way that it's not supposed to be for, but in a 
way it's not a bad thing, that is, to start saying something about their own ideas about politics. 
And they're very chaotic ideas '" 
(Bill, South University tutor, interview) 
Bill's dilemma was whether and how long to allow the discussion to continue, since it is 
'using the space for something ... that it's not supposed to be for'. While he does seem 
to value the fact that 'people are actually cutting in and engaging', he does not, unlike 
Alison, have a clear rationale for valuing this participation regardless of the actual 
content of the interventions. His inclination, as we have seen already, is to 'come in 
with a long and heavy bit'. 
As both an academic and a political activist, Bill identifies with an 'included' subject 
position in relation to the discipline of political thought on every significant level. In 
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particular, his position as a committed political activist makes it very difficult for Bill to 
sit back and let students take control of the discussion. He commented that: 
Bill: Some people are better at remaining silent in seminars than others. I'm not up to that. 
(Bill, South University tutor, interview) 
His mode of participation, it could be argued, is very similar to that of some of the 
'included' male students as West University and can be related to the culture of Political 
Thought, within which the expression and defence of your own position is the dominant 
mode of engagement with the discipline. This similarity may also be related to Bill's 
own experience of elite educational establishments in the UK. In combination with this, 
as I have already discussed, there is an institutional culture of low expectations of 
students at South University. This culture is sometimes expressed in the view that 
students see themselves as consumers, more concerned to get a qualification than to be 
inspired by ideas, and so preferring lectures to active engagement in seminars. These 
factors combine to produce a style of classroom interaction that structures the modes of 
participation available to the South University Political Thought students. 
This discussion of the tutors reveals that the same factors that effect the students' 
positioning in relation to Political Thought also effect the tutors and their ways of 
understanding and responding to classroom interactions. 
5.7. Conclusions 
What I have been describing is the way in which cultural codes that constitute teaching 
and learning practices in undergraduate Political Thought re-iterate existing codes of 
class and gender. By defining in/exclusion in terms of disciplinary methodologies, what 
is revealed is that even 'included' positions within university courses re-iterate 
structures of class and gender. Even when students identify with the conceptualisation 
of Political Thought as applied knowledge in the service of government, the 
embodiment of the discipline in the two institutions acts to maintain gender and class 
divisions. Rather than explicitly marginalizing or excluding students, the socially 
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divisive features of class and gender are incorporated into the structure of institutional 
practice. 
So West University attaches great value to vocal academic performance within the 
classroom. West University also has a culture that prioritises student independent 
reading, which further enables students to begin to develop their own position in 
relation to the academic subject matter of the courses. The culture thus encourages 
students to occupy an unmediated, masculine position in relation to their discipline, 
which is consistent with the methodological structure of Political Thought. These 
cultural and disciplinary features constitute conflicting demands for female students 
who must also pay attention to regulations of femininity. Despite this prioritisation of 
'masculine' positions, female students are able to construct relatively coherent positions 
with the course structure. In South University, low expectations of students in terms of 
participation and reading mean that the academic, masculine performances visible at 
West University are more or less unavailable in the South University classes. Instead, 
all students occupy a deferential, feminised position. In order for male students to 
construct an image of successful academic performance they may need to be selective in 
how they choose to represent their experience of the classes. Female students at West 
University, and both male and female students at South University, have to work hard to 
construct a successful account of their academic performance in their Political Thought 
classes. The socially and educationally advantaged male students at West University 
have less work to do. 
At another level of analysis, we can describe these observations in terms of the 
realisation of Political Thought as a stable social identity. Political Thought cannot be 
constituted as an autonomous identity, but is dependent on the masculine modes of 
engagement enacted within privileged and elite higher education institutions. In such 
institutions, both the identity of Political Thought and the identity of the privileged male 
students who constitute the privileged institution, are overdetermined. However, the 
gendered practices of the female students in such institutions are in conflict with these 
dominant discursive fields, and thus their position and identity within the classroom can 
be seen as more fragile and precarious than that of their male peers. 
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In less privileged environments, both the identity of the students and the identity of 
Political Thought are more precarious. Political Thought is transformed when it is no 
longer the discourse of the dominant classes, since it is only through its articulation 
within fields of social power that it gains its identity and influence. Similarly, the 
students, when required to speak a disciplinary language that is couched in the 
confidence and authority of a class to which they do not belong, struggle to construct a 
coherent and successful academic identity. It is here that we see, perhaps, the exemplary 
antagonistic relationship: each identity preventing the other from fully constituting itself 
as either a stable or an autonomous social object. 
171 
Chapter 6 
MULTIPLE METHODOLOGIES, DISCIPLINARY CULTURES 
AND GENDER: THE OVERDETERMINATION OF INTERACTION 
IN TWO AMERICAN LITERATURE CLASSES 
6.1. Introduction 
Just as it is impossible to understand the Political Thought classes purely in tenns of 
discipline, or purely in tenns of gender, or institution, so too the American Literature 
classes are constituted through the interaction of these relatively autonomous discursive 
fields. In both cases, it is the coincidence of particular features of disciplinary 
methodology and institution that construct the specific features of student positions in 
the classroom. However, while in relation to Political Thought gendered perfonnances 
that conform with hegemonic codes of masculinity and femininity reinforce features of 
the discipline that coincide with pre-existing positions of power in dominant social 
hierarchies, in American Literature the same gendered performances are in opposition to 
the position of the discipline as a critical description of hegemonic discourses. Thus, the 
marginalisation of certain groups of students, specifically female students and new 
university students, is more thoroughly overdetermined in Political Thought classrooms 
than in American Literature classrooms. 
This chapter will suggest that there are specific features of the structure, methodology, 
object and culture of American Literature that constitute a greater range of possible 
positions from which students can identify with the discipline than are available in 
Political Thought. This argument also constitutes a refinement in Bernstein's account of 
the probable exclusionary effects of horizontal knowledge structures. 
As I suggested in the introduction, Bernstein's category of horizontal knowledge 
structures is not fully elaborated in relation to empiri~al data. Thus, while I have 
suggested that both American Literature and Political Thought can be identified as 
horizontal structures, they constitute very different instantiations of Bernstein's 
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category that are not accounted for within his model. To re-iterate, in Bernstein's 
terminology, horizontal knowledge structures are disciplines that are made up of 'a 
series of specialised languages with specialised modes of interrogation and criteria for 
the construction and circulation of texts' (Bernstein, 1996, p. 161). These languages are 
'not translatable, since they make different and often opposing assumptions, with each 
language having its own criteria for legitimate texts, what counts as evidence and what 
counts as legitimate questions or a legitimate problematic' (ibid, p. 162). Now, there is a 
clear difference between the way in which Maxism, Liberalism and Anarchism 
constitute such segmental and specialised languages, and the suggestion that New 
Criticism, historicism and feminism can be similarly described. The differences in 
methodologies, the criteria for what counts as evidence, are far more explicit in the 
different approaches within American Literature than in the different schools of 
Political Thought. Nevertheless, the opposing schools of Political Thought are based on 
contrasting conceptual premises, which ultimately constitute criteria for identifying 
legitimate evidence, statements and questions. It might well be argued, then, that both 
Political Thought and American Literature do indeed conform to the criteria of a 
horizontal knowledge structure, but that American Literature conforms more 
completely, in that the boundaries between its different methodologies are more explicit 
than in Political Thought. How then do these different instantiations of horizontal 
knowledge structures affect interaction in the classroom? 
To re-iterate once more, Bernstein has suggested that: 'Because a Horizontal 
Knowledge Structure consists of an array of languages, anyone transmission 
necessarily entails some selection, and some privileging within the set recontextualised 
for the transmission of the Horizontal Knowledge Structure 1 (ibid, p. 164). The basis of 
this selection, or privileging of one language over another, Bernstein, suggests, must be 
conceived of at least partially as social, rather than purely academic, and so as acting in 
the interests of a specific social group. This suggestion is consistent with the analysis of 
marginalized students presented in chapter four. It could be argued that the privileging 
of liberalism within the West University Political Thought module acted in the interests 
of West University as a whole in maintaining its position of influence within the 
establishment. It also, as we have seen, acted to marginalize Michael, a student who 
wanted to explore more critical political discourses. Similarly, Laura's position on the 
margins of her Political Thought class can be at least partially explained in relation to 
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the segmental structure of Political Thought, and the prioritisation given to Marxist 
approaches by the class tutor. Again, the tutor's position is consistent with the 
institution's sense of itself, historically and still now within some sections of the staff , 
as a politically radical, egalitarian educational establishment. In both these cases, then, 
Bernstein's assessment of the probable social effects of horizontal knowledge structures 
in the classroom is borne out. 
The analysis of American Literature presented in this chapter, however, suggests the 
need for some refinement of Bernstein's categories. I will argue that a series of factors -
the adoption of explicitly multi-methodological approaches; curricula content that 
allows students to identify with the discipline at a level that is at the same time 
experiential, reflexive and academic; and a culture within literary studies that allows a 
variety of legitimate interpretations, in contrast to Political Thought's demand for one 
successful outcome to an argument - combine to produce a transmission of horizontal 
knowledge structures that does not necessarily serve one exclusionary social interest in 
the way that Bernstein's model suggests. Thus it is suggested that Bernstein's self-
consciously highly structural models will only act as useful tools within an analysis that 
also pays attention to the substantive content, culture and social positioning of 
disciplinary knowledge. 
6.2. What does it mean to study literature? 
The students' descriptions of what it means to study literature reflect the variety of 
methodological approaches associated with contemporary literary criticism: historicism, 
new criticism, humanism, uses of social and psychoanalytic theory, and general 
concerns with issues of equity. Different students emphasised different points, but this 
did not mean that they were necessarily advocating one particular approach over 
another, and several were explicit in their desire to use a variety of methodologies. 
In the interviews, I asked students to explain the nature of literary studies and I also 
asked about the relationship between literature and politics. There was general 
agreement that literary texts are in some senses political. However, the precise way in 
which students described this aspect of literature varied. One set of responses described 
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literature as necessarily political, but also suggested that literature can, and should, 
contain more than overt political statements: 
I think looking at a book in terms of politics is interesting to a certain extent. If that's all you 
take the book to be, if you perceive the book in terms of a simple tension between two political 
regimes or two political ideologies, I don't think it would be enough. Literature should have 
something more. Politics is one of the constituent parts of a book. 
(Rajpal, North University, interview) 
Maybe it's hard not to be political when you're writing, because everyone had their own beliefs 
and they come through in what you're writing. So some people, like in the book we read today, 
'Life in the Iron Mills', that was overtly political, trying to make a point. But you can make a 
point without it being like that. Literature definitely does that. 
(Sevket, North University, interview) 
Both of these students suggest that literature is inherently political: Sevket says, 
'everyone has their own beliefs and they come through in what you're writing', and 
Rajpal implies the same thing when he says, 'Politics is one of the constituent parts of a 
book'. Both, however, are looking for something more than politics in their reading of 
literature. 
Other students defined the political aspect of literature more narrowly, seemg the 
relationship between literature and politics as inherently related to issues of equity: 
(Literature) is not how it used to be understood, as studying dead white poets and playwrights. 
It's much bigger than that now, which is brilliant. It's just looking at other people's work. I think 
it means taking a whole range of books of people from totally diverse backgrounds, from 
different time periods, and just looking at them and enjoying them. You've got to enjoy the texts 
or else they won't mean anything to you.' 
(Monica, East University, interview) 
I think more often than not politics and literature are synonymous, aren't they? I don't know 
exactly why ( ... ) It depends how many political courses you choose to do. There are lots of 
courses that, you know, aren't considered the canonical courses to do. We have loads with sort 
of black writing, the African American writing, the post-colonial writing. There's lots of courses 
which have a totally political credo at the centre of them. 
(Ambia, North University, interview) 
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Monica and Ambia both identify the curriculum and the inclusion of non-canonical 
texts as a central feature of the politicisation of literary studies. Monica explained her 
interest in this aspect of literature in relation to her longstanding interest in racism and 
racial thinking and Ambia said that she had originally chosen the North University 
English course because it offered this range of option modules. 
An alternative to this explicit political agenda is expressed in the conceptualisation of 
literature as a way of understanding specific historical or geographical contexts. This 
view is in some ways closest to the way both of the tutors presented their American 
Literature modules: 
To be able to evaluate particular things in texts and actually get an understanding of a particular 
period, the historical aspect as well ... 
(Helen, East University, interview) 
The texts that he's picked are really conscious about being American Literature. So, urn, I think 
it's about kind of the position of the country and then he's been asking questions like, 'what does 
it mean to be American', and all ofthis. 
(Rose, North University, interview) 
Both Helen and Rose's accounts suggest that literature offers a way of developing your 
understanding of a place, or of a period in history, in a way that is not explicitly 
politicised, and which may perhaps be seen to offer a more objective type of knowledge. 
While the previous accounts prioritise the literary text as the object of study, identifying 
ways in which a work of literature itself might be analysed as a political object, Helen 
and Iris at this point are prioritising a historical or geographical object of study, which 
can be examined through the lens of literary texts. 
Another student, Hamid, suggests that the study of literature can offer a more politicised 
understanding of society in general. He identifies literature's appropriation of social and 
psychological theories as providing the link between the literary and the social: 
By reading theories you understand something, they are basic things in your life, for example 
Freud's theories, or Karl Marx's theories, or feminism theories or this stuff. You sometimes 
know, in everyday life you know about the repression of black people, or the repression of 
women, or the repression of the poor classes, or working classes. But sometimes it's hard to find 
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out the roots, where does this repression come from, or why doesn't anything relieve this. But in 
reading this, or in applying this to, for example, we read a lot of fiction, you become conscious 
that this is the reason and this is the cause, and what you can do. 
(Hamid, East University, interview) 
Here Hamid suggests that the theories of, for example, Freud and Marx offer an insight 
into different types of social oppression, and that this insight can be developed when 
you apply their theories in your reading of literary texts. Sevket makes a similar point 
about the way literary texts can offer an understanding of contemporary issues, when he 
contrasts historicised readings with contemporising approaches: 
Duncan looks at the writer's life and the historical situation of the time the book was written. 
Which I also think is quite a good way of understanding the book ( ... ) other lecturers might 
contemporise a play or a book, like, Shakespeare is a good example, will analyse Shakespeare 
and talk about issues from the twentieth century. 
(Sevket, North University, interview) 
Monica also suggested that the study of literature had developed her understanding of 
social issues and the way language in particular influences the way we categorise the 
world, concluding: 
The impact that words have on everyday life is amazing. 
(Monica, East University, interview) 
Monica, Hamid and Sevket all suggest that the study of literature can enhance your 
understanding of contemporary social issues and therefore, according to Hamid, your 
ability to act by identifying, Hamid says, 'what you can do'. 
The accounts so far all, in some way or other, prioritise the social or political resonance 
of literature. Students also talked about specifically literary aspects of texts, referring to 
New Criticism and to humanistic and subjective features of literature and reading. 
The humanistic account of literature is one way of describing the 'something more' that 
Rajpal and Sevket suggested literature has to offer in addition to political or ideological 
statements. Sevket and Hamid both offered explicitly humanistic accounts of literature: 
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One of my teachers told me as well that English is about understanding the workings of the 
human heart, so it's very, sort of, out there. You can make of it what you will, sort of thing. 
(Sevket, North University, interview) 
I think that literature, studying literature gives you insight, it's kind of understanding yourself, 
understanding others, it's a kind of mutual relationship. 
(Hamid, East University, interview) 
Both of these students appear to value the specific types of insight that are offered in 
literary writing. Rajpal offered an alternative account of what is specific to literature. He 
talked about the way texts produce meaning through linguistic mechanisms, referring to 
the New Critics and their prioritisation of the textual aspects of literature: texts as texts: 
I'd like to do a fusion of different types of readings. I can see where the New Critics, how they 
see literature as being constructed through lots of systems, as being familiar or de-
familiarisation, word play, ambiguity, metaphors, quotes, all that. 
(Rajpal, North Universtiy, interview) 
Humanism and New Criticism both offer ways of thinking about what constitutes a 
literary text. These unique characteristics of literariness also influence the ways that 
texts can be analysed, and the explicitly interpretive or subjective nature of literary 
analysis. This subjective aspect of the discipline was highly valued by the students: 
At A-level they always used to say, there's no right answer. And I always used to love that idea 
in English ... if you can explain your opinion well enough, and you have evidence and you can 
back it up, and you can prove, at least to some degree that what you're saying is viable, then 
there can never be a wrong answer. 
(David, North University, interview) 
English is sort of like an interpretive course, well, a lot of courses are '" maybe English is more 
about how I feel about a text and maybe Economics is more about a theory and a set formula. 
(Sevket, North University, interview) 
A connection can be made between the subjectivity of individual readings of a text and 
the personal experience that students bring to their reading. Although no-one explicitly 
mentioned this when defining the discipline, both in the classes and in interviews, 
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students introduced personal experience and interests as a reference point in their 
interpretations of texts: their experience of being a woman in a specific time and place, 
their experience as a member of a religion or a specific ethnic group, an interest in 
racism and racial thinking, or their experience of living in London, growing up in 
contemporary society and consuming contemporary culture. I will explore some 
examples of these personal references in more detail in section four of this chapter. 
Connections can also be made between the multiple approaches to the discipline and the 
opportunities available for students to explore both personal and literary interests within 
the boundaries of the course. Students are able to articulate their interest in and 
commitment to specific issues and ideas through a variety of methodologies within the 
classroom, ranging from primarily literary to primarily political or sociological modes 
of analysis. It is this feature of the course that I am going to explore in the next section. 
6.3. Student analyses of 'race' using different methodological 
approaches 
I am going to use the class discussions of 'race', or racial thinking, to exemplify how 
students used a variety of methodological approaches to analyse the set texts. These 
approaches can broadly be divided into two groups. Within the first set of approaches, 
texts are read and analysed through a prior understanding of racism and racial 
stereotypes. This prior understanding provides a language with which to label texts as 
'racist' or 'progressive'. The second set of approaches attempts to understand the way 
the text can be interpreted as a challenge to hegemonic conceptualisations of racial 
categories. Both approaches are valid within the American Literature classes, although 
both tutors can probably be more closely identified with the second approach than with 
the first. 
An example of the first approach can be taken from the East University discussion of 
Moby Dick. Errol's account of the beginning of the novel, when Ismael, the white 
narrator, tentatively meets and then becomes friends with Queequeg, a Polynesian from 
the Pacific Islands, sets up an opposition between features that might identify the text as 
'racist' or 'progressive'. To be 'racist', in the terms used in these interventions, means 
to treat black people as unequal, to be suspicious of black people, to think white people 
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are superior in some way, or to use negative terms such as 'savage' and 'cannibal' to 
describe people from non white ethnic groups. Errol describes Ismael's first responses 
to Queequeg: 
88. Errol: When he fIrst met Queequeg, and then, when he talks about the docks, it's one of the 
only places in America where you can see cannibals, and don't think twice about them, and I 
thought that was a bit weird. And then this whole bonding thing, that kind of struck me as very 
anti slavery, I mean, a very abolitionist way of thinking. I think he said something about, 'if any 
of us is anything but a whitewashed Negro'. It's weird that he's kind of in a place where he 
keeps describing them as savages, cannibals. You don't get the sense that he looks down on 
them, but that's natural, all of the thinking that these people have, and then he switches it. I mean 
he constantly does it, because he was one hundred percent against sleeping in the bed with 
anybody, let alone a savage, and then it was as though they were in love half the while, so, I 
think he keeps switching. You tend to get a one sided view, and then all of a sudden, he 
completely changes it to the opposite view. I think the race theme or whatever was like that. At 
one stage you thought, he's probably like most people who have never met or talked to a black 
person before or whatever, and then, all of a sudden you talk to them and they say, "oh, they're 
alright, they're fme, they're just like us". You got that sense of, "ob, my best mate's black, so 
I'm not racist", something like that. 
(North University, Moby Dick 1) 
Errol appears slightly confused by the text, identifying what he interprets as 
contradictory positions in relation to 'race': Ismael doesn't seem to look down on black 
people but he doesn't want to share his bed with a 'savage', but he expresses egalitarian 
sentiments, saying we're all 'whitewashed Negroes'. Errol's account initially represents 
Moby Dick, embodied in the character of Ismael, through the codified opposition 
between 'racist' and 'abolitionist', or 'progressive', but as he continues it becomes 
apparent that the text 'keeps switching', and thus confounds these categories. Errol tries 
to explain this 'switching' by historicizing it, suggesting that the disjuncture between 
Ismael's 'racist' language and his more tolerant features is 'natural, all of the thinking 
that these people have' - which I interpret as a reference to the opinions and language 
that prevailed in the period in which the novel was set. In this historicisation, Errol 
begins to develop a more sophisticated account of racism and to move beyond a 
simplistic application of the labels 'racist' or 'progressive'. He also explicitly relates the 
text to his own experience, as a black man, of a certain type of racism when he suggests 
that Ismael is 'probably like most people who have never met or never talked to a black 
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person, and then all of a sudden you talk to them and they say, "oh they're alright, 
they're fine, they're just like us".' So, it would appear, Errol reads not only initially 
through the set categories of 'racist' and 'progressive', but also through his own 
expenence. 
Helen, another student in the East University class, more explicitly attempted to 
categorise the novel as either 'racist' or 'progressive'. During the class, in response to 
Errol's intervention, she suggested that the relationship between Queequeg and Ismael 
was a 'progressive' feature of the novel: 
89. Helen: I found it quite progressive because I didn't think someone at that time would have 
accepted him (Queequeg) so willingly, he (Ismael) did have reservations, but after the bed 
incident he kind of like accepted him, although he did have his ideas of race before. I just found 
that quite progressive. 
(East University, Moby Dick 1) 
However, when we discussed the extract in her interview she had changed her mind and 
expressed regret that she hadn't said what she (now) thought. She argued that despite 
their close friendship the relationship between Ismael and Queequeg is unequal, with 
Ismael in the dominant position. Further, she says, the representations of the non-white 
people throughout the novel are negative and conform to stereotypes of black people as 
'horrific' and 'frightening': 
Helen: ... I just felt that it was that Robinson Crusoe, Friday relationship. I got a sense of that 
because I felt that he always felt that he was above Queequeg. He was actually better than him. 
In some respects he did respect his knowledge and his ability as a good harpoonist, but he still 
felt that he was above him ( ... ) the negative descriptions of the non-white people on the boat, it's 
quite, I thought, in some ways, horrific, the descriptions of Queequeg in the beginning were 
quite frightening, whereas Ahab (a white character) was mysterious, just mysterious, but he 
wasn't seen to be grotesque. Even the description of the leg wasn't grotesque. 
(Helen, East University, interview) 
At the end of this extract, Helen identifies specific features of the novel, and explains 
how they seem to her to present characters within racial stereotypes. This way of 
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understanding the literary repetition of stereotypes as necessarily racist, is repeated by 
several students in the American Literature groups 1: 
46. Dean: What I found quite interesting is, Melville tries to subvert the popular belief of what 
savages are, but he gives Queequeg an occupation which is very violent, and he carries a 
harpoon around with him all the time. 
(North University, Moby Dick 1) 
Dean, like Helen, starts from the assumption that the repetition of stereotypes is wrong, 
and then identifies stereotypes in the text in order to demonstrate that it is not 
progressive. This approach to textual analysis, while not always very sophisticated, 
allows students to develop and apply their own conception of what it means to be racist, 
which appears to be a concern for some individuals in the classes2• 
Both tutors respond to this type of intervention by trying to relate, or contrast it with a 
more textual or theorised interpretation of racial ideologies. Other students in both 
classes offered interpretations that were closer to what the tutor was looking for. One 
student followed Dean's intervention with a contrasting interpretation of the novel's 
conceptualisation of 'savagery': 
50. Lou: We were talking about the ideas 'civilised' and 'savage', and how it's not just a racial 
divide. How you have Queequeg and the other harpooners who are the other more exotic 
characters, and then you have Ahab, who's the white representative. And then you have 
Queequeg on the one hand who when one of the other guys falls into the sea, jumps off and 
goes and rescues him. And then you have Ahab on the other hand, who, when at the end 
they meet the Rachel, the ship, and the guy is looking for his son, and he's begging him to 
come and help him looking for his son, and Ahab says 'no'. So you see a lot of savagery 
coming out in the white characters. 
(North University, Moby Dick 1) 
This is a textual analysis of the way Melville presents and then undermines racial 
associations of savagery, through juxtaposition of events at different points in the novel. 
Queequeg and the other 'exotic' characters are the harpooners, and so, as Dean 
1 This is also similar to the discussion of the animalisation of black people in 'Benito Cereno', discussed 
in chapter 3. 
2 A more explicit development of a conception of what it means to be racist was carried out by Peter, in 
his essay on slavery. 
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suggested, associated with savagery. But Queequeg is also depicted as honourable and 
humane, in contrast to Ahab, the white, authoritarian captain of the whale ship, who is 
depicted as savage. In his interview, Duncan, the tutor's initial response to this extract 
in comparison with Dean's earlier intervention was that it is, 'much more like 
something that I would say' and that it 'moves the conversation onto another level' 
(Duncan interview). However, despite his apparent preference for this type of reading 
over the other, both methods of analysis are legitimate within the class. In fact, in the 
class on 'Benito Cereno', another story by Melville, Duncan explicitly set out to present 
the two contrasting ways of reading as providing equally viable interpretations of the 
text. Duncan acknowledged this difference in his approach to teaching the two texts, 
Moby Dick and 'Benito Cereno': 
I think it's right that I was teaching Moby Dick in a more utopian way, whereas I might be rather 
more sensible in thinking that 'Benito Cereno' was actually contaminated by the same racial 
thinking that it critiques ( ... ) I think a more nuanced reading of Moby Dick is one that says that, 
yes, as well as critiquing racial thinking it does implement racial thinking, and I'm sure that's 
closer to the ultimate position one might want to have about the text than saying that this is 
Melville, in a very prescient way, de constructing racial thinking, because I don't think that's the 
case. 
(Duncan, North University tutor, interview) 
The reason this is significant is that Duncan, here, explicitly identifies both 
methodologies as valid: the application of external criteria to define 'racism' as well as 
the textual analysis of the novel's internal development, or subversion, of concepts are 
both seen as appropriate tools in the construction of an overall interpretation of the 
novel. 
I want to look at one last example of the way a student used the set text to develop an 
understanding of racial thinking. Here, Sevket uses an analysis of Spike Lee's film 
Bamboozled to theorise about the nature of stereotypes, and identifies similarities 
between the film and 'Benito Cereno', the set text. Spike Lee's film is full of characters 
who conform to different racial and gender stereotypes. However, Sevket argues that the 
use of such stereotypes within the film is not itself racist, but rather constitutes an 
analysis and implicit critique of racial thinking: 
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76. Sevket: I don't know if anyone has seen a Spike Lee film called Bamboozled? It was like, 
there is a minstrel film in the twenty-first century ( ... ) It's a good film. And it's basically, 
he's saying, there's a black writer, and he has to come up with something good, otherwise 
he's going to get fired by the white boss, who's really quite racist ( ... ) And he creates the 
most racist TV show he can think of, which is a twenty-first century black minstrel show, 
and it becomes the most popular TV show in America. So, it's like, I think Spike Lee makes 
the point that our access to foreign people, to black people, to the black body or Asian body, 
or whatever, is through stereotypes. I think that that's going on in this country as well. In 
advertising, in film, everything. And maybe ( ... ) Melville's using stereotypes and that's 
how we access seeing people. 
(North University, Benito Cereno) 
The interventions I described earlier identified ways that texts present characters within 
racial stereotypes, using the concept of stereotypes as a tool rather than as the object of 
analysis. Here Sevket suggests that the texts under discussion are actually exploring 
the way stereotypes work in society: that 'Spike Lee makes the point that our access to 
foreign people '" is through stereotypes'. He is not arguing about the status of the film 
as 'racist' or 'progressive'. He is developing a way of understanding the mechanisms by 
which racial ideas permeate society. The reference to a contemporary text exemplifies 
another way in which students read through their personal and cultural experience. 
Other students also mentioned contemporary films they had seen and books they had 
read, in order to develop their interpretations of the set texts. In addition, Sevket's 
explicit reference to his belief that such racial thinking 'is going on in this country as 
well' suggests that these concepts have a contemporary, personal relevance for him in 
addition to any abstract literary interest. 
6.4. Personal subject positions in relation to American Literature 
The types of personal concern that students use in their interpretations of texts range 
from the political commitments to equity described above, to more directly experiential 
or subjective features of student positions. These personal concerns both motivate 
students' interpretations and also provide a mechanism for constructing reflexive 
readings, readings that call into question the language and assumptions that derive from 
students' social, historical and cultural experiences. 
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Razia, for example, suggested that her ability to identify with women characters is 
dependent on the extent to which she shares their emotions and experiences. She 
compared her experience of reading Toni Morrison's novel Beloved to her experience of 
reading Harriet Jacobs' autobiographical narrative, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, 
suggesting that she found the narrative easier to relate to because it downplayed the 
violence Jacobs had suffered under slavery. In her narrative, Jacobs describes how her 
master made advances to her, but does not depict an actual rape. Several students in the 
North University class questioned how convincing this was, and Razia considers this 
suggestion: 
93. Razia: When I read it, I just took it that he hadn't raped her. But now, speaking about it, 
and also other texts that I've read about the time we're talking about, not autobiographies, 
just texts written about slavery, like Beloved, it was more prominent. Rape was much more 
prominent in it. In this one it was more like a personal journey through slavery, and I found 
it easier to relate to, because sometimes texts about slavery can be really shocking, and even 
though you sympathise with the people, because what's happened to them is so awful, it's 
so far removed from what you've experienced yourself. Whereas I found it easier to read 
her text (the Jacobs). It was just a woman going through life and there were like emotional 
things involved in it. 
(Razia, North University, Slave Narratives) 
Razia is here evaluating her own reading practice and the fact that she finds certain texts 
'easier to read' than others. She suggests Jacobs' text, which is 'just like a woman going 
through life', is both easier to read and easier to relate to than the more violent 
depictions of slavery constructed by contemporary authors, such as Toni Morrison. This 
observation about her own reading, on one level, validates the reasoning behind the 
suppression of violence in the slave narratives, which was motivated by a political 
imperative not to offend or alienate the white American readership of the time. Razia's 
initial acceptance of Jacobs' account, 'I just took it that he hadn't raped her' might also 
be read as a confirmation of Morrison's analysis of the need to reconstruct these 
omissions (Morrison, 1990), since while successfully avoiding giving offence such 
accounts are perhaps too convincing in down playing the horrors of slavery. At another 
level, Razia is revealing both how she reads texts through her own experience, and how 
she is then able to analyse her own reading to relativise her interpretation. She 
recognises that her identification with elements of Jacobs' experience is a mis-
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identification, since, for example the 'emotional things', she identified with in her initial 
reading of Jacobs' narrative actually mean something quite different for each woman, 
because of their different relationship to power and freedom: 
97. Razia: She does keep reminding us how it's different for a slave woman, she can't act in 
the same way that a white woman will behave, in tenns of love and courtship and marriage, 
she doesn't have the same choices. 
(Razia, North University, Slave Narratives) 
Thus, not only does Razia interpret the text through the lens of her experience, but her 
reading also enables her to re-evaluate the terms and assumptions of her own position. 
In the same session, Paul used a similar reference to his own experience in his reading 
of Douglass' Narrative of the Life ... He contrasted literacy practices under slavery, 
where reading is a rebellious and dangerous act for slaves (Douglass, 2003, p. 2076), to 
contemporary attitudes to literacy: 
36. Peter: Douglass kind of rebelled against it. I mean today, if you went home and told your mum 
that to celebrate a holiday you were going to do a bit of reading, she'd be impressed by it. But 
he, when they looked at him reading. 
37. Duncan (tutor): It's seen as very dangerous ... 
(East University, Slave Narratives, # 36). 
In a similar way to Razia, Peter relates his reading of the narrative to his own 
experience, and uses the contrast to develop his understanding of both the text and of 
the context of his own assumptions. Peter's interpretation is not as explicitly reflexive 
as Razia's, but both are articulating the way in which their reading of the set texts, and 
thus their position within the class, is dependent on specific elements of their personal 
expenence. 
Personal experience can contribute to explicitly reflexive interpretations, but it can also 
simply determine which features of a text a reader prioritises. In his interview, Sevket 
explained an observation he had made in class about Ismael' s lack of respect when 
Queequeg is fasting (East University, Moby Dick 1, #83) by reference to his own 
religious practice: 
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Sevket: Maybe because, initially it's something close to me. I mean, I was fasting myself, and 
some people would question the point. And when he was trying to fast in the book, Queequeg, 
and Ismael wouldn't let him, or was trying to stop him, I found it very disrespectful. 
(Sevket, North University, interview) 
Here there is a very direct link between Sevket's experience and his selection of issues 
to foreground in his analysis of the text. 
There were also occasions where it might be possible to infer a relationship between 
black students' experience of racism and their interpretation of the text. As, for 
example, in Errol and Helen's interpretations of the racial thinking represented in Moby 
Dick in the East University class. Both students are black, and it is possible that their 
engagement with this section of the class discussion is related to their own experience. 
Similarly, in the North University discussion of 'Benito Cereno', the two students who 
were most explicit in identifying racialising traits in Melville's story were both black. 
However, it also appears from my data that at least· one of these students, Josephine, 
was actively resisting being positioned as taking up a politicised, rather than a more 
literary stance. She explains her initial response to the story, but refines this response, 
incorporating points raised in the lecture and class discussion into her interpretation: 
24. Josephine: I didn't like it, because, at the end, I just thought, this is another story that 
stereotypes black people, and the black people did end up having the bad qualities, they did end 
up as savages. But then, when you said about the shaving scene, it actually seemed to subvert 
that, because it's saying that Babo was intelligent, and it seemed that Delano didn't credit the 
fact that they would rebel because he didn't credit the fact that he had any intelligence, so it 
seems that it's not just stereotypical. (North University, Benito Cereno) 
Josephine re-iterated this move away from an over-simplistically politicised 
interpretation when the tutor, Duncan, returned to her a little later in the session: 
27. Duncan: ... But Josephine, you defInitely thought that there were just stereotypes that were 
used in sort of'? 
28. Josephine: Yes, I did. But now I can see that it was maybe, in a different way it was 
something about, just the capability of people with the intelligence to be able to fight back. 
(North University, Benito Cereno) 
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This appears to suggest that while the object and methodology of the discipline allow 
students to incorporate their experience into their interpretations, the academic context 
also allows the construction of another, more literary and less politicised, or less 
racialised, position. 
American Literature, then, provides explicit opportunities for students to objectify, 
relativise and historicize their own responses, experiences and the concepts they use to 
categorise the world. When combined with the multiple methodological approaches that 
are legitimate within the discipline, these possibilities for codification of experience, I 
have suggested, lead to a reduction in 'unthinkable' or 'feminised' positions within the 
American Literature classroom. This contrasts with the unitary methodological 
approach of Political Thought, and the prioritisation, within included subject positions, 
of students able to identify with political or governmental systems. In effect, for the 
justifications of government that constitute the subject matter of Political Thought to be 
relevant to students, they have to be able to imagine themselves in a position of 
government, and as a result the dominant positions within the Political Thought classes 
correspond to dominant positions within society. The effect of the methodology 
Political Thought is to narrow down its definitions of concepts - 'justice', 'equality' -
which excludes the possible co-existence of alternative interpretations, and also the 
legitimacy of alternative approaches to the construction of interpretations. In contrast, 
the relativising and reflexive features of American Literature mean that students are able 
to use the discipline to denaturalise existing hierarchies and to mediate new subject 
positions within the classroom. 
6.5. Institutional similarities: student body, teaching methods and the 
culture of literary studies 
So far I have not made any distinction between the two institutions, North and East 
University, in my description of the American Literature classes. The general argument 
of this chapter, that the multiple methods and approaches used in the American 
Literature classes produce a wide range of legitimate student positions, provides a 
partial explanation for the similarities observed in the two groups. There are also some 
relevant institutional factors which can help to explain these observations. In addition, 
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there are aspects of the culture of literary studies that can be related to potentially 
inclusive teaching methods. 
The institutional differences between the English departments at North University and 
East University are not as consistent as those between the Politics departments at West 
and South Universities. Similar contrasts can be drawn between the universities in 
relation to previou~e educational attainment of students and the reputation and status 
of the institutions. However the contrast in family and educational background of 
students in the two Political Thought classes is not replicated in the participating 
American Literature groups. 
The North University English department is highly selective, requiring only slightly 
lower A level attainment than the West University Politics Department. The East 
University English department is far less selective, requiring only slightly higher A 
level attainment than the South University Politics Department3. North University is 
also very similar to West University in its high status and international reputation, and 
East University is similar to South University in its low status and poor reputation. 
These features are not unrelated: the criteria for university admissions are dependent on 
the market and institutions with poor reputations are especially vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the market. Hannah, the East University American Literature tutor 
observed, 'we are going through a recruitment crisis at the moment and we get huge 
amounts of people through on clearing', implying that the expected educational level of 
entrants to the English degree course was not as high as staff in the department might 
wish for, even taking into account the access orientation of the university. 
The similarities between North and West University do not extend to the social 
composition of the student body, in relation to which North University is more similar 
to East and South Universities than to West University. In the West University Political 
Thought group all of the students had either been privately educated or had at least one 
parent educated to post-graduate level. In the American Literature class at North 
University, out of twenty-one students who completed background questionnaires, one 
had been privately educated and five had parents with post-graduate qualifications. A 
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further four reported that at least one of their parents either had remained in education to 
the age of twenty-one or had a degree. The largest group, eight students, reported that 
their parents had left school at sixteen, or that their parents' highest qualification was 0 
level or CSE. One student had one parent with A level, two students didn't know and 
one didn't give information about their parents' education. In the North University 
American Literature group, then, approximately half the students were the first 
generation of their family to go to university, while this was the case with only one of 
the twelve students in the West University Political Thought group. 
In the East University American Literature class, five of the nine students who attended 
regularly were mature part-time students. Of these, one had left school after 0 level and 
only returned to education much later, to do an Access course. Another reported that she 
fitted the degree in 'between jobs and life', and that her time at university had been 
disrupted by several breaks from study. Two of the mature students were non-native 
speakers of English now living in the UK, one of whom had completed a degree in Iran 
before coming to this country. The last of the mature students found it very difficult to 
get time off work to attend the classes, and during the course of my observations missed 
one session and arrived late to another, as a result, he said, of his inflexible work 
schedule. Of the four full-time, younger students, two were visiting students from an 
American University. One of the younger, full-time, UK students reported severe 
financial difficulties and the other was living at home with her mother, who was also in 
the middle of a first degree at East University. 
Both North and East Universities also explicitly targeted similarly ethnically diverse 
local communities and this was reflected in the composition of the classes that I 
observed. In the North University class, eleven out of twenty-one of the students for 
whom information is available had access to a community language other than English 
at home. Nine languages other than English were represented. The vast majority, 
however, had been educated in the UK system. In the East University class, of the nine 
regular attenders, as I have said two had moved to the UK as adults, from Italy and from 
Iran. Of the others, two students were black British, one was half Iranian, two were 
white British and the final two were from the US on a one semester exchange 
3 Source: the Guardian University Guide, www.educationGuardian.co.ukluniversity guide, retrieved 
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programme. The limitations inherent in my methodology combined with the overall 
diversity of ethnic background in both groups means that it is not possible to infer any 
conclusions about the experience of specific ethnic groups. However, this type of ethnic 
composition might be assumed to be significantly different from a class made up of a 
majority white UK students or international students from rich industrial countries. 
Thus, some of the similarities identified in the student positions available in the 
American Literature classes may be attributable to the fact that both are composed of a 
majority of 'non traditional' students: mature students, students with no family 
experience of higher education and non-white or non-UK educated students. However, 
in the rest of this section 1 want to foreground the shared culture of literary studies as a 
factor in the production of student positions within the American Literature classes. 
This culture includes some specific assumptions about student reading practices and 
also about appropriate ways of responding to student interventions. 
An underlying assumption within English Literature is that reading is something you do 
for pleasure4• The responses elicited from students when tutors asked general questions 
about how they felt about a text were often couched in terms of their initial subjective 
enjoyment or lack of enjoyment: '1 liked it', '1 found the first ten pages boring', '1 found 
it quite funny in places', 'It's kind of almost like suspenseful'. These subjective 
responses can be used as a basis for a more developed interpretation, but they also 
suggest that reading literature can always be assessed in terms of enjoyment, that 
reading is not purely academic work. Reading for enjoyment IS III some ways 
considered as the elementary qualification for studying English. The final concern 
Hannah raised when she was discussing technical limitations that she had to take into 
account in her teaching, such as the fact that she couldn't assume high levels of general 
knowledge in her students, was the far less technical concern that they might not enjoy 
reading: 
30/5/2002. 
4 Melissa Marsh has quite correctly pointed out that this assumption itself can be exclusionary. Referring 
to subject choices at sixteen, she suggests that 'enjoying reading' is frequently used as a criterion for 
entry onto A level English courses. This has a naturalising effect, suggesting that enjoyment of literature 
is somehow inherent, rather than something that can be taught or acquired. (Melissa Marsh, Academic 
Literacy seminar, Institute of Education, 15th November 2003) 
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I'm very prejudiced, but they don't seem to read for pleasure ( ... ) I did a degree in English in the 
first place because I really loved reading books. That's the basic reason why most people do a 
degree in English. (Hannah, East University, interview) 
In fact, although some of the students did find the quantity of reading required for an 
English Literature degree quite challenging, and several admitted that they could not 
always complete all of the required reading in time for the classes, they did seem to 
share Hannah's basic enjoyment of literature. Monica was quite emphatic that literature 
should be about enjoying the texts that you read: 
... just enjoy looking at them and enjoying them. You've got to enjoy the texts or else they 
won't mean anything to you. 
(Monica, East University, interview) 
Hamid expressed his enjoyment of literature in a slightly different way. His comment 
about different types of texts suggests he sees reading as an inherent part of life: 
... in your life, when you grow up, you read, basically what you read is novels, fiction, short 
stories. (Hamid, East University, interview) 
His statement that 'when you grow up ... what you read is novels' leaves no room for 
the possibility of not reading. 
The assumption that reading should be pleasurable and that this is why students choose 
literature courses is connected to the fact that reading literary texts is a fundamental, 
essential, component of all literature courses. There was a clear understanding amongst 
the tutors and students that in coming to study English they had agreed to spend a lot of 
their time reading and most students appeared to have read at least a significant amount 
of the set text, usually a novel, a selection of poems or short stories, or an 
autobiography, before coming to the classes. Even one of the apparently less diligent 
students said: 'I always read enough to know what's going on' (David, interview). It 
was generally felt that at least some knowledge of the set text was necessary to 
participate fully in class discussions, which inevitably involved direct textual 
references. Three of the students 1 interviewed admitted that in some weeks they hadn't 
even begun the reading, but two of these also implied that when they hadn't done the 
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reading, it then wasn't worth turning up to the class. This may have been an 
unnecessary omission on their part, but it demonstrates the extent to which reading the 
set text is viewed as fundamental within literary studies. 
The central role of the set text also can also be related to the teaching methods deployed 
by the tutors, both of whom designed discussion activities around selected extracts 
which students read during the sessions. In the North University class, these discussion 
activities usually took place in small groups of three or four students. In the smaller East 
University class the tutor often integrated the reading activities and student discussion 
into her lecture. Students in both groups expressed appreciation of these text-based 
activities. For some students it was the change in dynamic from whole class to small 
group that they suggested was helpful. Iris in the North University group, when asked 
how she felt speaking in classes, said: 
I have no problem with it. Usually it's better with the small groups than actually just me talking 
to the whole group. (Iris, North University, interview) 
Other students said that they found the opportunity to focus on a segment of text 
selected by the tutor particularly useful to help them to identify and discuss ideas: 
... because he wouldn't print out a passage that we couldn't read into, because that would be 
pointless. So obviously, this particular passage, you can contextualise it, and that way people can 
permeate their ideas. So I think I do prefer at least ten minutes group discussion. (Bashir, North 
University, interview) 
Small group work helps students to generate and experiment with ideas and also 
provides an opportunity for discussion for students who may not feel so comfortable 
speaking in front of the whole class. As a result, it inevitably has the effect of 
producing more positions, more time and more access to ideas, from which students can 
speak. 
Of course small group work is not unique to Literature teaching, nor is it a tool adopted 
by all literature teachers. Both American Literature tutors described a lack of this type 
of structure in the teaching they had received at university. Duncan, who put copious 
amounts of planning into highly structured lectures and discussion tasks, suggested that 
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he had developed his teaching methods more in reaction against than in mimicry of his 
own experience as an undergraduate: 
I had very little lecturing when I was an undergraduate and most classes started with student 
presentations, which had all the faults of student presentations. They were badly prepared, they 
were irrelevant, they were just pointless and stupid and et cetera. 
(Duncan, North University tutor, interview) 
Thus both his lectures and his seminar teaching are carefully thought out solutions to 
problematic teaching methods encountered when he was a student. Hannah also 
reported less structure in the teaching she had experienced as an undergraduate, 
although she explained the difference in her teaching methods partly as a response to the 
needs of the students she was teaching: 
In some ways what they need is an awful lot more care. They need more guidance and structure, 
that I certainly didn't get ( ... ) It's all so much more structured, I mean, when I teach 
everything's planned. And I just don't even remember there even being something like a course 
outline on some of the units that I did. You just kind of made it up as you went along. It was 
more like chats in somebody's room. 
(Hannah, East University tutor, interview) 
Hannah's experience of teaching as 'more like chats in somebody's room' is not in the 
same pedagogic tradition as the kind of structured sessions and activities that she 
provides for her students. When I suggest that the text-based tasks used by both 
American Literature tutors are connected to a tradition within literary studies, I do not 
mean a pedagogic tradition but a disciplinary tradition. I think it is plausible to suggest 
that the centrality of the text and the tradition of close textual analysis within literary 
studies may help to explain the use of some similar methods and activities in the classes 
that I observed. 
Teaching methods that facilitate the production of multiple legitimate positions from 
which students can speak can also be associated with the subjective, or interpretive 
nature of literary studies in general. As I have already suggested, this is a feature of the 
discipline that is highly valued by literature students (see also Thomas, 1990, ch. 3). 
The high value attributed to the idea that 'there is no right answer' translates into a 
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teaching style common to both American Literature tutors: one that avoids rejection or 
correction of points raised by students in class discussions. 
Hannah, the East University tutor, described the interpretative aspect of literary studies 
in relation to the use of metaphors: 
Hannah: I think another thing about metaphors in texts is that they're not necessarily, I mean, the 
whale might be a metaphor for lots of things, and you to some extent it's my decision, or 
whoever's decision, of how you're going to read it. It's not a fIxed thing. It's a sign. And there 
are certain things that suggest themselves. Because a metaphor isn't a hard and fast thing 
anyway. It may be that the same metaphor is a metaphor for lots of different things ( ... ) If you 
value a work of literature, part of what you value is its complexity and ambiguity ... 
(Hannah, East University, interview) 
Here Hannah re-iterates the idea that ambiguity of meaning in a text or a metaphor is a 
key feature of literary language and that interpretation of these ambiguities is the 
decision of the reader. Duncan, the North University tutor, explicitly relates this literary 
ambiguity to his tendency not to correct students in class discussions: 
Duncan: I tend not to say 'no', and I think I probably should ( ... ) In literature, you know, it 
starts from the assumption that there are these interpretations and that one is not, defInitely not 
that one is not better than another, but that there isn't an ultimate factual grounding for 
interpretations. Interpretations are inferior or superior on slightly nebulous criteria, or on criteria 
that can be quite clear but are not matters of fact. 
(Duncan, North University tutor, interview) 
Duncan is clear that interpretations are not all of equivalent value, but suggests that the 
criteria for judging the value of interpretations are 'nebulous' or at least 'not matters of 
fact'. Both tutors, then, have a coherent justification for their avoidance of direct 
correction, based on the interpretive nature of literary studies. 
It is perhaps worth noting that it would be quite possible to read the set texts of the 
Political Thought classes in a similar way to a traditional 'literary' text. But this would 
inevitably mean you would be doing literature and not Political Thought. The 
methodology of Political Thought sets a limit on what counts as a valid interpretation of 
the set text, and this in tum effects the way the discipline is taught. Cheryl, the West 
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University lecturer, explicitly identified one of the main roles of the tutor as ensuring 
that students went away with a 'correct' interpretation: 
Cheryl: The role of the teacher is ( ... ) to make sure that when a student says something that is 
false, he or she stands corrected. 
(Cheryl, West University co-ordinator and lecturer, interview) 
Both Political Thought tutors' interventions in the Political Thought sessions confonn to 
this model of the tutor's role. Students in the Political Thought classes also frequently 
correct and contradict each other, both on points of textual interpretation and during 
more general discussion. In the American Literature classes students rarely contradict or 
correct each other, and the tutors' responses to dubious points raised by students are less 
direct than the Political Thought tutors'. Duncan responded to a student contribution 
that he later described as 'questionable' by asking the student a series of questions: 
'What sort of double meanings?', 'Do the characters know what they're saying?', 'Do 
you think Huck knows what he's saying all the time?' and finally, 'Interesting point. I 
don't know', before moving on to a slightly different point. In the interview he 
described this approach as: 
... maybe my way of finessing it and avoiding saying to the student, ' I think that's rubbish'. 
(Duncan, North University tutor, interview) 
Hannah, too, responded to dubious interpretations offered by students by asking 
questions or attempting to reformulate the student's point into something more 
coherent. She only corrected students on factual or historical points, which constitute a 
comparatively minor part of the class discussions. Again, then, features inherent to the 
discipline have a direct effect on teaching methods and classroom culture, and on the 
extent to which student interventions are constructed as legitimate or illegitimate as 
interpretations of the material being discussed in the classroom. 
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6.6. Gendered student positions in the American Literature classes5 
In my analysis of the Political Thought classes, I identified two gendered aspects to 
interventions in the discussions. The first was related to the disciplinary methodology 
that requires participants to explore their understanding of concepts unmediated by 
empirical data or textual evidence. This mode of analysis, I suggested, requires students 
to take up a 'masculine' position in relation to language, one that is identified with a 
dominant position from which the terms of the language can be defined. The second 
gendered aspect of interventions was social. I suggested that female students had to 
conform to codes of gender behaviour that were frequently in conflict with the criteria 
for a successful academic performance within the classroom. The analysis presented in 
this chapter so far suggests that, in relation to disciplinary methodology and mode of 
interaction, the American Literature classes do not share the highly masculine features 
of the Political Thought classes. The multiple approaches, combined with the central 
role attributed to the text, produce a more varied and mediated set of possible 
relationships between students and legitimate disciplinary claims. However, the 
gendered features of social interaction in American Literature classes are not dissimilar 
to those I described in the previous chapter. For example, Rose's claim, cited earlier in 
this chapter, that she has no problem speaking in class, although 'it's usually better in 
small groups', is very similar to Charlotte's uncertain and empirically inconsistent 
claim, discussed in the previous chapter, that, 'I think I knew that if I wanted to say 
something I wouldn't have a problem with it'. Rose's claim is similarly empirically 
unfounded, since during my observations she contributed to class discussions on only 
one occasion, when directly invited to do so. 
The accounts given by the American Literature students were, then, consistent with the 
analysis in the previous chapter. The reason why it is important to re-iterate apparently 
5 In the North University American Literature class, my impression was that male students contributed 
more, but this impression wasn't as clear cut as for the other classes. When I counted, both my general 
impression and my sense of uncertainty were confirmed. In three out of four of the sessions, contributions 
from male students did out number contributions from female students (Moby Dick, f= 20, m = 29; Slave 
Narratives, f= 20, m = 40; Huckleberry Finn, f= 10, m = 29), however in the session on Benito Cereno, a 
class where fewer students than usual were present, the female students contributed more than the male 
students (f = 33, m = 23). As I have suggested, without more detailed analysis, these numbers merely 
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similar material about gendered modes of classroom participation is precisely to 
emphasise the way that gendered codes provide a more generalisable context within 
which the more localised fields of disciplinary specialisms on undergraduate courses are 
positioned. 
Having discussed non-participative female students in the previous chapter, here I am 
going to focus on some of the female students who participated most frequently. These 
female students took up a feminised position within the classes when they intervened to 
facilitate discussion or to alleviate uncomfortable situations. 
Monica, a student in the East University American Literature class, was very active in 
class discussion, despite only joining the class in the third week of the course. The first 
session she attended was the second class on Moby Dick. Although she had not read the 
text, she took an active role throughout. In the following extract, Edward has been 
speaking for some time. The point he is making is rather obscure and difficult to follow 
and Hannah, the tutor has already attempted to intervene. Here she attempts to intervene 
for a second time and Monica follows up Hannah's intervention by offering a 
suggestion that attempts to make sense of what Edward has been saying: 
228. Edward: I mean, at the end of the day, here we have a situation where we've historically 
got this cormnunication system, we know where we are, in America they don't have that, and 
somebody like Melville is trying to identify with their new concept of who they are ... 
229. Hannah (tutor): I think this is really, I don't know, you're bringing in too many different 
things that I can't keep a lid on. 
230. Monica: (to Edward) Are you saying to look at things in their historical context, look at 
what was going on at the time? 
(East University, Moby Dick 2) 
In her interview, Monica explained her intervention: 
Monica: I didn't understand anything he said, but I just thought, because he was talking about 
the cormnunication system, I just thought he was trying to put everything into a historical 
context that I don't really think he knew enough about ( ... ) I was trying to save him. I felt really 
give a very general impression that female students did contribute, and that, in general, male students 
contributed slightly more. 
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bad, you know, he said it and everyone was like. I thought, okay, you're putting it in historical 
context, yes, of course you are. 
(Monica, East University, interview) 
This explanation reveals that the purpose of her intervention was absolutely related to 
Monica's desire to manage the social situation, and not at all related to her own learning 
or academic expression. Although her suggestion that Edward may be attempting 'to 
look at things in their historical context' sounds reasonable, in was not in fact an 
attempt to reconstruct what he was saying, since, she 'didn't understand anything he 
said.' The more convincing explanation of her intervention, is, as she says, that she was 
'trying to save him. ' This attempt to support another student might almost be 
interpreted as a maternal position. Monica's final comment, 'I thought, okay, you're 
putting it in historical context, yes, of course you are', expressly ignores Edward's real 
meaning and offers a solution, in a way that infantilises Edward and puts Monica into a 
mothering position. 
In the North University class, Ambia takes up a similar position in relation to the tutor. 
She describes her response to uncomfortable silences in the American Literature 
classes: 
Ambia: I think some of the stuff people say in class is brilliant, but when it comes down to the 
fact that no one's read the book, or everyone's found the book difficult, or no one's been able to 
think about the book in depth, then we come across problems, and it's just an hour of Duncan 
trying to cajole people into saying something. The worst thing is I always feel like I should say 
something, so I'm always like clutching at straws, just so that the conversation gets started. 
(Ambia, North University, interview) 
There was evidence of her intervening as she has described, 'clutching at straws, just so 
that the conversation gets started', filling the awkward silences after the tutor has asked 
a question, on several occasions during my observations. It is perhaps also worth noting 
that I was surprised by her perceptive comments about set texts during our interview, as 
I had noticed that her comments in class were sometimes rather trivial. As with 
Monica's intervention to 'save' Edward, Ambia is prioritising a supportive, feminine 
performance over a concern to demonstrate her own academic abilities. 
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A comparison with a student occupying a more masculine position will help to clarify 
the feminised nature of the position I am describing. David was also a student in the 
North University American Literature class. When I arranged to interview him, he 
hadn't yet contributed in the classes, but he did contribute in later sessions, and in the 
interview he presented himself as generally quite active in class discussions. We spent 
some time during the interview discussing his mode of participation in classes: 
David: Sometimes I've felt bad that I haven't said anything, because I have an idea and I think 
maybe it's not quite right, maybe I shouldn't say anything. And then someone else says 
something similar and I think, I should have said that. And other times, there was one time 
Duncan said, I'd been thinking things all through the lesson but hadn't said anything, and then 
he actually asked me something, and then I didn't have any thoughts, so I was like, 'no, urn', and 
it looked really bad. 
(David, North University, interview) 
Ambia and David provide similar accounts of the discomfort of sitting in class when no 
one is responding to the tutor's question. However, their responses to this situation are 
strikingly different. For Ambia, the need to contribute to the management of the class 
overrides her concern or embarrassment about making trivial points. For David, 
according to his account, his doubts about the value of what he is thinking stop him 
from articulating his ideas. David described another class, where, in a similar type of 
uncomfortable situation, he had intervened. His intervention, as he describes it, 
contrasts with Ambia's, because instead of risking saying something that might appear 
trivial, but that is still related to the subject, David introduces a slightly unrelated topic, 
in order, he suggests, to bring an end to an awkward silence: 
David: ( ... ) In Nineteenth Century Novels I'd often go into pornography quite a lot, in terms of 
the books, because a lot of them are quite sexual. Our seminar leader, she was quite a, she was 
really dry, quite serious, quite humourless, as such, to look at her. She was quite difficult to talk 
to on a personal level. She always looked at the floor, she seemed strange. She dressed like a 
nun. She was very bland ( ... ) She'd ask questions in a seminar and nobody would say anything, 
and I would pipe up talking about how I felt this was like pornography and give a modem 
example of something. And she, it would lighten the atmosphere, everyone would have fun 
talking about that. I think people might have got annoyed by me in the class, because they 
wanted to do something more serious, but, you know, you could have fun with that. You could 
go off topic, but at the same time you did talk about the book. 
(David, North University, interview) 
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Not knowing the tutor being described here, and not having observed the sessions, it is 
difficult to interpret the precision of this account. However, according to David, his 
strategy was successful in managing to 'lighten the atmosphere'. His references to 
pornography during the classes, as a way of teasing, engaging with, and/or, possibly 
insulting the tutor, is a highly gendered, sexualised strategy. In contrast to Ambia, who 
intervenes to maintain the general class discussion, David does not appear concerned by 
his recognition that 'people might have got annoyed with me in the class, because they 
wanted to do something more serious'. David's intervention relieves the discomfort of 
the classroom silence, but, it would appear, prioritises his relationship with the tutor 
over the lesson as a whole. The prioritisation of this relationship in his evaluation of his 
performance is suggested in a comment he made earlier in the interview, where he 
describes his participation in the Nineteenth Century Novels class in terms of his 
interaction with the tutor. 
David: ( ... ) I remember, Nineteenth Century Novels in the ftrst year. My seminar group was a 
very quiet one, and I think I was one of the few people who said anything in that class. And I 
always started it off, and I was always engaged in some argument or hot debate with our seminar 
leader. 
(David, North University, interview) 
David's prioritisation of his relationship with his (female) tutor constitutes a more 
positive version of the way Michael and Edward (discussed in ch. 4) both foreground 
perceived weaknesses in their tutors arguments in order to enhance their own positions. 
Similarly, David's explicit presentation of himself as a student capable of active 
participation and engagement in seminars was replicated in other interviews with male 
students. This desire to be seen as someone capable of performing and of expressing 
their ideas is evident in Hamid's response when I asked him if he found it easy or 
difficult to make contributions in the classes: 
Hamid: Most of the time, whatever I think that this is right, in my opinion, so I say this. I'm not 
kind of ashamed or embarrassed, just to be silent. Have you noticed that? I say whatever I think. 
(Hamid, East University, interview) 
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What is signified in these differences between male and female students is the different 
gendered performances that students are required to produce. The discourses of 
masculinity, which structure the performance of (mostly) male students, prioritise the 
ability to identify with powerful ideas and individuals. The discourses of femininity, in 
contrast, prioritise the role of supporting pre-existing structures of power. This support 
can be enacted through the acquiescent performances of non-vocal students, or through 
the active mediation of social relations within the classroom. Female students who don't 
make use of these highly feminised modes of participation in class discussions often 
appear either slightly nervous or slightly over-assertive when intervening to make a 
point. 
6.7. The gendered positioning of the teacher/academic 
There are significant differences in the ways in which the American Literature tutors 
both conceptualise the boundaries of the discipline and construct their positions as 
academic/tutor. Hannah does not construct a very definite boundary between the 
discipline of American Literature and the personal and political experiences of the 
students. She also varies her position in classroom interactions, moving from the highly 
academic to the more personal, and at times takes a relatively light hearted, un-
academic approach to what is being said in the sessions. Duncan, in contrast, has a very 
explicit conception of the boundary between the academic and the personal and 
maintains a very strict academic position throughout the sessions. When he makes a 
joke, it is an academic joke that he signposts for the students by saying: 'that was a 
joke'. These differences are consistent with the definition of the masculine position 
situated in identification with, and the feminine position as on the outside of dominant, 
in this case academic, discourses. 
Hannah's explanation of the purpose of the classes foregrounds the overlap between 
issues raised in the literature and issues relevant to students' lives: 
I think that class contact is for getting people to engage with the subject on their own terms, so 
that they are actively interested in it rather than having this rather mechanical attitude towards it 
( ... ) I don't think it necessarily matters if you're teaching the nineteenth century American 
novel. I don't think the issues that it deals with should necessarily be seen as that separate to the 
world in which the student is living. I think it has to be related to the students' experience. And I 
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think that if you want someone to really engage with something you have to make it relevant to 
them 
(Hannah, East University tutor, interview) 
The purpose of the sessions, she suggests, is to excite students' interest in the subject, 
and to do this she thinks it is important to demonstrate how the texts are relevant to the 
students: 'it has to be related to the students' experience'. An example of one of the 
ways in which Hannah relates textual issues to students' experience came in a 
discussion of 'race' and gender in Moby Dick. Here, Hannah is trying to elicit the 
broader metaphorical implications of the relationship between Queequeg and Ismael at 
the beginning of the novel. She is trying to get to the idea that Ismael's feminised 
position in his relationship with Queequeg can be related to a broader critique of white 
power within the novel: that there is a strong identification between the feminine 
position and the position of the non-white as the weaker partner in relation to white 
masculinity, and that Ismael's position subverts this identification. They have just 
discussed the reference made in the novel to Queequeg and Ismael sharing a bed and 
participating in a 'marriage' ceremony: 
96. Hannah (tutor): So what is this about? What is this image ofIsmael and Queequeg as husband 
and wife? What's that about? I mean this implicit thing C ..• ) What's it there for? Is it just a 
joke? Do you think there's any relationship between what might be going on in terms of ideas 
about race and how Ismael deals with this savage and issues about gender and how Ismael 
identifies himself as a man? Do you think they're related? Issues of racial identity and issues 
of gender identity? Why do you think they're there? Sorry, is that a bemusing concept? 
97. Hamid: It's two now, racial identity and then gender identity. 
98. Hannah: Well do you think they're related? Do you think of who you are in terms of what 
gender you are is at all bound up with how you defme yourself in terms of your sexuality? Is 
that at all inter-related with racial identity? 
99. Errol: Well, It's your first and second point of identification, race and then gender, black 
male, white female. 
100. Hannah: I think gender comes first for me. I think I would always think of somebody first in 
terms of gender before anything else. 
101. Errol: I suppose I was looking at it from the other side of the fence. I mean, not from a 
personal point of view, because I always think of myself as male first (laughter) - and I've 
seen myself naked, so I know - but from a descriptive point of view, if you describe anybody 
you always describe their race first and then their gender. 
102. Hannah: Yes, it's true. Even though that's not how you describe yourself. 
203 
103. Errol: That's not how you perceive yourself, but you always perceive somebody else in that 
light. 
104. Paola: But Ismael is Queequeg's wife. 
(East University, Moby Dick 1) 
Hannah moves from initial general questions about the relationship between 'race' and 
gender (96) to the complex personal question 'Do you think who you are in terms of 
what gender you are is at all bound up with how you define yourself in terms of 
sexuality? Is that at all inter-related with racial identity?' (98). Errol's response (101), 
considering how he would describe himself, does not immediately appear relevant to the 
issues she wants to raise in relation to the text. However, the distinction he draws in his 
conclusion (103) between what is foregrounded when we think about ourselves and 
what is foregrounded in other people's perceptions of us, is pertinent to the issues raised 
in the novel in relation to racial thinking6. Paola's intervention (104) then brings the 
more personal section of discussion back to the text, and a little while later Hannah is 
able to develop her argument to a conclusion. 
When she explained how she felt about this extract, Hannah suggested that it had raised 
interesting issues that were not directly related to the novel, but which she would have 
liked to follow up: 
That conversation left me, I thought it was quite problematic because I wondered whether the 
fact that I think of myself primarily as a female rather than primarily as white is to do with issues 
of race, you know. I don't have to think about my whiteness because it's the invisible colour, 
whereas if I was black I'd have to think about it. And maybe we should have had a discussion 
about that, because I did feel at the time that it was quite unsatisfactory. But I didn't want to, I 
suppose I didn't want it to go off at a tangent. 
(Hannah, East University tutor, interview) 
Although her sense of a boundary meant that she 'didn't want it to go off at a tangent', 
it is clear that Hannah felt that the issues raised in this extract were legitimate material 
for academic discussion. This is consistent with her later comment that she sees the 
introduction of personal issues into academic discussions as both obvious and useful: 
6 As a piece of grammatical analysis, however, Errol's interpretation of adjective order is inaccurate: the 
most fundamental characteristic is always closest to the noun, so 'black male student' actually prioritises 
gender over 'race'. I don't think this necessarily undermines the final point Errol makes here. 
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I don't think it's difficult to talk about personal issues. I mean, obviously everybody in the room 
has a gender and a colour, but I don't think it means you can't talk about them, and I think that 
very often you can have good seminars in which people talk about themselves in that kind of 
way. 
(Hannah, East University tutor, interview) 
Duncan's feelings about the introduction of the personal into his teaching sessions are 
very different. In the interview, we discussed the extract from the session on slave 
narratives where Razia talked about the way she responds to different representations of 
women's lives. Duncan's evaluation of the extract was slightly negative: 
Towards the end of the extract it becomes a bit un-textually grounded, not un-textually 
grounded, but the level of analysis is quite sort of shallow, perhaps, or basic, 'I found this really 
shocking', 'it was how I related to it as a sort of person in my contemporary space' - all that 
stuff that's sort of quite A levelly. But I think, I don't mind that happening occasionally in 
classes, because I think those are the ways you respond to a text and you do have to 
acknowledge that ( ... ) I do want to sort of push those buttons in people. I wouldn't want this sort 
of thing to appear in a student's essay7, but there is a place for that in class. (Duncan, North 
University tutor, interview) 
While he acknowledges that 'there is a place for that in class', Duncan suggests that 
Razia's reference to her personal experience is 'shallow', 'basic', and 'quite A levelly'. 
He is constructing a clear distinction between legitimate and illegitimate modes of 
analysis, and explicit reference to the personal appears, for him, to be illegitimate. 
The section of discussion when Razia was speaking was notable within the session on 
Slave Narratives. Before that moment, the class had focussed on Frederick Douglass' 
text, and the participants had mostly been male students. Duncan then asked the 
7 This can be contrasted with Hannah's response when a student did precisely this. In his essay - an 
analysis of how Equiano's understanding of his own position as a slave was confused by historical 
differences between European and African slave traders - Errol put in a personal observation: 
When 1 first read this book some years ago, I was astonished to learn that slavery was a 
commonplace way of life in Africa. 
(Errol, essay on Slave Narratives) 
Hannah commented in the margin: 
Your surprise (and it's clearly not an uncommon response) is itself interesting. 
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students to think about the text by Harriet Jacobs, and it was during this section of class 
that two female students contributed and became the main participants in the discussion 
for several minutes. Duncan acknowledged that this was a striking moment in the class 
but it is not clear whether it is something he values or something he feels is, or should 
be, slightly marginal: 
When Razia started speaking it was very obvious at the time that this was a moment when 
women in the room were being engaged as women. And Razia does sort of thematise that 
, 
perhaps without saying it explicitly, but you can tell from the tenor of her comments, she says, I 
was thinking about this as a woman, reading other books by women about women's experience. 
(Duncan, North University tutor, interview) 
In a later meeting, Duncan explained his discomfort with the fact that female students 
sometimes seem to be engaging with a text 'as women', saying that he would prefer 
everyone to engage with texts at the same level, i.e. an academic level, which, for 
Duncan, appears to be distinct from the personal, gendered engagement. This desire for 
all students to engage with texts in the same way, while unrealistic, is a justifiable 
stance to take as a teacher, and although Duncan seemed particularly aware of the 
moments when female students foreground their gender, he appeared equally 
ambiguous about the suggestion that students' contributions in class might be related to 
other aspects of their personal experience. He acknowledged that contributions from 
students from the US were sometimes attributed a distinctive status within the American 
Literature classes, but did not think it relevant to consider the religion of a student who 
questioned references to religion in a text. 
This contrast between the tutors affects their positioning in relation to a certain 
conception of what it means to be academic. Duncan's seriousness during the classes, 
his discomfort with what he sees as un-academic contributions from students and his 
consistent use of a precise and formal academic language, constitute a strong 
identification between him and a formal conception of academic modes of thinking. 
Hannah, in contrast, explicitly distances herself from this position through the use of 
informal language, through the interjection of offhand comments during the seminars 
and through references to personal issues. This difference in their relation to a formally 
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objective academic position is exemplified in the different types of light-hearted 
comments each makes in class. Duncan's asides were always academically grounded. 
The joke I have already referred to was based on a section of discussion in the session 
on Huckleberry Finn. The class had been discussing Twain's criticism of Emerson's 
literary style, and how this appeared contradictory in the light of Twain's other claim 
that he was only interested in telling a good story. Duncan commented: 
Duncan: Yes C ... ) Emerson can say, 'why are you worried about the inconsistencies in my 
argument, there wasn't meant to be one.' And it would undercut any sort of academic criticism 
you might want to make. Which is why we should reject them, obviously. (pause) That was a 
joke. 
(North University, Huckleberry Finn) 
I am not sure whether the suggestion is that we should reject academic criticism or that 
we should reject authors' attempts to deny any serious point in their work, but either 
way, the joke is that Duncan is following his argument to an extreme in suggesting that 
either position should be rejected outright by students of literature. On another occasion 
Duncan interjected his enthusiasm when it became apparent that students' felt that the 
suspense in Melville's 'Benito Cereno' was effective: 
Duncan: C ... ) We come in in media res, when Delano does, and we don't know the sort of 
context of this whole story. So that is a way of getting at a certain effect, of making a certain 
theoretical point, that couldn't be achieved in any other way, perhaps. I'm really glad that sort of 
- go Melville! - the suspense works C .•• ) 
(North University, Benito Cereno) 
Duncan's enthusiastic outburst, <go Melville!', is entirely grounded in the literature. 
These examples can be contrasted with a moment in the East University session on 
Moby Dick. Hannah had spent some time eliciting ideas about the novel's use of the 
ocean as a metaphor for American expansionism. Nevertheless, while Errol is 
explaining the implications of the contrast between expansion on the land and 
expansion on the sea, Hannah interjects a point that is, as Duncan would say, totally un-
textually grounded: 
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183. Errol: ( ... ) there's no way of taming it, no closure, because there's no way you can 
stick a fence round it. There's no way you can, you know, herd all these whales into 
one little corral and get them to breed and ... 
184. Hannah (tutor): Well you can do that with killer whales, can't you? They can jump 
through hoops. Sorry, yes. 
(East University, Moby Dick 1) 
Despite the fact that Errol is articulating precisely the point she has been trying to 
develop, Hannah allows herself to be distracted, for a moment, from her role as class 
tutor and academic. 
These examples typify the tutors' different feelings about relinquishing their academic 
position in their classes. Duncan expressed concern about an incident where he hadn't 
remembered a detail about a text during a seminar, saying, 'what I remember about that 
was not being quite in control'. In contrast, Hannah is less concerned about such losses 
of control, saying, 'I admit to not knowing things all the time.' It would be possible to 
suggest that both in her academic interests and in her interaction as a teacher, Hannah 
values the personal and is relatively comfortable relinquishing control, while Duncan is 
sceptical of the value of the personal in academic work and is uncomfortable 
relinquishing control. However, an analysis more in line with a Lacanian conception of 
the feminine can provide a less individualistic account. It is possible to align the ability 
to identify fully with academic discourse with the masculine ability to express sexual 
desire. Just as Lacan's female patients have to deny knowledge of their ownjouissance 
in order to maintain their gender position, so, perhaps, female academics have to 
disguise their own seriousness in their intellectual pursuits. Academic work, like sex, 
within this conceptual framework can be described as the embodiment of the masculine 
position, not of course because women are inherently less capable of, or derive less 
pleasure from either activity, but because conformity with socially imperative codes of 
femininity requires the repression of such pleasures. 
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6.8. The effects of gendered academic positions on student 
participation 
As I hope I have already shown in other sections of my analysis, it is not possible to 
predict student reactions to different teaching styles. Certain teaching orthodoxies might 
maintain that Hannah's less academic style is necessarily less intimidating, and 
therefore less exclusionary than Duncan's academic seriousness. However, as Edward's 
experience in Hannah's class demonstrates (see ch. 3), the legitimacy afforded to 
discussion of personal experience, especially in relation to issues of gender and 
ethnicity, can act to marginalize rather than to include some students. Further, Hannah's 
relaxed and occasionally unserious style may well have contributed to Edward's 
avowed lack of confidence in her position as an academic. Edward is clearly an extreme 
case, but it may be more generally true that some university students want a 
distinctively academic experience, and that therefore supposedly 'intimidating' 
academic language presented by someone who refuses to 'come down' to their level 
may be a part of what they have signed up for. 
I am not, then, suggesting that either of these gendered modes of interaction within 
academic discourse constitutes a necessarily more or less exclusionary teaching style. 
The important point is that both constitute boundaries that will affect different groups of 
students in different ways. Just as Hannah's feminised mode of interaction can be seen 
to have contributed to Edward's marginalisation, Duncan's more masculine, academic 
style also had an effect on classroom interaction. 
The strict boundary that Duncan constructed around what counts as legitimate 
classroom discussion elicited a variety of responses to his teaching. As I have 
suggested, his planning of lectures and seminars was extremely rigorous and highly 
structured. His demeanour in the classes was also extremely focussed and several 
students were emphatically appreciative of this rigour: 
Rajpal: I think his lecturing style is pretty good and I can see a continuity between each of the 
lectures that he does ( ... ) I don't think that other courses I'm doing come close in terms of, like, 
the coherence of the course. 
(Rajpal, North University, interview) 
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Sevket: I do enjoy these classes. I think that Duncan's lectures are brilliant. I think he goes into a 
lot of detail and you can tell that he puts the hard work in ( ... ) He is structurally very clear. 
There is a lot of detail. He doesn't seem to leave many gaps, and the comprehension is there: I 
always seem to understand what he's saying and what he means. There's not much I can fault 
him on. I really enjoy his lectures. 
(Sevket, North University, interview) 
However, two of the other students I interviewed explicitly commented that Duncan's 
style could be intimidating: 
Ambia: Other people can entice you into talking just by, you know, saying some general stuff 
before ploughing into the work, whereas Duncan, he's very passionate about what he does but I 
think with that he's sort of, you don't get relaxed with him. ( ... ) Sometimes lecturers might say 
something very general and then, something that happened in the week to them, and then bring 
you into the seminar like that. I think that works well, because apart from getting to know about 
the book, you get to know a little bit about your seminar leader as well, and you can relate to 
that, and then I think that puts everyone at their ease ( ... ) I think Duncan's a very bright man, 
you can tell, and I think people do fmd that a bit intimidating. 
(Ambia, North University, interview) 
David: Duncan's a nice guy, but he comes across as being quite serious. There are fun times, but 
he doesn't come across as the kind of guy that you can mess around with and make a few 
offhand comments. 
(David, North University, interview) 
Both of these students also referred to a specific incident that had occurred at the 
beginning of the course, before I had started observing the sessions. Apparently, a 
student had made a flippant remark about not being able to afford to buy the set texts 
and Duncan had taken the comment seriously, and had responded quite severely. Both 
students suggested that this incident might have inhibited students from participating in 
later classes. Indeed, in the preparatory discussions before I went in to observe the 
classes, Duncan had mentioned that he found this class quite awkward and 
unresponsive. Both he and several students also commented that after I had started my 
observations participation in class discussions had increased. Since I hadn't seen the 
class before, I wasn't able to assess this for myself, and although the class didn't appear 
strikingly unresponsive in comparison to other classes I have taught or observed, it also 
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never appeared to me that the group was particularly relaxed. If, as appears plausible 
from Ambia and David's accounts, students were inhibited from participating following 
the incident at the beginning of the term, then it also seems plausible to suggest that 
there is a relationship between these marginalizing effects and Duncan's generally 
serious approach to his academic work and his strong identification with the position of 
academic. 
6.9. Conclusions 
The evidence of this chapter appears to demonstrate that American Literature's 
combination of a variety of interpretive methodologies produces a multiplicity of 
legitimate student positions within undergraduate classes. The explicit engagement with 
issues of class, gender and racial thinking in addition to more literary or linguistic 
aspects of texts, provides a legitimate academic context in which students can explore a 
range of literary, political and more personal concerns. Further, the specifically 
relativising or reflexive nature of some of the modes of interpretation available within 
the discipline constitutes a critical mode of engagement with existing social relations: 
mediated through the literature class, the set texts enable students to identify and 
question initial responses and linguistic assumptions that are derived from their own 
cultural context and experience. 
The evidence presented here further suggests that the gendered structuring of classroom 
interaction crosses disciplinary divides. Just as male students and tutors can be seen to 
resist the feminine position, and to make positive efforts to align themselves with 
dominant discourses and individuals within the classroom, so female students and tutors 
actively resist too close an alignment with dominant discourses, which would require 
them to suppress feminising performances. As I have suggested the Lacanian 
framework helps us to understand these gendered responses to discursive contradictions 
by foregrounding the position of gender as a first signifier of subjectivity. However, in 
the American Literature classes, the re-iteration of hegemonic masculine and feminine 
positions constituted in these gendered performances does not overlap with the issues 
and methodologies of the discipline, and as such, the participation of female students 
appears to be less problematic and contradictory than in the Political Thought classes. 
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This analysis, then, constitutes two different developments of Bernstein's category of 
horizontal knowledge structures. Firstly, it suggests that segmentally structured 
disciplines do not necessarily foreground one language or approach in the interest of a 
specific social group, and, following from this, that they are not necessarily 
exclusionary in the way that Bernstein has described. This finding is not inconsistent 
with Bernstein's model, but merely represents a refinement developed in response to the 
examination of empirical examples. Secondly, the analysis of both Political Thought 
and American Literature as partially constituted in relation to gendered discursive 
practices identifies an aspect of the internal structure of disciplinary knowledge that is 
not accounted for in Bernstein's model. While Bernstein's overall framework presents a 
relational picture of knowledge, his models of horizontal and hierarchical knowledge 
structures do not offer a very sophisticated account of the different ways in which 
disciplines interact with substantive features of the social context. The analysis 
presented here reveals how social, and specifically gendered features can both be 
identified in the substantive content and can also be associated with the methodology 
and mode of engagement of the disciplines. 
Finally, it is worth noting that, while American Literature's explicitly critical content, 
its multiple methodologies, and its open interpretive possibilities do mean that it can be 
described as a more inclusive discipline than Political Thought, these features should 
not give rise to an over-idealistic account of American Literature as an 'inclusive' 
discipline. As has already been demonstrated in the analysis of marginalized students in 
chapter three, there are some aspects of the disciplinary object and methods of 
American Literature that can act to marginalize certain students. All disciplines are 
necessarily constructed within boundaries, and, arguably, it is the students on the 
margins who constitute these boundaries within each specific classroom context. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION: A RELATIONAL CONCEPTION OF STUDENT 
POSITIONS 
7.1. The product of the research: a structure for the sociological 
description of gender and disciplines 
In so far as I began this research with a set of hypotheses about the social positioning 
and effects of academic disciplines within higher education classrooms, it could be 
argued that these hypotheses have been confirmed. However, I find it more accurate to 
describe the product of the research as a set of descriptions that elaborate the theoretical 
frameworks that I have drawn on from within social theory and sociology. These 
descriptions do not act to either confirm or rebut initial hypotheses, but rather offer a 
new way of viewing students' relations to the discursive practices of both gender and 
discipline within the institutional settings of higher education. 
What the research provides, then, is an innovative structure for the sociological 
description of gender and disciplines. The Lacanian framework, conceptualising gender 
as a position in relation to language and the symbolic order, enables a connection to be 
made between the substantive content and methodologies of academic disciplines and 
students' identifications with gendered positions within the classroom. There are three 
distinct stages in the production of this framework. In the first, it is necessary to provide 
a description of the object and methodologies of academic disciplines. The second stage 
is to identify gendered aspects of students' and tutors' participation in the classes: 
participation that conforms or fails to conform to the recognised, legitimate codes of the 
academic setting. The third stage is to identify where there is a correlation between 
gendered modes of participation in the classroom and specific features of disciplinary 
methodologies. It is in this stage that a connection can be made, for example, between 
the masculine position, student participation, and the methodology of Political Thought. 
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This final level of analysis constitutes a distinctive description of the relationship 
between gender and academic disciplines. 
The analysis, then, has two key implications. The theoretical implication is that it is 
possible to make a connection between the methodologies and objects of academic 
disciplines and gendered positions in relation to language, knowledge and social 
interaction. The methodological implication is that sociological claims about the 
internal structure of disciplinary knowledge must be based on a detailed analysis of 
disciplinary languages produced within specific contexts. Further, this study also 
demonstrates that a sociological understanding of academic knowledge must always 
position fields of disciplinary knowledge within the other overdetermining social fields 
that constitute the boundaries of disciplinary identities. 
Here I want to summarise the ways in which the thesis suggests that it is possible to 
view student positioning in undergraduate classrooms as a relational effect of the 
interaction between the relatively autonomous discursive fields of institution, discipline 
and gender. 
7.2. The social positioning of academic disciplines. 
The description of the methodologies of Political Thought and American Literature as 
prioritising respectively metonymic and metaphoric reasoning processes forms the basis 
for my elaboration of Bourdieu's analysis of the position of different disciplines in 
relation to temporally dominant social hierarchies. Bourdieu's analysis of academics in 
a range of disciplines has already revealed the relationship between social class, 
discipline choice and the position of the discipline in relation to dominant social 
structures, with proportionately more academics from the dominant classes working in 
academic fields with a close relationship to dominant positions within the 
establishment. The research presented here has elaborated ways in which the internal 
structure of knowledge, constituted in the relationship between the object and 
methodologies of the disciplines, can also be related to the social divisions that 
Bourdieu has observed. 
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The analysis in chapters four and five revealed how the metonymic structure of 
legitimate claims within Political Thought tends to exclude more interpretive modes of 
analysis. In addition, these narrow chains of reasoning can be associated with a 
combative style of interaction, within which different arguments are seen as necessarily 
in opposition to each other, rather than as useful alternative possible interpretations. 
This style of interaction is exacerbated by the fact that the object of study in Political 
Thought classes tends to be the argument itself, rather than an external empirical object, 
and thus students are required to articulate their ideas and opinions directly, rather than 
being able to offer their views mediated through the interpretation of a source text. 
These features of the discipline, I have argued, can be associated both with the position 
of the discipline as applied knowledge in the service of government and with a 
dominant, masculine position in relation to language and the symbolic order. These 
features of the substantive content combined with the dominant methodology and mode 
of interaction of the Political Thought classes constitute an elaboration of Bourdieu's 
account of the social positioning of the discipline. 
The description of the metaphoric structure of reasoning within American Literature and 
the way in which this permits multiple interpretive possibilities, which are not 
conceptualised as necessarily in opposition to each other, constitutes a similar 
elaboration of Bourdieu's account of the social positioning of academic disciplines. The 
more open, interpretive style of interaction in American Literature classes, combined 
with the discipline's adoption of multiple methodological approaches, constitutes a wide 
variety of different possible modes through which students can identify with the 
discipline. This description of the multiple interpretive approaches of American 
Literature, combined with an understanding of its explicit incorporation of issues of 
class, gender and racial thinking, and its critical descriptive position in relation to social 
hierarchies, constitutes an account of the social position of the discipline that contrasts 
with Political Thought's narrower methodology and far closer identification with the 
masculine codes of the establishment. 
These detailed descriptions of features of the disciplines as enacted in the classrooms 
suggest that in order to take up a successful position within the classroom students are 
required to identify with subject matter, methodologies and modes of participation that 
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occupy specific social positions and that have correlative social effects. The extent to 
which they are able to do this is at least in part dependent on other factors constituting 
the social position of individual students. Thus the positioning of students within the 
classroom is a product of the interaction between their own social position and the 
social position of the discipline. 
However, a distinction must be maintained between different features of the social 
positioning of academic disciplines. It is possible to make some general claims about 
the connection between the social functions of knowledge and student in/exclusion. 
However, the specific associations described here between the social functions of 
Political Thought and American Literature and the internal structure and methodologies 
of these two disciplines cannot be generalised to other disciplines with similar social 
functions. Thus, descriptive or critical disciplines such as the natural sciences cannot be 
assumed to have a similar structure to Literary Studies, and other temporally dominant 
disciplines, such as Law and Medicine, may not share methodological features with 
Political Thought. The specific ways in which the methodologies of these disciplines 
constitute modes of interaction within social settings is an empirical question that 
requires separate investigation. 
7.3. Moving beyond Bernstein's pedagogic codes 
As has been seen, Bernstein's work on the concept of pedagogic codes provides 
innovative insights into the relationship between forms of knowledge and social 
organisations. His conceptualisation of the structure of academic disciplines as either 
hierarchically or horizontally organised, and of the way such organisation might 
influence the transmission of disciplinary knowledge within the classroom, foregrounds 
an important object of study for the sociology of knowledge. However, his specific 
criteria for identifying horizontal knowledge structures are not adequate to account for 
the differences between Political Thought and American Literature, and his theorisation 
of the possible effects of horizontal knowledge structures in educational settings does 
not account for the examples described in this study. 
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There are two implications of this finding. The first is the need for detailed empirical 
work to form the basis of any sociology of disciplinary knowledge. Although, as 
Bernstein's work demonstrates, it is possible to develop useful models on the basis of a 
general knowledge of academic disciplines, concrete statements about the actual nature 
and effect of disciplinary knowledge require a closer examination of contextualised 
instances of disciplinary statements. Such empirical analysis will also help to ensure 
that the role of anyone aspect of the social positioning of academic disciplines is not 
attributed disproportionate significance in the analysis of educational settings. Bernstein 
himself does not ever suggest that the analysis of pedagogic codes alone can provide an 
adequate description of the social. However, some instances of the taking up of his 
work (Moore and Muller, 1999, Maton, 2000, Arnot, 2002) suggest interpretations of 
the social that overplay the autonomy, and therefore the predictive capabilities, of 
Bernstein's models and that do not take sufficient account of other discursive factors in 
their analysis of the development and effects of disciplinary knowledge structures. Thus 
the second implication of this study, in relation to Bernstein's pedagogic codes, is that 
the formulation of such codes constitutes an overly structural account of knowledge, 
and ultimately of the social. The emptying of descriptions of knowledge of any 
substantive content or object removes an essential tool for understanding how 
knowledge constitutes and is constituted within an existing social order. 
By identifying the overlap between aspects of the identities of different discursive 
practices - the overlap between, for example, Political Thought, elite higher education 
institutions, and masculinity - this study has argued both for the impossibility of 
producing discrete descriptions of social objects, and also for the importance of 
developing an understanding of academic disciplines as embedded within other socially 
positioned discursive fields. 
7.4. Methodological limitations on the analysis of gender and ethnicity 
There are, of course, many limitations in the analysis presented here. The foregrounding 
of discipline, gender and institution as key reference points in the analysis means that 
the influence of other factors, teaching style, for example, or peer relations, are not 
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systematically explored. What is offered is a new way of describing the relationship 
between disciplines and gender, in a way that foregrounds gender as symbolic of all 
socially subordinate positions. However, the methodology of the study means that 
significant aspects of both gendered and other subordinate positions are not fully 
explored. 
The analysis of the female students within this study revealed modes of interaction that 
can be associated with the primacy of conformity gendered codes of behaviour in the 
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maintenance of a stable sUbjectivity. These modes of interaction take different forms: 
for some students they were instantiated in their silence or passivity within class 
discussions; other students adopted the role of facilitator or helper within the classroom; 
and other students offered feminising descriptions of classroom interaction that might 
otherwise be interpreted as either successful, within academic criteria, or masculine, in 
relation to codes of gender. These varied modes of interaction have been identified as 
different possible ways of negotiating the contradictions between academic criteria for 
success and social codes of femininity. However, these particular findings do not 
constitute an innovation in the sociological description of gender and education. 
One possible way to expand current understanding of the ways in which students 
negotiate gender would be to attempt to describe why individual female students adopt 
one strategy rather than another within the classroom. The complexity of individual life 
histories, however, means that the specificity of such negotiating strategies cannot be 
captured within the generalising sociological framework of my study. My analysis 
confirms that the imperative to conform to gender codes contributes to the 
contradictions that female students have to negotiate. The level of data presented here 
cannot, however, provide a fuller account of the specific gendered manoeuvres of 
individual participants. A sociological research design that more fully incorporated 
psychoanalytic techniques, or a deliberate and systematic use of biographical or 
ethnographic methods (Wengraf, 2000, Hey, 2003) might be able to develop more 
personal, explanatory descriptions of the particular feminising strategies adopted by 
specific female students. Why did individual students within my study adopt the 
specific strategies that they did? The answers to this question are appropriately beyond 
the scope of this piece of research. It is, however, important to note this limitation in 
order to avoid constructing an essentialising account of the modes of interaction 
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adopted by female students within the study. The descriptions presented here suggest 
the types of strategies adopted by female students to negotiate academic settings. They 
do not describe the context within which individual students come to adopt one strategy 
rather than another. 
The distinctive insights developed within this study do not, then, constitute an 
explanation of individual students' strategies for maintaining their gender positions. The 
distinctive aspect of the research lies in its description of the positioning of students 
within their classes as a relational effect of the interaction between the discursive fields 
of gender, discipline and institution. The thesis describes how strategies adopted by 
both male and female students occupying a subordinate, feminine position can be 
described in relation to specific features of the disciplines they are studying. These 
features, then, constitute a demand for modes of participation that can be described in 
gendered terms. This constitutes a distinctive approach to the description of gender and 
academic disciplines, but leaves many other aspects of subordinate, or feminised 
positions unexplored. 
Significantly, the methodology of the thesis does not distinguish between the strategies 
or experiences of different ethnic groups that occupy subordinate, feminine positions in 
relation to social and academic codes. The generalising methodology of the study 
conflates gender, class and ethnicity into one subordinate category. While the analysis 
differentiates between male and female student who constitute this subordinate 
category, it lacks an articulated framework for the systematic analysis of ethnicity. It 
would be interesting, in future work, to see whether the framework for the analysis of 
gender and disciplines developed here could be combined with more systematic 
approaches to the study of discursive practices of different ethnic groups (see for 
example, Heath, 1983). This might add to our understanding of the contrasting 
experiences of male and female students from different ethnic groups within 
contemporary education systems. 
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7.5. Disciplines, gender, and teaching: personal reflections on the 
implications of the research 
In the introduction I suggested that a secondary aim of the study was to shed some light 
on my own educational experiences. My initial account of my experience provided a 
more detailed account of institutional features than of features of gendered interaction, 
or of disciplinary methodologies. The analysis of the disciplines within this study has 
reinforced my sense of the disjointed relationship that can exist between student 
expectations and interests and the academic disciplines that they have chosen to study. 
The analysis of the relationship between the academic and gendered positioning of 
female students has also provided a reassuring explanatory framework within which it is 
possible to make sense of my own experience of confusion and frustration when I was 
at university. At the same time, the new perspective I have gained on my own 
educational experience has also provided me with a structure within which to think 
about my position as a teacher. 
The description of the three students who found themselves in conflict with the 
disciplinary assumptions and methodologies presented to them resonates strongly with 
my own experience of studying Analytical Philosophy and Political Theory. It suggests 
that my sense of puzzlement and disappointment with many of the texts that I studied as 
an undergraduate may indeed have had some external social basis. It has also clarified 
my understanding of the nature of such conflicts and of the difficulties that they may 
present for students in my classes. As a result, I have consciously tried to adopt 
strategies to alleviate these conflicts. In doing so, however, I have also become aware of 
the way my teaching is influenced by my own disciplinary background. 
One strategy I have adopted within my own teaching is to attempt to incorporate the 
boundaries of the discipline into the course content, and to explicitly point out when 
students seem to be articulating ideas that would be more coherent within a different 
disciplinary paradigm. For example, in teaching a module on Contemporary Culture and 
Society which drew heavily on theories of postmodernism, I attempted throughout to 
draw attention to the way these modes of interpretation can be seen not only as a 
development from modernism, but also as a critique of dominant liberal positions that 
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were not represented in the set reading for the course. When students articulated 
strongly liberal assumptions that impeded their understanding of a set text, we could 
identify a framework within which their 'misunderstanding' could be seen as legitimate. 
Similarly, in giving feedback on an essay that attempted to analyse stereotyping in a set 
text at the same time as arguing against the significance of the social effects of 
stereotypes in general, rather than simply pointing to the weaknesses in the structure of 
the essay, I also commented that the specific approaches studied within the course had 
not provided this student with the resources to support his argument. To a certain extent, 
this limitation can be seen as a necessity of the curriculum. However, in the light of my 
analysis of the American Literature classes in my study, I can also associate the specific 
limitations of the course I was teaching with my own disciplinary background. Whereas 
the culture of literary studies tends to prioritise reading of literary texts over reading of 
theory, and thus to be more likely to legitimise a range of different interpretations, my 
background in philosophy probably contributed to my decision to include theoretical as 
well as cultural sources in the set reading, which inevitably acted as a limit on the range 
of interpretations discussed in the classes. In addition, my background in philosophy, 
and also in language teaching, probably contributed to my tendency to emphasise the 
need for correct interpretations. In the light of this, it seemed to me important to 
acknowledge that some students were put at a disadvantage by their initial political 
position, whereas others found the approaches offered on the course fitted far more 
closely with their initial assumptions and interests. 
These personal reflections suggest some of the ways that teachers might minimise 
possible exclusionary effects of the disciplines that they teach. I discussed some similar 
ideas with one of the tutors who participated in the research. She said that just reading 
the summary I had sent her had helped her to think more clearly about the different 
ways Political Thought might be taught. Simply making teachers more aware of the way 
methodological choices are frequently invisible to students, she suggested, might help to 
increase understanding of some of the difficulties students have in grappling with 
disciplinary ideas. These difficulties could then be addressed more explicitly in the 
content and presentation of the curriculum. An alternative strategy would be for tutors 
to provide sensitive and informed advice about the approaches taken within different 
fields of study, acknowledging the limits to disciplinary methodologies, before students 
make choices about courses and option modules. This might help students to make more 
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informed choices, or at least to enter classes aware of the conflicts they may experience 
in attempting to identify with the discipline. 
The analysis of gender within the study has also affected my understanding of both my 
own classroom practice and of gender relations more generally. In a way, the result that 
I had least predicted, and that most shocked me as I was carrying out the analysis, was 
the explicit and consistent gendering of the tutors' performances and of the way that this 
affected students' responses to their tutors. The analysis of tutors' interaction within the 
classroom revealed the female tutors' use of feminising strategies that had the effect of 
distancing them from too close an identification with the academic discourses that they 
were articulating. The male tutors, in contrast, showed no inclination to avoid 
identification with the discipline that they were teaching. In addition, the analysis of 
student interviews, and also of some interventions within the classroom, revealed the 
casualness with which some male students were willing to dismiss or to undermine the 
academic authority of their female tutors, as well as, in some instances, an assertion of a 
sexualised or flirtatious relationship that foregrounds gendered hierarchies over the 
academic discourses and practices of the classroom. This can be interpreted as the 
corollary of the female students' incorporation of feminine performances into the 
classroom. However, the inherent imbalance in the power relation between masculine 
and feminine positions means that the resonance of these gendered practices is very 
different. It can, nevertheless, create similar difficulties for male students as for female 
students, in terms of their access to the curriculum and to successful academic positions 
within the classroom. 
This analysis has made me increasingly aware of these gendered practices in my own 
teaching, both in my own performance and in student responses within the classroom. I 
have become aware of a set of, now, almost self-conscious strategies that I use to step 
out of a position of academic authority when I am teaching. I have also been more 
analytical of the effect of my academic authority on, especially, male students. In one of 
my classes last year I had a specific problem with a group of male students who were 
underachieving, but whom I found it very difficult to offer any help. They would rebuff 
my approaches within the classroom, although they would be happy to interact with me 
and to offer me assistance in non-academic contexts. A variety of strategies set in place 
by the institution have helped us to address this problem productively this year. In 
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particular, the appointment of a high profile and pro-active disability officer constructed 
a route through which two of the male students I was concerned about, who were both 
identified as dyslexic, were able to approach me and ask for help, and together we were 
able to identify strategies to assist their participation in class activities and discussions. I 
can, though, also think of at least two male students who I did not handle so effectively, 
and to whom I was not able to offer the support that they probably needed. 
Although the initial problem does seem to me to be at least in part to do with the fact 
that I am a woman in a position of academic authority, I do not think that a solution to 
the difficulties in my communication with these students could have been found in a 
conscious attempt either to further feminise or academicise my classroom practice. 
Either strategy would only have shifted, rather than resolved, the intersecting conflicts 
between my and my students' gendered and academic identities. This constitutes an 
aspect of gender relations that has been clarified for me by this study. I am left with a 
far stronger sense of the inevitability, or unavoidability of the contradictions between 
the gendered and academic practices of male and female practitioners and students. This 
does not relieve teachers of responsibility for addressing such contradictions and the 
difficulties that they present for students within their classes. It does, however, imply 
that solutions cannot be found at an individual level. In addition to administrative 
routes, of which the appointment of a disability officer is an example, the educational 
implications of contradictory gender relations might also be addressed through explicit 
curriculum content and reflexive activities analysing gender relations within classes and 
institutions. 
These reflections demonstrate, perhaps, how the process of writing this thesis, while not 
providing answers to specific questions about my own education, has provided a 
framework within which my experience can be described more coherently. The process 
has also helped me to become more analytical about my practice, and to consider 
strategies for making my own teaching more accessible to students, both in the 
articulation of disciplinary boundaries and in the negotiation of gender relations within 
the classroom. It would seem to me that the description of classroom interaction 
developed in the thesis might also be useful to other teachers in higher education in 
developing a more analytical understanding of their own teaching. 
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7.6. Antagonism and overdetermination: a picture of the social 
The thesis has presented a description of student positions as constituted in relation to 
the discipline they are studying, the institution in which they are studying, and 
hegemonic codes of masculinity and femininity. Each of these discursive fields is 
conceptualised as an incomplete identity, instantiated within specific contexts which 
overdetermine different aspects of student positions. The analysis of the empirical data 
has revealed specific differences between the student positions produced in relation to 
both different institutions and different disciplines. 
Political Thought, it has been argued, constructs antagonisms both in relation to 
feminine positions and in relation to the culture of South University and its students. 
Codes of appropriate feminine behaviour are in opposition to the criteria of 
assertiveness and self-expression associated with both the social position and the 
methodological structure of Political Thought. Similarly, low expectations in terms of 
student reading and participation within South University Political Thought produced a 
culture of deference to both tutor and text that was in conflict with the dominant mode 
of engagement with the concepts and language of the discipline. Meanwhile, the 
academic success of upper middle class male West University students and the identity 
of Political Thought as a discipline of the governing classes overdetermine each other. 
This has produced a depressing picture of the re-iteration of social hierarchies of both 
gender and class within undergraduate Political Thought classes. The marginalisation of 
both female students and new university students, it has been argued, is overdetermined 
by the position of Political Thought as a discipline closely related to the establishment 
and to socially dominant positions, both in terms of its subject matter, and also in terms 
of its narrow methodological structure. 
In contrast, the multiple methods and descriptive, or critical subject matter of American 
Literature combined with the relatively access oriented admissions policies of both 
North and East University appear to produce a more egalitarian array of student 
positions, despite the difference in entry qualifications required by the two universities. 
Thus, despite the generic antagonisms between academic discourse and feminine 
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positions, the marginalisation of specific groups of students was not as apparent in the 
American Literature classes as in the Political Thought classes. It would appear, then, 
that when similarly politicised features of different discursive fields overlap, the effects 
of the stark divide within our university system, which tends to simply reproduce 
existing social divisions, may be mitigated. The critical, politicised position of 
American Literature and the explicit opportunities it offers within the curriculum to 
address issues of gender, class and racial thinking through a variety of legitimate 
methodologies are complemented by the intake of universities that have a positive 
approach to widening participation. The intentions of widening participation, in turn, 
are complemented by the varied methodological approaches and politicised curriculum 
content of American Literature. 
In both cases, we can describe the findings of this study as observations of the dispersal 
of a multiplicity of social instances that coalesce around a shared signifying position in 
relation to the symbolic order. The explicit politicisation of practice can be identified as 
a signifying position shared by both access-oriented higher education institutions and 
contemporary approaches to literary and cultural analysis. The findings presented here 
suggest that this shared signifying position can have productive effects in relation to 
equity and participation in higher education, in so far as it can overdetermine the 
codification and stabilisation of previously marginal and unstable student positions. In 
contrast, the description of the antagonisms within undergraduate Political Thought 
classes identifies weaknesses in the overall symbolic articulation of the field. The 
differential positioning of different social groups in the Political Thought classes reveals 
the inconsistency of claims to autonomy and equity made in relation to both the 
disciplinary curriculum and the institutions. The interdependent, privileged positions 
represented by both West University male students and the disciplinary field of Political 
Thought are in part maintained by this illusion of autonomy, which conceals their 
privileged status. This assertion of autonomy, however, is destabilised by the revelation 
of contradictory inequalities in the comparative positions of both students and 
disciplines in relation to the social. 
Contradictions within the discursive fields of gender, disciplines and institutions can, 
then, be identified at two levels: firstly, in relation to claims of equity within current 
higher education institutions and curricula; and secondly, in relation to claims to 
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autonomy and independence made on behalf of both academic disciplines and higher 
education institutions. Such claims can be described as antagonistic, because in order to 
sustain them, other identities - in particular the identities of students from subordinate 
social groups - must be symbolised in ways that repress significant features of their 
social constitution. What is needed is a re-codification of these subordinate positions. 
The analysis of the American Literature classes presented in this study suggests that, at 






Infonnation for participants 
Outline of my research 
The topic of my research is the relationship between disciplines, pedagogy and students 
in hi~er e~uca~ion. I ~ do~ng a com?arison ~cros~ institutions (an 'old'/highly 
selectIve umversIty and a new /access onented unIVersIty) and across two disciplines 
(Political Theory and American Studies/Literature). The fieldwork element will involve 
videoing a series of 4 or 5 sessions and interviewing the tutor and students about the 
discussion that took place in class. I am interested in the way in which a conception of 
what counts as disciplinary knowledge is produced by both teacher and students in class 
discussions. 
Interviews 
I will video the weekly sessions and then I will ask if you would be willing to take part 
in an interview about the session. 
Written work 
It would also be useful for me to see examples of the written work you are producing 
for the course. I will ask your tutor if it okay for me to photocopy some of your essays 
after they have marked them, but I will not photocopy or look at any essays without 
your pennIssIon. 
Use of the research data 
In anything that I write arising from this research, pseudonyms will be used for both 
institutions and individuals, and as far as possible, any specific identifying features will 
be altered. I will not speak to anyone in your university about information that you 
provide. 
Transcripts, videos and tapes of classes and tapes of interviews will normally only be 
viewed/listened to by myself. However, in the university where I am studying, there are 
sometimes classes or seminars to help students with their analysis. It is possible that I 
might wish to present small sections of data at one of these sessions. If you would prefer 
that I do not show any data that you have participated in at one of these sessions, please 
let me know. 
Feedback 
I will be transcribing the sessions that I video, and I will e-mail you copies of the 
transcripts (unless you don't want me to). . . 
I will arrange to come and present some of the results of my research at your umversIty. 
If you would like any further information, you can contact me bye-mail: 
clalapping@hotmail.com, or by post, at: Flat 7,1 Bishop's Road, N6 4HP 




All names have been changed 
1. West University Political Thought Class 
Infonnation from students who completed a background infonnation questionnaire 
(completed in class). 
Name Age Previous education Parents school Ethnic 
(Type of school, highest previous leaving age background 
qualifications) Or (inferred) 
hiehest qualification 
Tom 19 State comprehensive Doctorate (White UK) 
3 A's at A level 
Jake 19 State comprehenseive Both post graduate (White UK) 
5 A levels qualifications 
Rachel 20 Independent, fee paying 15/16 (White Welsh) 
3 A levels CSE / 0 level 
Megan 20 Fee paying Catholic/ 18 (White US) 
Ivy league US university 
Ruby 19 Independent, fee paying, 3 A levels, 1 AlS Doctorate (UK Asian) 
level 
Mark 20 French State School in the US + 1 year of Masters French 
'Prepare' for les grands ecoles. 
Corrine 20 Independent, fee paying Masters Not known 
4 A levels 
Sarah 18 Private International School in Brazil, Degree Not known 
Austria and Germany. 
International Baccaleaureat 
Charlotte 18 State Comprehensive. Doctorate (White UK) 
5 A levels 
Infonnation collected about other students in the group. 
Name Age Other information Information about 
background 
(inferred) 
Michael 18? Studying Politics and Economics. Made referenced to (White UK) 
lifestyles that suggested a wealthy, upper middle class 
background. 
Greg 18? Told me he had applied to Cambridge, but chosen West (White UK, privately 
University for the urban social life. educated) 
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2. South University Political Thought Class 
Infonnation from students who completed a background information questionnaire 
(circulated bye-mail) 
Name Age Previous education Parents school Ethnic background (Type of school, leaving age (inferred) 
highest previous qualifications) Qr 
highest 
qualification 
Laura 20 State Comprehensive + FE college, Degree Born in Trinidad, 
HND MusiclDance secondary education in 
UK 
Gabor 28 Soviet schools in Hungary. Also Postgraduate (Hungarian) 
schools in Algeria, MonKolia, US 
Guy 18 State Comprehensive Degree (White UK) 
D at A level 
Andy 18 State Comprehensive o level (White UK) 
A level 
Will 30 State Comprehensive 15 (White UK) 
2 A levels 
Infonnation collected about other students in the group. 
Name Mature Other information Information about 
student- background 
YeslNo (inferred) 
Nadia No Worked for an MP in her year off Mother Polish, came to 
UK as a student. 
Omar No? Spasmodic attendance. (North African?) 
Waheed Yes Sometimes couldn't attend because of work Egyptian. Did an Access 
commitments. Sometimes wrote for an Egyptian course in the UK before 
newspaper. Poor English, so couldn't easily starting the degree. 
follow the classes. 
Tamsin No? Slightly spasmodic attendance. Sometimes left (black UK) 
before the seminar. Job? 
Ozra Yes? Very keen, asked a lot of questions in class. (Turkish?) 
Katrin Yes? Interested in animal rights. Slightly irregular (East European) 
attendance. Rare!y ~oke in class. 
Julie Yes Didn't sp_eak durin~ observed sessions. (BlackUK'Q 
Simon No? Didn't speak dUl'iI:!& observed sessions. ~(White UK?) 
3. North University American Literature Class 
Infonnation from students who completed a background infonnation questionnaire 
(completed in class) 
Name/ Age Previous education Parents school leaving Ethnic background! 
Year of (Type of school, age languages spoken at 
degree highest previous Or home 
qualification~ h!ghes(qualification 
Bashir 20 Independent, fee paying Not known English + Bengali 
3rd year A levels 
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Ambia 24 State Comprehensive Pakistani higher Urdu 
3rd year A levels education 
qualifications 
Razia 20 State comprehensive and FE 21 and 16, Indian English and Bengali 
3rd year college Qualifications 
3 A levels 
David 20 State Comprehensive Masters English and Polish 
3rd year A levels 
Rajpal 21 State comprehensive 16 Syneti, went to school in 
3rd year A levels Bangaladesh 
Sevket 21 State comprehensive + FE o levels? English and Turkish 
3rd year college 
A levels (BBC) 
Ranjiv 22 State comprehensive + FE o levels Creole 
2nd Year college 
3 A levels, grade A 
Tessa 23 State comprehensive degrees English 
3rd Year A levels + Diploma 
Foundation Art 
Rowan 20 State comprehensive degree English 
2nd Year 5 A levels, grades A 
Sue 21 US high school Masters in Business English 
3rd 
Ed 22 State grammar MA in English English 
2nd Year A levels 
Martha 21 US high school Masters English 
3rd year 
Caroline 20 State comprehensive o levels English 
2nd year A levels 
Peter 21 State comprehensive 16 English 
3rd year A levels 
Josephine 20 State comprehensive o levels English (Black UK?) 
3rd year A levels 
Joanne 19 State comprehensive CSE English 
2nd Year A levels 
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Leela 21 State comprehensive + FE o level English 
2nd year college 
A levels 
Ashita 19 State comprehensive + FE 18 I A levels English, Urdu, Punjabi 2nd year college 
A levels 
Meera 19 State comprehensive + FE Not known English and Punj abi 2nd year college 
A levels 
Rose 21 State + 3 years fee paying, Doctorate Finnish and English 3rd Year in Finland and the USA 
High School Diploma 
Finn 25 State comprehensive Not known English, Welsh 
3rd Year A levels 
Infonnation collected about other students in the group. 
Name Age Other information Information about 
background 
(inferred) 
Jonathan 20? Was on a one semester exchange programme. (Black US) 
Dean 20? 3 rd year student. Had done previous modules on 
slavery. 
4. East University American Literature Class 
Infonnation collected about students in the group 
Name Mature Other information 
student? 
(yes Ino) 
Monica No A levels in Media, English and 
Information about background 
(inferred) 
Mother currently completing a law 
Sociol~. d~gree at East University. Father Iranian 
Hamid Yes Sometimes works as a translator. Completed a degree in Iran before 
coming to the UK. 
Helen yes Works in a drug rehabilitation (Black UK?) 
centre 
Gr~ no (White UK) 
Errol Yes Full time job sometimes prevents (Black UK?) 
him attending class. 
Francesca Yes Changed to morning class Italian 
because of work commitments. 
Edward Yes Originally left school at 16 and (White UK) 
worked in the army. 
Christine No On exchange programme from (White US) 
US universi!Y 




Student Interview Schedule - Example 
N.B. The structure of the interview remained the same throughout. The extracts and the list of concepts 
varied for each interview. 
Introduction. 
I am interested in the relationship between the subject/discipline you are studying, the students and the 
teacher, and how these three together produce knowledge in the classroom. 
First of all I am going to ask you some questions about the session I observed and about some of the 
concepts used in the session. Then I will ask you a few questions about your perception of the class, the 
other students, and the teacher. 
If there are any questions you do not wish to answer, or if you have any questions about anything, please 
say. 
[Throughout the interview, add probe questions to get students to expand on explanations about the 
discipline. ] 
1. How do you feel about attending these classes? [Do you look forward to them? What aspects do 
you look forward to/ not look forward to? What is the purpose of the sessions? What is your role 
in the sessions?] 
2. What would you say that last week's session was about? 
3. Here are some concepts that were used or discussed in the session (Show list on next page): 
• Can you define one that you find comparatively easy? 
• Can you define one that you find comparatively difficult? 
• W ouId you use these terms yourself? 
• How did you feel about the discussion/use of these terms in the class? 
4. Now I want you to talk about several small sections of the lesson. 
1. p. 2, tutor: 'what he's saying here ... ' to p. 3, tutor: ' ... the collapse of civilisation as we know it.. ' 
Why did you ask this question? 
How did you feel about the tutor's response? 
2. p. 5, : 'It's just that in saying ... ' to p. 6, , ' ... individual circumstances of each society.' 
What did you think of the discussion at this point? 
Did you agree with any of the points made? 
Can you relate this part of the discussion to Marx's ideas? 
3. p. 8, : 'I would argue that actually ... ' to :' .... So, they just sit there . .' 
What did you think of the discussion at this point? 
Could you explain the point you were making in a bit more detail? 
How did you feel about the response to your contribution? 
4. p. 1, 'Could you explain dialectical...' to Richard, p. 1: ' ... so it's an active materialism . .' 
What did you think of this question? 
What did you think of the tutor's response? 
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I also have a couple of questions about the session 2 weeks ago on Rousseau and Burke. First, to remind 
you a bit, I've go a list of the concepts from that session ... 
4, p. 4 Q about difference between Rousseau and Marx .. 
In what way did you feel that Marx and Rousseau are similar? 
How did you feel about the tutor's response? 
5. p. 1: Q about French revolution and Rousseau. 
What was confusing you about the relationship between Rousseau and the French revolution? 
How did you feel about tutor's response to your question? 
5. Are there any other points in the lesson that you would like to comment on? 
6. How would you define the subject/discipline you are studying in this course/module? 
7. What is your impression, very generally of the other students in the class? Are there some 
students who make particularly useful contributions? 
8. What is your impression of the teacher? What is your impression of the teacher's position in 
relation to the subject / discipline you are studying? Do you have a sense of your own position 
within the discipline? 
9. Have you got any questions? 
Is there anything you would like to add to any of the areas we have discussed? 
10. Part time/full time? age? Job? Educational background! exams? 









Slave society - feudal system - modem capitalism 
Social change / political change 




Representation vs delegation 
The wages of the average worker 
The withering away of the state 
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APPENDIX 4 
Tutor Interview Schedule - example: East University American Literature tutor 
Hannah - 6th November 01 
1. Are there any points you want to talk about from the sessions? 
2. What do you see as the purpose of these sessions? 
3. I've picked out a couple of sections to look at. .. 
a. Olaudah, p. 3 student's use of' detailed .. ' - what did you think of what 
she was saying in general? What do you think she means when she uses 
the term 'detailed'? 
b. Olaudah, p. 4 - 5 : student's description of Paine's language ... is the 
saying the same thing about rhetoric as you were? 
c. 2nd and 9th October: Talking about sexuality and race ... do you think this 
requires reflexive analysis on the part of the students? 
d. student on the slave trade 9th Oct, p. 15 , what did you think was going 
on? What do you think his idea of what he is studying might be? Is it the 
same as what you think he is studying? 
4. I've also picked out a couple of points about the mode of analysis ... 
a. 9th October, p. 3. metaphorical rather than logical deduction? How 
would you describe the difference between the kind of arguments you 
construct in Literature and arguments in philosophy? Which do you think 
is more difficult? 
b. How is this module different from other modules in the literature 
programme? American studies vs English lit? 
c. How do you decide what reading to prioritise, i.e. text over theory? 
5. Are there any other points you would like to raise? 
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